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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of rigid designation. In the ten years
since Kripke called attention to the notion, a variety of claims have
been made about rigid designators. Many of the claims are problematic,
and some of them are in direct conflict with others. The effect is to
raise doubts about the notion. The principal goal of this thesis is a
clear statement of what rigid designators are and what is special about
them.
The first part of the thesis offers a definition of rigid
designation and defends it against others that have been proposed. The
concern is whether there is a distinct notion here at all. I conclude
that there is an intuitively well-motivated, theoretically interesting
notion of rigid designation. Furthermore, it can be defined perspicuously
in terms of necessity de re. I argue that any adequate definition must
at least resort to such a modal operator, but it need not employ the full
paraphernalia of possible worlds.
The second part of the thesis explores the logic of singular
terms in modal contexts. The goal is to determine the logical properties
that rigid designators have and other singular terms lack. To this end,
various formal modal languages are emphasized. I conclude that rigid
designators have a number of important properties--e.g. the substitutivity
of identity holds for them. But they do not have some of the properties
that they are often claimed to have. In particular, differences in the
scope of a rigid designator in a modal context can affect truth-value.
Thus rigid designators are not scope neutral.
Much of the second part of the thesis is devoted to accounting
for why rigid designators might be thought to be scope neutral. This con-
cern leads to some interesting conclusions about the regimentation of de
re modality. For instance, the tendency to liken rigid designators to
the constants of standard logic is found to be a major source of trouble.
I show that constants like those in standard logic cannot be introduced
in the formal modal languages considered in the thesis without in the
3process rendering these languages philosophically uninteresting. Simi-
larly, a previously unexamined approach to quantified modal logic is found
to conform unusually well with intuitions about the scope characteristics
of rigid designators, and with essentialist intuitions generally. I
indicate ways in which this approach to regimenting de re modality, which
distinguishes between normal and recherche predicates, is more promising
than other approaches.
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Chapter I
Introduct ion
Saul Kripke's lectures "Naming and Necessity" and "Identity and
Necessity" have attracted a good deal of philosophic attention since their
publication. One of the central notions in the lectures is rigid designa-
tion. The idea of a rigid designator is easy to motivate. Many singular
referring expressions can switch reference when they occur in counter-
factual contexts. For example, 'the inventor of bifocals' does not denote
Benjamin Franklin on one reading of 'the inventor of bifocals might have
been born in the ninth century'. Rigid designators do not suffer from
such vagaries of reference. Thus, they would provide a way of maintaining
reference to specific objects even in counterfactual and modal statements.
A pivotal thesis of Kripke's lectures is that proper names in
natural language are rigid designators. Many of his most important argu-
ments turn on this thesis. It is not altogether surprising, therefore,
that a good deal of controversy has developed around the thesis. Un-
fortunately, this controversy has been less than illuminating. One
difficulty with it is that different disputants seem to take the thesis
to mean quite different things. One reason for this is that there are a
number of related notions with which rigid designation might be confused,
and there have been a number of related claims about proper names that
might be confused with the claim Kripke is making. It is also in part a
result of the brevity with which Kripke introduces the notion. He gives
a possible worlds characterization ("call something a rigid designator if
in any possible world it designates the same object"), a single paradigm
('the square root of 25'), and an intuitive test involving a schema that
is open to different readings. I think Kripke's point comes through
clearly. Still, given the leverage provided by the thesis that names
are rigid, he might well have anticipated a tendency to misconstrue
it.
There is a need, then, to clarify the notion of rigid designa-
tion. Such clarification will be my immediate concern in this dissertation.
I will not as such address the question whether proper names are rigid.
Indeed, I will give comparatively little attention to natural language.
Rather, the goal will be a clear statement of what rigid designators are
and of what properties they have in suitable regimented languages.
Following the publication of Kripke's lectures, a number of
distinct definitions have been offered of rigid designation, and a number
of conflicting claims have been made about the logical properties of rigid
designators. The natural question to ask in these circumstances is whether
there is a specific intuitive notion of rigid designation at all. I argue
in the next chapter that the answer to this question is yes--there is a
naturally motivated, theoretically interesting notion of rigid designation,
indeed the one that Kripke points out. I offer a formally explicit
definition of rigid designation and then show that this definition isolates
the naturally motivated, theoretically interesting notion from other close-
ly related ones. This definition is then defended at length against others
in the literature.
Given a formally explicit definition of rigid designation, the
obvious next question is, what are the distinctive logical properties of
rigid designators. The definition put forward in the next chapter uses
'0', the necessity operator of modal logic. No formal interpretation of
'O' is given in the chapter, however, so that its use there is primarily for
perspicuity. But equipped with a definition framed in the syntax of
9quantified modal logic and facing a question about logical properties, the
natural approach is to concentrate on the logic that rigid designators, so
defined, have within quantified modal logic. This is the approach taken
in the long final chapter.
Quantified modal logic remains controversial. One source of
this controversy is the complaint that "it leads us back into the meta-
physical jungle of Aristotelian essentialism." But as we will see, this
complaint has little force for someone studying rigid designation; rigid
designation is part of this same jungle. Indeed, Aristotelian essentialism
amounts to the view that certain predicates are necessarily true of some
individuals and not true at all of others. If the goal is to find a
regimented framework in which to express such claims prior to evaluating
them, then the appropriate stance to adopt toward the complaint against
essentialism is that it should be held in abeyance. This is the stance I
adopt throughout. But this stance does not eliminate the controversy
surrounding quantified modal logic. Having granted that the goal is a
framework in which to express essentialist claims, the question remains
whether the framework of quantified modal logic is adequate. In particular,
is a single necessity operator--e.g. '('--sufficient for expressing both
claims that certain sentences are necessarily true and also claims that
certain predicates are necessarily true of certain individuals? There are
reasons to suspect not. Efforts to formalize quantified modal logic have
more often than not yielded theorems like 'O(3x)Fx ~ (3x)QFx' and
'(-x)aFx 0C(3x)Fx'--the so-called Barcan and Buridan formulas--that are
unacceptable to most proponents of essentialism. Indeed, many quantified
modal logics in the literature contain as theorems denials of such basic
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essentialist claims as (i) there are contingently existing objects and
(ii) predicates can be necessarily true of contingently existing objects.
In addition to these worries, concerns have been expressed about the
interpretation of free variables in modal contexts. The issue raised
is whether one can coherently quantify into modal contexts. Part of its
force comes from doubts about the logic of singular terms in quantified
modal logic.
The question whether the framework of quantified modal logic is
adequate remains in the background throughout most of the long chapter on
the logic of rigid designators. But it is nevertheless the question of
ultimate concern. Of course, our approach to it is somewhat indirect.
The immediate question concerns the logic of singular reference within the
formal setting of quantified modal logic. But evidence that the behavior
of singular terms in this setting is idiosyncratic or counterintuitive is
evidence against the adequacy of quantified modal logic. In particular,
quantified modal logic is put in doubt to the extent that the logical
properties of rigid designators in it are not compatible with those that
rigid designators have in informal settings.
Because of this question in the background, the logic of rigid
designators turns out to be more interesting than one might have antici-
pated. As expected, the substitutivity of identity holds for rigid desig-
nators. But contrary to claims prevalent in the literature, rigid designators
are not "scope neutral"--i.e., the truth-value of modal sentences containing
rigid designators is often sensitive to the scope of these designators.
Much of the long final chapter is devoted to determining the significance
of this seeming discrepancy with informal expectations. Two important
11
results emerge. First, philosophically interesting modal quantificational
languages cannot contain constants of the kind found in standard logic.
The tendency to think otherwise is a major source of confusion both about
rigid designation and about quantified modal logic. Second, there is a
modal quantificational framework that conforms well both with essentialist
intuitions and with informal expectations about the scope characteristics
of rigid designators. This framework appears to be the most promising of
those that have been proposed for regimenting essentialist reasoning.
Hence, instead of challenging the adequacy of quantified modal logic, our
results lend a particular version of it support. The logic of singular
terms in modal contexts appears to be perspicuously captured by this
quantified modal logic.
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Chapter II
Rigid Designation and Its Variants
13
Michael Slote claims that in "Identity and Necessity" and "Naming
and Necessity" Kripke has blurred a distinction between two kinds of rigid
designation.. Slote calls the one kind inclusively rigid and the other
exclusively rigid. On his account, a designator is inclusively rigid if
and only if, should it pick out a certain object in some one possible
world, then it picks out that same object in every other possible world
in which that object exists. By contrast, a designator a is exclusively
rigid if and only if it designates some actual object and rit is not logi-
cally possible that d be something other than the thing that in fact is <
is true.
In "Naming and Necessity" Kripke says, "call something a rigid
designator if in any possible world it designates the same object;"2 and
he adds that of course the object in question need not exist in every
possible world. This specification corresponds to Slote's condition for
inclusive rigidity. Yet on the very next page, in arguing intuitively
that proper names are rigid designators, Kripke says, "although the man
(Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he
might not have been Nixon." This phrasing of an intuitive test for rigid
designation suggests Slote's condition for exclusive rigidity. Accord-
ingly, if Slote is correct that the two kinds of rigid designation are
distinct, then there is some evidence that Kripke has blurred the distinc-
tion.
Slote is not alone in complaining about Kripke's specification
of what a rigid designator is. In calling attention to the ambiguity of
Kripke's initial specification, Hugh Chandler says that Kripke may be
offering any of the following definitions: 3
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Definition I: Given a term that, in the real world, designates
an object, the term is a "rigid designator" if, and only if,
every possible world in which that object exists is one with
respect to which the term designates the object.
Definition II: Given a term that, in the real world, designates
an object, the term is a "rigid designator" if, and only if,
every possible world with respect to which the term designates
at all is one with respect to which it designates that object.
Definition III: Given a term that, in the real world, desig-
nates an object, the term is a "rigid designator" if, and
only if, (1) every possible world in which that object exists
is one with respect to which the term designates the object, and
(2) every possible world with respect to which the term desig-
nates at all is one with respect to which it designates that
object.
Chandler does not go on to discuss the relative merits of these three
alternatives, for he is concerned with a different question.
Slote's and Chandler's remarks raise the question whether we have
a clear notion of rigid designation at all. It is one thing not to have
successfully defined a clear notion and quite another not to have a clear
notion to define. Which is true in the case of rigid designation? This
is the central concern of this chapter. I shall begin with Slote's dis-
tinction between inclusive and exclusive rigidity. Once that distinction
is clear, I will consider among other topics the relation between Slote's
two conditions and Chandler's three definitions. For the moment I will
not be concerned with whether proper names or any other linguistic
entities are in fact rigid designators.
A difficulty with Slote's statement of the condition for ex-
clusive rigidity is that substitution instances of the schema it relies
15
on are open to more than one reading. In particular, substitution
instances in which '4' is replaced by a definite description suffer from
the standard sort of scope ambiguity. Including the phrase 'in fact' in
the schema does not eliminate such ambiguities; it merely calls attention
to the need to pick out the relevant reading. Thus Slote would better
have said that a is an exclusively rigid designator if and only if e picks
out some actual entity and rit is not logically possible that c be some-
thing other than the thing that in fact is L' is true on a certain reading.
But what is this reading? Consider the following definition:
An instance of the schema
is an exclusively rigid designator if and only if (1)
the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x) [(Vy)(.*.y.*. y=x) & O((Vy)(...y... =0 y=x)
is true.
It eliminates the ambiguities. And it seems to capture what Slote wants.
On the one hand, according to it 'the inventor of bifocals' is not ex-
clusively rigid. For Thomas Jefferson might have been the inventor of
bifocals. On the other hand, according to it 'the thing which is identical
with Scott' appears to be exclusively rigid. For intuitively the follow-
ing appears to be necessary: if y is the thing which is identical with
Scott, then y is identical with Scott.
Two points need to be made about (1). First, defining exclusive
rigidity for definite descriptions rather than for terms in general need
not involve any loss of generality. Quine's method of eliminating names
from regimented languages--e.g., use the predicate 'Nixonizes' and a
definite description to eliminate 'Nixon'--gives us one way for (I) to
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handle names. Or we might say, for example, that 'Nixon' is a rigid
designator only if the definite description 'the individual that is
identical with Nixon' is. By framing the definition in terms of definite
descriptions, we can eliminate scope ambiguities completely.
The second point about (1) is that it employs modality de re.
That is, the modal operator occurs within the scope of the existential
quantifier. Consequently, whether (1) yields a precise definition depends
in part on whether we can make sense of modality de re. I do not want to
worry about this here. For now let us assume that an adequate account of
modality de re can be given. The force of the governing schema of (1)
is then clear. Its existential quantifier requires that there exist an
actual individual, and its modal clause requires that something be
necessarily true of that individual. Of course, if the reader insists,
the schema is open to possible world interpretation. I am reluctant to
introduce such an interpretation at this point, not only because there is
controversy as to which possible world interpretation of quantified
modal logic is best, but also because I am uncertain whether a possible
world interpretation does anything to clarify this schema. I have framed
the definition in terms of a schema with a modal operator rather than in
terms of possible worlds in order to remain neutral on questions of how
to explicate modality de re.
How are we to state with comparable precision Slote's condition
for inclusive rigidity? First note that his statement of this condition,
unlike his statement of the condition for exclusive rigidity, does not
expressly require the designator to designate an actual individual. 7
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Nevertheless, to keep the conditions parallel with one another, I will
assume that inclusive rigidity does require this of a designator. We
might then mistakenly try to exploit the parallelism by proposing the
following:
An instance of the schema
(1x)(.--x...)
is an inclusively rigid designator if and only if (2)
the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x) (y)(-.-y... - y=x) & O(Vy)(y=x = .. y...)]
is true.
The attractive feature of this proposal is that the modal clause in
the schema is the converse of the modal clause in the schema for ex-
clusive rigidity. Thus, if the proposal were right, we could readily
account for any blurring of the distinction between the two kinds of
rigidity. And we could construct a further kind of rigid designation,
as follows:
An instance of the schema
( x)(-..x...)
is a completely rigid designator if and only if (3)
the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x) (y)(...y... = y=x) & o(Vy)(...y. _ y=x)]
is true.
This third kind of rigid designation will yet be of interest. But (2)
will not do as a definition of inclusive rigidity, for the last clause is
not strong enough. In possible worlds terminology, for a definite descrip-
tion to be inclusively rigid, not only must it be true of an object in every
possible world in which that object exists, but it must be uniquely true
18
of that object in every such world. The modal clause of the governing
schema of (2), unlike those of (1) and (3), does not require uniqueness.
The following definition secures the desired uniqueness:
An instance of the schema
(1x)(.*x.x--)
is an inclusively rigid designator if and only if
the corresponding instance of the schema (4)
(3x) [(V)(y***Y.. e y=x) & O(V'y)(y=x >
(..y*..* & (Vw)((***w-- a w=x)))]
is true.
The sort of possible world interpretation which Slote adopts in his book
indicates that the governing schema of (4) is what he wants. On the one
hand, according to (4) 'the inventor of bifocals' is not inclusively
rigid. For in some possible world Franklin exists and in that world is
not the inventor of bifocals. On the other hand, according to it 'the
thing which is identical with Scott' appears to be inclusively rigid. For
intuitively if in a possible world there is an individual that is identical
with the actual Scott, then in that world that individual is uniquely the
thing which is identical with Scott.
Four governing schemata have been singled out in (1) through
(4):
Ox) P(Vy)(.-.y... e y=x) & (Vy)(...y... y=x)] (5)
(3x) (Vy)(0.y.y.. -- y=x) & 0(Vy)(y=x : ... y...)) (6)
(3x) (Vy)(---y-m.- y=x) & O(Vy)(--.y--- E y=x) (7)
(3x) [(Vy)(...y.. , = y=x) & Q(Vy)(y=x o (8)
(...y... r (Vw)(...w... w=x)))]
What are the relations among these four? As already remarked, (6) does
not entail (8), though obviously (8) entails (6).10 (7) entails each of
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the others, but is not entailed by any one of them. That is, if a
designator is completely rigid, then it is both inclusively and exclusive-
ly rigid. Furthermore, since the conjunction of (8) and (5) entails (7),
a designator which is both inclusively and exclusively rigid is completely
rigid. What remains, then, is to examine the examples Slote uses to argue
that an exclusively rigid designator need not be inclusively rigid, and
conversely.
Slote's example of an exclusively rigid designator that is not
inclusively rigid is 'the being that is identical with Nixon and also a
politician'. Intuitively it satisfies (1). For, letting 'n' stand for
'Nixon' and 'P' for 'is a politician', (9) is intuitively true:
O(y) (y=n & Py) = y=n] (9)
But this designator does not similarly satisfy (4), for intuitively (10)
is false:
CI(Vy)[y=n = (y=n & Py & (Vw)((w=n & Pw) = w=n))] (10)
(10) is false because, of course, Nixon might have existed and yet not
been a politician. We agree with Slote, then, that an exclusively rigid
designator need not be inclusively rigid.
Slote's example of an inclusively rigid designator that is not
exclusively rigid is 'the being that came from Harry', where 'Harry' is
the name of the particular sperm from which Slote himself originated.
The reason it is not exclusively rigid is that the sperm in question
might have united with a different egg and thereby yielded an individual
other than Michael Slote. Thus (ll) is intuitively false, where 's'
stands for 'Michael Slote' and 'H' for 'comes from Harry':
O(Vy)Hy >y y=s (11)
20
The question then is whether, as Slote claims, 'the being that came from
Harry' is inclusively rigid. Slote bases his claim on the supposition
that his coming from Harry is one of his essential attributes. I will not
quarrel with this supposition here. But notice that even if this attribute
is essential to him, it may not be essentially unique to him. Slote might
have had an identical twin, and then two different individuals would have
12
come from Harry.2 Hence, 'the being that came from Harry' is not in-
clusively rigid. It does not satisfy (4), although it does satisfy the
mistaken definition of inclusive rigidity, (2).
Is there an inclusively rigid designator that is not exclusively
rigid? We might try to get around my objection by modifying Slote's
example to read 'the first-born being that came from Harry'. But this
does not help. For, though the attribute invoked is one that would hold
uniquely if at all, there is no reason to think that it is an essential
attribute. Isn't it logically possible for identical twins to be born
in either order?
To get a clear example, Slote needs an attribute that on the one
hand holds essentially and essentially uniquely of a certain object, but
on the other hand might hold of some other object were the first object
not to exist. In possible world terms, Slote requires an attribute that
(i) holds uniquely of some object in every possible world in which that
object exists and (ii) holds of some other object in some other possible
world. It would be nice to find an everyday attribute of this sort since
contrived examples are less compelling. But I have not found one. Of
course, this should not be surprising. It is a direct reflection of the
problem central to Kripke's lectures, viz, the problem of fixing the
21
reference of an expression that is rigidly to designate a contingent
entity. We seem not to know of an everyday attribute that is essential
and essentially unique to a contingent object. If we did, we could
readily fix the reference of a name of that object, and in the process
give that name a sense.
Nevertheless, we can get a designator that on the intuitive
interpretation of logical necessity is inclusively, but not exclusively
rigid. In particular, we can construct an example in parallel with the
one Slote gives us of a designator which is exclusively, but not inclusively
rigid. The example may seem awkward, but it accomplishes what we want,
and it is not without precedent in the literature. Consider the designator,
'the thing which is identical with Nixon, or should nothing be identical
with Nixon, the thing which is identical with 0'. The idea here springs
from Frege's suggestion that failure of reference be eliminated from
regimented languages by stipulating that otherwise denotationless names
14denote 0. In symbolic notation the example might be expressed as
follows, where 'n' stands for 'Nixon':
(ix)[x=n v (-(3z)(z=n) & x=0) (12)
However, this formulation will unfortunately require us to adopt a free-
logic if its second clause is not to be vacuous. A better formulation
is therefore as follows, where 'N' stands for 'Nixonizes':1 5
(Ix)rNx v (''(3!z)(Nz) & x=0)J (13)
This designator is not exclusively rigid since it is presumably possible
for Nixon not to have existed, in which case it would designate 0 rather
than Nixon. Thus (14) is intuitively false:
O(Vy) (Ny v (~(,! z)(Nz) & y=O)) > y=nJ (14)
22
But since (15) seems true, this designator appears to be inclusively
rigid:
(Vy) [y=n I (Ny v (O(3! z)(Nz) & y=O)) &
(Vw)((Nw v (o(3!Iz)(Nz) & w=0)) w=n])
That is, intuitively it is necessary that if Nixon exists, then the
description holds of him and of him uniquely.
We therefore agree with Slote that an inclusively rigid desig-
nator need not be exclusively rigid. This example, together with the
parallel one that Slote gave us earlier, shows that neither an inclusively
nor an exclusively rigid designator need be completely rigid. The three
notions are distinct.
II
Slote's proposed distinction has led us to define three dif-
ferent notions of rigid designation--inclusive, exclusive, and complete
rigidity. The three correspond to Chandler's alternative definitions of
rigid designation, quoted earlier. The correspondence is easy to see
once we give the usual possible world interpretation to the governing
schemata of (4), (1), and (3). For consider a definite description that
successfully picks out a certain object in the actual world. Such a de-
scription is inclusively rigid provided that the actually designated
object uniquely satisfies the description in every possible world in which
it exists. What inclusive rigidity leaves open is whether some other ob-
ject satisfies the description in a possible world in which the actually
designated object does not exist. By contrast, a definite description is
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exclusively rigid provided that in no possible world does any object
other than the actually designated object satisfy the description. What
exclusive rigidity leaves open is whether there are possible worlds in
which the actually designated object exists, but fails to satisfy the
description. Finally, a definite description is completely rigid provided
that the actually designated object satisfies the description in every
possible world in which it exists and in no possible world does any other
object satisfy the description. The only differences between these
characterizations and Chandler's are matters of wording. I persist in
the view that neutral definitions in terms of a de re modal operator are
preferable to definitions in terms of possible worlds. Still, the corres-
pondence between Chandler's and our definitions is interesting. It is
evidence that our definitions have been stated correctly, and it is evidence
that we have successfully identified the principal notions of rigid desig-
nation.
An obvious question, given these three notions, is whether any
one of them is of more interest than the others. Neither Chandler nor
Slote addresses this question. In offering three possible definitions of
rigid designation, Chandler prompts the question. But instead of choosing
one, he develops a separate argument around each of them for an independent
point. Slote, having called our attention to a potential difficulty, pro-
ceeds to restrict his attention to what we have called completely rigid
designation.
Of course, since what is of more interest from one point of
view may not be from another, the question is vague as it stands. The
way in which Kripke introduces the notion of rigid designation suggests
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two more precise questions. First, Kripke introduces the notion by appeal-
ing to an intuitive distinction between rigid and nonrigid designators, as
illustrated by some paradigms. This suggests the question, which of our
three notions best approximates the intuitive notion Kripke invokes?
Second, Kripke introduces the notion in order to explicate certain features
of reference. This suggests the question, which of our notions is most
useful for explicating these features? Which, if any, of our notions
promises to be central to the theory of reference? Since intuitive
notions sometimes prove not to be best for developing a theory, these
two questions need not receive the same answer. Furthermore, neither
question is trivially answered by citing Kripke's paradigms. All three
notions fit them. His paradigm of a rigid designator, 'the square root
of 25', satisfies (1), (3), and (4); and his paradigm of a nonrigid desig-
16nator, 'the inventor of bifocals', satisfies none of them. We will have
to look deeper for answers.
It seems clear to me that, though the questions are distinct,
the answer to both is the same, viz., completely rigid designation. That
is, I think that (3), the definition of complete rigidity, provides the
best definition of the intuitive notion Kripke's examples invoke. And I
think that the notion of complete rigidity is the most useful of the
three in addressing questions about reference. I have four arguments
for these claims. The structure of each argument is the same. The
initial step is to show that complete rigidity has an attribute that
exclusive and inclusive rigidity lack. This step usually requires most
of the effort. The shorter, concluding step divides into two parts. One
part shows how its having the attribute in question is evidence that
25
complete rigidity is the intuitive notion; the other part shows how the
same thing is evidence that complete rigidity is the notion of principal
theoretical interest.
One argument is that all examples I have found of designators
which are exclusively or inclusively, but not completely rigid seem con-
trived. 'The thing which is identical with Nixon and a politician' and
'the thing which is identical with Nixon or, should nothing be identical
with Nixon, the thing which is identical with 0', even when less awkwardly
phrased, do not represent ordinary ways of designating things. Examples
like these do not favor exclusive or inclusive rigidity. Of course,
this line of argument would be more compelling if I could show that the
only possible examples of exclusively or inclusively rigid designators
which are not completely rigid are contrived. We could then argue that
complete rigidity is more likely the intuitive notion Kripke's paradigms
invoke, since whatever the principle for projecting from these paradigms
is, the projection should extend to as few contrived cases as possible.
Similarly, we could argue that complete rigidity is more likely to be
central to the theory of reference, for normal, not contrived cases com-
prise the principal explicative burden of a theory. Unfortunately, I
cannot show that the only examples are contrived. Still, this line of
argument suggests that complete rigidity is the better founded of the
notions and that the others are weakened offshoots.
A more compelling line of argument considers how other notions
of designation give rise to that of a rigid designator. The idea is that
the way in which they naturally give rise to it will be found under close
inspection to imply that it is the same as completely rigid designation.
26
The basic notion is that of a designator simpliciter--i.e., a singular
referring expression which in fact picks out exactly one actual individual.
We can define this notion in parallel with our earlier definitions as
follows:
An instance of the schema
(x)(...x...)
is a designator (simpliciter) if and only if
the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x)(Ny)(0*ey... *- y=x)
is true.
Of course, a singular referring expression may in fact designate something
without it being necessary that it designate anything. This suggests the
notion of an unfailing designator--i.e., a singular referring expression
which is guaranteed to pick out some individual or other. We can define
this notion as follows:
An instance of the schema
is an unfailing designator if and only if (17)
the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x) (Vy)(---y--- : y=x)
is true.
But again, a singular referring expression may be guaranteed to designate
something without it being necessary that it designate the particular
individual it now does. This suggests a further notion, viz., that of a
singular referring expression which in some sense is guaranteed to desig-
nate the individual it now designates. The notion we get at in this way,
I submit, is rigid designation.
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Roughly, then, the idea of the argument is to motivate the
notion of a rigid designator, much as Kripke does, by considering designa-
tion in general vis-a-vis logically possible counterfactual situations.
However, we need to develop this approach at some length and with some
care before it can help us to choose among our three kinds of rigid
designation. In particular, we need to answer the question, how is what
an expression might have designated pertinent at all?
First, however, we need to make more precise the possibilities
these other kinds of designation leave open. Assume we are given a
singular referring expression that is a designator in a language L--one
like 'the x such that Fx'. Assume further that the rules governing L,
especially those governing reference, remain fixed. And now consider
the ways in which things might have been different. One possibility
that designation simpliciter leaves open is that things might have been
different in such a way that 'the x such that Fx' would have designated
some other object even though the object it now designates would still
have existed. For example, suppose that Franklin had concentrated on
politics rather than science and Jefferson had developed bifocal lenses.
Then 'the inventor of bifocals' would have designated Jefferson, and yet
Franklin would still have existed. A second possibility left open is
that things might have been different in such a way that 'the x such that
Fx' would have designated nothing even though the object it now designates
would still have existed. For example, suppose that Franklin had con-
centrated on politics and that eyeglasses had never been conceived of.
Then 'the inventor of bifocals' would have designated nothing, and yet
Franklin would still have existed. A third possibility left open is that
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things might have been different in such a way that 'the x such that Fx'
would still have designated something even though the object it now
designates would not have existed. For example, suppose Franklin had
never been born and that Jefferson had developed bifocal lenses. Then
'the inventor of bifocals' would have designated Jefferson and Franklin
would not have existed.
Other possibilities left open by designation need not concern
us here. Note that unfailing designation also leaves the first and third
possibilities open. For a singular referring expression can be an unfail-
ing designator without having to designate the object it does. And if
the object it now designates had not existed, it would have had to desig-
nate some other object to have been unfailing. Finally, in saying that
designation leaves a certain possibility open, I do not mean that all
designators leave it open. I mean only that a singular referring expres-
sion can be a designator and yet the possiblity in question remain open.
What difference do these open possibilities make? And how do
they give rise to a notion of rigid designation? They would seem to
make no difference if the reference of every singular referring expression,
regardless of context, were determined solely on the basis of what is
actually the case. For then, regardless of the context in which it
occurs, a designator would always in practice designate the same thing.
What it might have designated or what it would have designated if things
had been different would be just a matter of curiosity. And the open
possibilities would probably not give rise to a notion of rigid designation.
However, some languages, notably English, have contexts in which
the reference of singular referring expressions can also be determined on
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the basis of what might have been or would have been the case. Consider
the following ambiguous sentences:
The inventor of bifocals might have been the third
President of the United States.
If Jefferson had devoted more time to optics, the
inventor of bifocals would have been the third (19)
President of the United States.
One way in which they are ambiguous is that in both 'the inventor of
bifocals' can be taken to refer either to Franklin or, for example, to
Jefferson.17  If Franklin, then its reference is being determined on
the basis of what is actually the case; but if Jefferson, then its
reference is being determined on the basis of what might have or would
18have been the case. Now, if the reference of singular referring ex-
pressions in some contexts can be determined on the basis of counter-
factual conditions, then what a designator might have or would have
designated is not just a matter of curiosity. Given our open possibil-
ities, a designator could in practice denote something else. The open
possibilities would then make a difference--e.g., they could lead to a
certain type of referential ambiguity.
The idea, then is to focus on languages having contexts in
which the reference of singular referring expressions can be determined
either on the basis of the actual situation or on the basis of a counter-
19factual situation. We need to examine the consequences of the possi-
bilities left open by designation simpliciter and unfailing designation
in such languages to see how these possibilities give rise to a notion
of rigid designation.
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We can fix our ideas by concentrating on contexts of the follow-
ing form:
Suppose p had been the case; even so the x (20)
such that Fx would have been G.
The detailed workings of reference in such contexts in English need not
concern us here. We will simply assume that in such contexts the
reference of 'the x such that Fx' can be determined on either of two
bases:
Basis 1: What is actually the case.
Basis 2: What would have been the case if p had been true. 20
Now consider the three open possibilities sketched earlier. In
the first a designator would have designated something other than what it
now does even though the latter would still have existed. But then a
sentence of the form of (20) could be true if the reference of 'the x
such that Fx' were determined on Basis 1 and not true if it were deter-
mined on Basis 2. To illustrate, consider the following example:
Suppose Jefferson had developed bifocals and Franklin
had concentrated on politics; even so, the inventor (21)
of bifocals would have been a delegate to the
Federal Convention.20
Presumably the second clause of (21) is true if 'the inventor of bifocals'
is taken to refer to the person who actually invented bifocals, Franklin;
and it is not true if the phrase is taken to refer to the person who
would have invented bifocals in the supposed counterfactual situation,
Jefferson.
In the second open possibility, a designator would have failed
to designate anything at all even though the object it now designates
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would still have existed. But then a sentence of the form of (20)
could be true if the reference of 'the x such that Fx' were determined on
Basis I and not true if it were determined on Basis 2.22 To illustrate:
Suppose human eyesight had never needed correction
and eyeglasses had never been invented; even so, (22)
the inventor of bifocals would have been a delegate
to the Federal Convention.
Presumably the second clause of (22) is true if 'the inventor of bifocals'
is taken to refer to the person who actually invented bifocals; and it
is not true if the phrase is taken to refer to someone who would have
invented bifocals in the supposed counterfactual situation.
Finally, in the third open possibility, a designator would have
designated something even though the object it now designates would not
have existed. But then a sentence of the form of (20) could be true if
the reference of 'the x such that Fx' were determined on Basis 2, and not
true if it were determined on Basis 1. To illustrate:
Suppose the Franklins had had no children and
Jefferson had developed bifocals; even so, the (23)
inventor of bifocals would have been in France
during the Federal Convention.
Presumably the second clause of (23) is true if 'the inventor of bifocals'
is taken to refer to Jefferson; and it is not true if the phrase is taken
to refer to Franklin.
Thus in languages of the specified type designation simpliciter
and unfailing designation leave open the possibility that certain sentences
-- e.g., descriptions of counterfactual situations--will have contrasting
truth-values when the reference of designators occurring in them is
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determined on one basis rather than another. This possibility calls
attention to a special kind of designator, one that, regardless of the
basis on which its reference is determined, never leads to contrasting
truth-values. This special kind of designator, I take it, is a rigid
designator.
We now have a natural way of motivating rigid designation.
This way requires some comments before we continue with the argument.
First, note that according to our characterization it is not the point of
a rigid designator to eliminate contrasting truth-values by forcing
reference to be determined on only one basis. Rather, the point is to
eliminate contrasting truth-values while still permitting reference to
be determined on different bases. This helps to explain why I have
characterized rigid designation as a way of eliminating contrasting
truth-values rather than as a way of eliminating ambiguities. For assume
that 'the x such that x Franklinized' rigidly designates Benjamin Franklin,
and consider the following:
Suppose the Franklins had had no children; even so,
the x such that x Franklinized would have been a (24)
delegate to the Federal Convention.
To me the second clause of (24) still seems open to two readings. On
one reading it says that there is exactly one individual who Franklinized
and this individual would have been a delegate even in the supposed
situation. On the other it says that even in the supposed situation
there would have been an individual who alone Franklinized and who was a
delegate. 2 3 If so, (24) has two readings, and these correspond to two
bases on which the reference of 'the x such that x Franklinized' can be
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determined. The rigid designator would thus not eliminate the ambiguity.
But since (24) is presumably not true on either reading, it would
eliminate contrasting truth-values.
Second, note that we have motivated rigid designation only for
a certain type of language. The point of distinguishing the rigid
designators of a language is lost according to our characterization un-
less the language has some contexts in which the reference of singular
referring expressions can be determined on different bases. Now, I
suspect that a language does not have to be of this type. Even in
English it is not obvious that much expressive power would be lost if the
reference of singular referring expressions were invariably determined
on the basis of what is actually the case. But if so, rigid designation
is not a particularly fundamental theoretical notion. A philosophically
ideal language could avoid the need for it. This may be one reason why
rigid designation has only recently come to attract so much attention.
Finally note that our characterization universally quantifies
over contexts of a language. A rigid designator provides a way of
designating an object without causing any sentence to have contrasting
truth-values when the reference of the designator is determined on one
basis rather than another. Now, in practice confusion stemming from a
referential ambiguity in a single sentence can be reduced by pragmatic
factors or by using a more refined designator. For example, (25) is less
confusing than (21):
Suppose Jefferson had developed bifocals and Franklin
had concentrated on politics; even so, the person who (25)
invented bifocals and experimented with lightning
would have been a delegate to the Federal Convention.
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Yet 'the person who invented bifocals and experimented with lightning'
is no more a rigid designator than 'the inventor of bifocals'. We can
thus deal with a source of referential ambiguity in practice on a case
by case basis, as the ambiguity arises. We rarely, if ever, need one
way of dealing with it that works across the entire language. 2 4  Rigid
designation might therefore be thought of as a practical notion carried
to a theoretical limit. This may be another reason why it has only
recently attracted attention.
If the comments of the last two paragraphs are correct, there
is neither a compelling theoretical nor a compelling practical reason
for rigid designators. Rigid designation is motivated by a type of
referential ambiguity that does not have to occur and that, when it does,
can be handled in other ways. In a way this is as it should be. For if
rigid designators were somehow mandated, there should be little controversy
over proper names being rigid, since they are the only candidates we have
for rigidly designating contingent objects.
Let us return to the argument. So far we have a natural way of
motivating a notion of rigid designation. A rigid designator is one that
does not cause any sentence to have a contrasting truth-value when the
reference of the designator is determined on the basis of what might
have been or would have been the case instead of on the basis of what is
the case. What conditions must a designator satisfy to achieve this?
One condition is: regardless of how things might have been, the desig-
nator would not have denoted any object other than the now designated
one. Otherwise, in those circumstances in which it would have denoted
another object, something would have been true of this other object that
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would not have been true of the now designated object. This is the point
of the first and third open possibilities discussed earlier. Another con-
dition is: regardless of how things might have been, if the now designated
object had still existed, the designator would have denoted it. Otherwise,
in those circumstances in which it would have failed to denote the object,
something would still have been true of the object. This is the point of
the second open possiblity.
Now, these two conditions are precisely the ones satisfied by
complete rigidity. And they are not satisfied by exclusive or inclusive
rigidity. Exclusive rigidity fails to satisfy the second condition. It
leaves open the possibility that the designator would have denoted nothing
even though the now designated object would still have existed. Thus a
sentence of the form, 'The x such that Fx would have been G', could be
true if the reference of the exclusively rigid designator, 'the x such
that Fx', were determined on the basis of what is the case, and not
true if its reference were determined on the basis of what would have
been the case. Similarly, inclusive rigidity fails to satisfy the
first condition. It leaves open the possibility that the designator
would have denoted another object if the now designated object had not
existed. Thus a sentence of the form, 'The x such that Fx would have been
G' could be true if the reference of the inclusively rigid designator,
'the x such that Fx', were determined on the basis of what would have been
the case, and not true if its reference were determined on the basis of
what is the case. Accordingly, if the point of rigid designators is to
avoid contrasting truth-values of the sort sketched above, then rigid
designation is completely rigid designation.
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The preceding analysis is meant to expand on Kripke's remarks.
It is worth noting that at one point Kripke expressly indicates that what
he means by 'rigid designation' is what we have called 'completely rigid
designation':
All I mean is that in any possible world where the object
in question does exist, in any situation where the ob-
ject would exist, we use the designator in question to
designate that object. In a situation where the object
does not exist, then we should say that the designator
has no referent and that the object in question so
designated does not exist.25
Thus the upshot of our long second argument is compatible with Kripke.
So far the argument has shown that one natural way of motivating
rigid designation leads to complete rather than to exclusive or inclusive
rigidity. It remains to show how this bears on the claim that complete
rigidity is both the intuitive and the more central theoretical notion.
First, whichever intuitive notion Kripke is invoking, the principle for
projecting from his paradigms must be one for which there is a natural
motivation. Otherwise, the projected notion is not intuitive. The
preceding analysis has yielded a naturally motivated principle for pro-
jecting from his paradigms. And what this principle projects, among our
alternatives, is completely rigid designation. Thus, in the absence of a
different natural principle, our argument provides evidence that complete
rigidity is the intuitive notion. Similarly, whichever notion we make
central to a theory of reference, it should be useful for explaining those
features of reference that give rise to notions of rigid designation.
According to the preceding analysis, a major item to be explained is why
certain designators do and others do not cause sentences to have contrast-
ing truth-values when their reference is determined on one basis instead
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of another. But the designators that cause this are not completely rigid;
and those that do not are the completely rigid ones. Our argument thus
provides evidence that complete rigidity is the more useful notion in
addressing questions about reference.
However, on neither point is this argument conclusive. For
we have not shown that our way of motivating rigid designation is the
most natural one. Nor have we shown that the features of reference we
used to motivate rigid designation are the most important features for a
theory to explain. Still, until we have an alternative analysis of
how other notions of designation give rise to that of a rigid designator,
our second argument will remain compelling.
Ill
Of the arguments I have in favor of complete rigidity, the
preceding one is probably the most important. Still, two further lines
of argument deserve consideration. The first of these focuses on the
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problem of defining subordinate notions of rigid designation. The idea
is that complete rigidity yields better definitions. Kripke calls atten-
tion to the notion of a strongly rigid designator--i.e., a rigid designator
which, because it designates a necessary entity, cannot fail to designate
that entity.27 If we identify rigidity with complete rigidity, we can
define this notion as follows:
An instance of the schema
(Ix)(.--x-..)
is a strongly rigid designator if and only if
the corresponding instance of the schema (25)
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(3x) (Vy)(...y.-* e y=x) & O(Vy)(...y... y=x) &
is true.
The correlative notion is that of a weakly rigid designator--i.e., a
rigid designator which, because it designates a contingent entity, can
fail to designate that entity. We can define this notion as follows:
An instance of the schema
(1x)(---x-.-)
is a weakly rigid designator if and only if (26)
the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x) [(y)(...y... - y=x) & O(Vy)(...y... y=x)] &
-0(3x)[e.*x...'
is true.
These definitions have several virtues. They bifurcate the class of rigid
designators (so construed). They are simple and transparent. And they
are expressly of the genus-difference type. That is, their governing
schemata are obtained by conjoining a clause to the schema for completely
rigid designation; they involve no modification of the clause correspond-
ing to that schema.
What happens if we instead identify rigidity with exclusive or
inclusive rigidity? When we conjoin the same clauses to the schema govern-
ing exclusive rigidity, we get the following:
(x)[(Vy)( y y=x) & O(y)(.--y.-- * y=x)] & (27)Q(3x) Co-x...*
(tx)4(Vy)(.y...y y=x) & Cl(Vy)(...y... = y=x) & (28)
Now (27) defines a notion of strong rigidity. For it entails both that
the designator cannot fail to designate the object it does and that the
object is necessary. But (28) does not define a notion of weak rigidity
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because it does not entail that the designated object is contingent. 'The
number which is the square of 3 and which numbers the planets' satisfies
(28) and yet denotes a necessary entity. To get a notion of weak rigidity
we need a more complicated conjoined clause:
(3x) [(Vy)(***..**.. y=x) & O(y)(...y.. = y=x) & (29)(3x) x..a--- .&O0(3y)(y=x)J
By analogous reasoning, we need (30) and (31) to construct definitions
of strong and weak rigidity out of inclusive rigidity:
(3 x)(Vy)(.-,y-**. " y=x) &CO(Vy)(y=x V (-y-.- &
(Vw)(.***w*** w=x)))j & (3x)C.--x-.. & 3O(Vy)(y=x) (
(3x) [(Vy)(...y*... y=x) & u(lvy)(Y=x = ( y- & (31)( .w)( *w. = w=x))) &P-PD(3x) ***.x--*
The two pairs of definitions so obtained are less perspicuous than (25)
and (26). In neither case are the correlative schemata--(27) and (29) or
(30) and (31)--duals of one another. In neither case do they bifurcate
the class of rigid designators (so construed). Nor are they so simple
and transparent as the schemata in (25) and (26). In particular, the
added clauses in (29) and (30) are more complicated. There are simple
alternatives to (29) and (30); for example, (32) is equivalent to but
simpler than (29):
(3x)[(Vy)('&*y-- y=x) & O(Vy)(.'y.'' = y=x) & (32)
~ (Vy) (y=x)]
But this simplicity is gained at the sacrifice of an expressly genus-
difference form of definition. That is, unlike the other schemata, (32)
does not leave the rigidity clause intact.
Grant me that complete rigidity yields better definitions of
these subordinate notions. How does this show which notion is the
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intuitive one and which is theoretically more central? On the second point,
one of the roles of a central notion in a theory is to provide definitions
of subordinate notions. If better definitions are obtained from one
rendering of a fundamental notion than from others, then in the absence
of opposing reasons, considerations of simplicity and elegance make this
rendering preferable. Thus, in the absence of opposing reasons, the
argument shows that complete rigidity is the preferable theoretical
rendering of rigid designation. On the first point, the correlative
notions of strong and weak rigidity are intuitively closely related to
rigid designation. If rigidity is identified with complete rigidity, then
the relation is indeed close since the two bifurcate it. But the relation
is not so close if rigidity is instead identified with either of the
other two. The argument thus offers further evidence that complete
rigidity is the intuitive notion. However, considerations of simplicity
and elegance--whether with respect to our intuitions or with respect to
a theory--are not conclusive unless other factors do not outweigh them.
We have not shown that there are no overriding factors here.
The three preceding arguments have indicated what we lose with
exclusive and inclusive rigidity. We must admit more contrived examples
We must give up a natural way of motivating rigidity out of other notions
of designation. And we must accept less elegant definitions of some
subordinate notions. The final argument examines what we must give up
when we identify rigidity with complete rigidity. If we lose more with
complete than with exclusive or inclusive rigidity, then we should reconsider.
We appear to lose little in choosing complete over exclusive
rigidity. An exclusively rigid designator never would denote any other
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object. But, it may include superfluous details in its description
component--i.e., details not needed to insure that it would never denote
anything else. And these details can affect whether it would refer in
some counterfactual situations. For example, Slote's 'the being that is
identical with Nixon anda politician' includes such a detail. The
addition of extra details can be carried to extremes. It is logically
possible to incorporate enough details that the exclusively rigid desig-
nator would lack reference in any but the actual situation. By contrast,
completely rigid designators contain no superfluous details that could
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ever affect their reference. Thus, with complete rigidity we must give
up a license for imprecision which, given our ignorance of essential
attributes, we might want to retain. But surely complete rigidity is
none the worse for this. We want the central notions of a theory to deter-
mine matters exactly. We have found here that in one respect complete
rigidity will distinguish between the crucial and the superfluous more
directly than exclusive rigidity. Thus, what complete rigidity loses
vis-a-vis exclusive rigidity does not detract from its usefulness in
theories. Furthermore, it is scarcely an intuitive feature of rigidity
that a rigid designator might lack reference in any but the actual situa-
tion. Therefore, what complete rigidity loses vis-a-vis exclusive rigidity
does not make it any the less intuitive.
We appear to lose more in choosing complete over inclusive
rigidity. For we have to give up devices like Frege's for eliminating
all failure of reference. 'The x such that x is identical with Nixon or,
should Nixon not exist, is identical with O' illustrates Frege's device.
As we found earlier, it is inclusively, but not completely rigid. Of
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course, inclusively rigid designators need not be unfailing. But in-
clusive rigidity does permit us to make all designators in a regimented
language unfailing. Complete rigidity does not. Thus, if we permit
completely rigid designators of contingent objects in a language, we
will have to face failure of reference problems that we might otherwise
avoid. Now, since devices like Frege's are scarcely intuitive, in
losing them we are not sacrificing an intuitive feature of rigidity.
Hence, the claim that complete rigidity is the intuitive notion is not
being challenged here. Rather, the challenge is to the claim that
complete rigidity should be made central to the theory of reference.
The objection is that in so doing we increase the burden on the theory.
It must now treat failure of reference as a basic rather than as a peri-
pheral phenomenon. The point can be made in another way. It is reason-
able to contend that all the central notions of a theory of reference
should be reflected in a philosophically ideal, regimented language. Now,
if complete rigidity is central, then such a regimented language can have
failure of reference problems when reference is determined on counter-
factual bases. But failure of reference problems are the very ones that
Frege thought a mathematically ideal, regimented language should not have.
Can we nevertheless justify making complete rigidity central?
I think so. Our long second argument showed that in languages of a certain
type unfailing designators can lead to contrasting truth-values. We find
now that in languages of this type completely rigid designators can
lead to failures of reference (i.e., when their reference is determined
on counterfactual bases). Of course, we may not want a regimented
language to have contexts in which the reference of singular referring
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expressions can be determined on any but the actual basis. But if the
language has such contexts, then problems of one sort or another will
have to be faced. On the one hand, we can avoid failure of reference
problems if we make all designators unfailing. But then we will have no
way of circumventing contrasting truth-value problems. On the other hand,
we can circumvent contrasting truth-value problems by having a completely
rigid designator for every object the language refers to singularly. But
then we will require means for handling cases in which a designator would
lack reference if its reference were determined on a counterfactual basis.
Now, the theory of reference should show us that regimented
languages of the indicated type involve a trade-off between contrasting
truth-value problems and failure of reference problems. The theory
should indicate both that a choice must be made and what the choice will
affect. But the theory can do this better if both unfailing designation
and completely rigid designation are central notions in it. It can then
explicate directly the trade-off between using an unfailing designator and
using a completely rigid designator to designate a contingent entity.
The theory cannot explicate this trade-off so directly if instead in-
clusively rigid designation is made central. Thus, as before, what complete
rigidity loses vis-a-vis inclusive rigidity does not detract from its use-
fulness in theories.
In sum, our fourth argument has shown that the obvious things
we have to give up when we identify rigidity with complete rigidity are
just as well given up. Sacrificing them does not detract from either the
intuitive quality of the explicative power of rigid designation. However,
again, the argument is not conclusive. We have not shown that the
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features we have discussed are the only ones lost in choosing complete
over exclusive and inclusive rigidity. Nevertheless, until other features
lost with complete rigidity are put forward, the argument will carry
weight.
IV
None of the four arguments offered above for complete rigidity
is conclusive. But together they make a strong case. We can restate
their conclusion formally by means of the following definitions:
An instance of the schema(0x)(***xV**)
is a rigid designator if and only if (33)
the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x) (Vy)(--*y-* 0 - -y=x) & O(Vy)(*0-y--- - y=x) ]
is true.
An instance of the schema
(,x)(*..**x*)
is a nonrigid designator if and only if (34)
the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x)[(Vy)('*'''y*" y=x) &#3(Vy)('Y'y') ( y=x)]
is true.
Various subordinate notions can be defined. Exclusive and
inclusive rigidity, as defined by (1) and (4), can be viewed as degenerate
notions of rigidity, obtained by weakening its requirements. Strong and
weak rigidity have already been defined by (25) and (26). We should
note that a strongly rigid designator is an unfailing rigid designator,
and vice versa. Another subordinate notion is that of a conditionally
rigid designator--i.e., a singular referring expression which, if it
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designates something, is a rigid designator. One way to define this
notion is via the material conditional:
An instance of the schema
(Ix)(..-x--.)
is a conditionally rigid designator if and only (35)
if the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x)[(Vy)(0**y*.. -_ y=x) = (3x)D( y)( y... y=x)]
is true.
On this definition, all singular referring expressions which happen not
to designate are conditionally rigid designators. A stronger notion of
conditional rigidity is obtained if we instead use the strict implication
connective. But even with this all inconsistent singular referring ex-
pressions are conditionally rigid designators. A yet stronger notion
is thus desirable, although we must leave the point here. A final sub-
ordinate notion is that of a potentially rigid designator--i.e., a
singular referring expression which can be a rigid designator:
An instance of the schema
(tx)(-.-x---)
is a potentially rigid designator if and only if (36)
the corresponding instance of the schema
(3x)[((Vy)('-y' -m o y=x) & O(Vy)(---y. -- y=x)]
is true.
These are the principal notions related to rigid designation.
Undoubtedly some people will want to identify rigid designation
with potential rigidity rather than with complete rigidity. Their
rationale derives from a possible world reading of its governing schema.
The standard possible world interpretation for the schema is: in some
possible world there exists exactly one object of which the description
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is true, and necessarily of this object and only of this object is the
description true. This interpretation reads just like the one for
complete rigidity except that 'in some possible world' replaces 'in
the actual world'. In other words, so the rationale continues, the
only difference between a completely rigid designator and a potentially
rigid designator is whether the object described exists in the actual
world. This suggests that a potentially rigid designator designates--
indeed, rigidly designates--the object that satisfies its description,
even though that object is a possible-yet-not-actual object. But then why
restrict rigid designators to those that designate actual objects?
The contribution which a designator makes to determining whether a
sentence is true on a specific world is essentially the same whether
the world is actual or just possible. Hence, to restrict rigid desig-
nators to those designating actual objects reflects an arbitrariness
that the theory of language can ill afford.
Slote promotes this view when he characterizes an inclusively
rigid designator as one that, should it pick out a certain entity in some
one possible world, picks out the same entity in every other possible world
in which that entity exists. Indeed, the view seems natural for anyone who
accepts possible-yet-not-actual objects existing in possible, but non-
actual worlds. Moreover, once one is inclined to the view, other con-
siderations appear to recommend it. For example, on the possible world
reading, potential rigidity seems a straightforward generalization of
complete rigidity. More general characterizations of a notion are
preferable. Similarly, if rigidity is identified with potential rigidity,
then whether a singular referring expression is a rigid designator is a
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matter of logic, not a matter of contingent fact. And we would prefer
to categorize linguistic items on formal grounds, as independently as
possible of contingent facts. Finally, if complete rigidity promises to
yield an account of denoting proper names, then potential rigidity
promises to yield an account of proper names in general, including
fictional names. And we would prefer a unified account of names.
All these considerations not withstanding, I think that rigid
designation should not be identified with potential rigidity. Indeed, I
think that there are decisive arguments against identifying the two.2 9
However, for now I want to take a more moderate line, one requiring a
less ambitious argument. I want to leave open the question whether
potential rigidity is the well-motivated, straightforward generalization
of complete rigidity that the two preceding paragraphs suggest. We can
leave this open and still claim that rigidity is complete rigidity. For
there is too much that is problematic in the rationale for identifying
rigidity with potential rigidity. First, the possible world interpreta-
tion of the schema is open to dispute. Not only are possible world style
interpretations of quantified modal formulas still controversial when
taken literally, but there may also be more than one reasonable possible
world interpretation of this schema.30  Second, even if we accept the
possible world interpretation of the schema, perhaps we need not accept
such controversial entities as possible-yet-not-actual objects. Plantinga,
for example, would agree with the possible world interpretation of the
schema, yet he rejects such objects. 3 1
Third, we can even grant both the possible world interpretation
and the existence of nonactual objects, and yet deny that a potentially
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rigid designator designates anything. For suppose some singular refer-
ring expression is potentially rigid--i.e., suppose that necessarily
its description is satisfied by exactly one possible, nonactual object.
It is still not clear that the expression denotes the object. To
secure reference, a possible world in which the object exists and rules
for picking out the object in that world may also be needed. This point
can be made in another way. The condition set down by the governing
schema of complete rigidity is necessary and sufficient for rigidly
designating an object in the actual world. Still, this schema may
succeed only because of background rules governing reference that do
not apply in the case of nonactual worlds. If so, then why should we
conclude that the schema for potential rigidity gives a condition
necessary and sufficient for rigidly designating an object in a nonactual
world? We know too little about how reference is determined, especial-
ly in the case of possible worlds, to accept the generalization of rigid
designation to nonactual objects uncritically. 32  Finally, even granting
all the points we have questioned and also granting that proper names
are rigid designators, fictional names need not be (generalized) rigid
designators. If proper names are rigid, they are so in part by
virtue of the way their reference gets fixed--e.g., by baptism. But
it is not clear whether the reference of a fictional name can be comparably
fixed.33
Such difficulties indicate that potential rigidity is not the
intuitive notion of rigid designation. Furthermore, they discourage us
from taking potential rather than complete rigidity as a central notion
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in the theory of reference. A better strategy is evident. For the
present we should make complete rigidity the central notion. This will
permit us to build a theory on comparatively firm grounds. Potential
rigidity should for now be regarded as a related, but subordinate notion.
As the theory develops, we can re-examine the status of potential
rigidity. As we come to know more about singular reference, we may
have grounds/for extending rigid designation to include potentially
rigid designators. I predict not. But this way we can handle the
issue sensibly.
Let us recapitulate. We began by questioning whether we have
a clear notion of rigid designation at all. Slote and Chandler provoked
the question by calling our attention to three conflicting plausible
definitions of rigidity. Our main accomplishment has been to put the
doubts raised by Slote and Chandler to rest. Among the notions related
to rigid designation, one--complete rigidity--is both the intuitive notion
Kripke invokes and the notion of principal theoretical interest. The
other notions--exclusive and inclusive rigidity and, for that matter,
potential rigidity--are degenerate forms of rigid designation, obtained
by weakening its conditions in one way or another. We have thus dispensed
with the concern that provoked the original question. However, we have
not yet quite answered the question. Our formal definition of rigidity,
(33), contains an unexplicated de re modal operator. Whether de re
necessity itself is clear remains controversial. Hence, our definition
will not convince everyone that we indeed have a clear notion of rigid
designation.
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V
The de re modal operator in our definition of rigid designation
is not necessarily a flaw. The notion may well be inherently modal, for
better or worse at Quine's third grade of modal involvement. However,
if it is not, then our definition is at best misleading. We thus have
cause to be interested in whether rigid designation can be defined without
resorting to modal notions. From the discussion so far, one would suspect
not. But not all of the definitions proposed in the literature are modal.
Christopher Peacocke has proposed a definition which is meant to be, and
34
which on the surface appears to be nonmodal. His definition for the case
of a language L free of indexicals and ambiguity is as follows:
A singular term t is a rigid designator in L if and
only if there is an object x such that for any (37)
sentence G(t) in which t occT"rs, the truth condition
for G(t) is that <x> satisfy G( ).35
The idea behind this definition is that of "a certain object entering the
truth-conditions of all the sentences of the language in which t occurs."36
If Peacocke has succeeded here, we will have to reconsider our
definition--and we will probably have to abandon it. But has he succeeded?
Does (37) provide an adequate definition of rigidity without implicitly
or covertly relying on modal notions? This is the principal question of
this section of the chapter.
Before addressing this question-we should discuss a direct ob-
jection Peacocke lodges against a definition like ours. His main com-
plaint against Kripke's definition is that it "quantifies over possible
worlds and appeals to transworld identity.' 3 7 But there is a simple
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way to avoid this complaint and still employ a modal definition: one
can define rigid designation, as we have, in terms of uninterpreted modal
operators. Peacocke calls attention to this move, and he responds to it.
Specifically, he responds to the following definition of this type:
A singular term t is a rigid designator in L if and
only if it is true in L that nothing else might have (38)
been t or, more carefully, if and only if
r-"
r(3x) x=t &~(3y)(y=t & yx)J'
is true in L. 3 8
He contends that the indicated condition is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for rigid designation.
This criterion is not necessary, for it presumes that
the object language is capable of defining a possibility
operator, which is not, intuitively, required for a
language to contain rigid designators. It is not
sufficient either; for if t is, intuitively, a rigid
designator, then so, by this criterion, is (7x)(x=t & p),
for any true sentence replacing p.39
How broad a conclusion he expects us to draw from this argument is not
clear. The conclusion suggested is that no necessary and sufficient
condition for rigidity can be stated in terms of uninterpreted modal
operators. By intimation, then, the argument challenges our definition.
Part of what is going on here should be evident. The modal
clause of the condition can be rewritten as follows:
S(Vy)[y=t y=xJ (39)
Thus the condition that Peacocke says is not sufficient is just the con-
dition for exclusive rigidity. And indeed, the schema he uses to argue
that the condition is not sufficient is transparently akin to 'the x such
that x is Nixon and a politician'--Slote's example of a designator which
is exclusively, but not inclusively rigid. Accordingly, Peacocke's
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argument does not show that our condition, the condition for complete
rigidity, is not sufficient.
Furthermore, his argument against modal definitions being neces-
sary rests on a mistake. The definition should not require truth in L.
The correct form of definition has the condition expressed in the meta-
language and requires simply that the instances of the schema be true.
To see the absurdity of requiring truth in L, observe what happens if L
employs for example intuitionistic rather than classical negation or if
L has no negation connective at all: then the condition expressed is not
necessary for rigidity in L even if L does contain a possibility operator.
Of course, once the form of the definition has been corrected, there is
nothing left to the argument that L must contain a possibility operator
for the condition to be necessary. Consequently, Peacocke has not shown
that our condition--and a fortiori the condition for exclusive rigidity--
is not necessary for rigid designation. If hiis paper is to undermine our
definition, the success of his alternative definition will have to do
the undermining.
But does (37) successfully define rigid designation without
indirectly relying on modal notions? As (37) stands, the question is
difficult to answer. The meaning of the key phrase, 'the truth condition
for G(t)', is not clear. To answer the question, we need to rephrase
(37) to make the criterion it sets down explicit and clear. An obvious
way to rephrase it is as follows:
A singular term t is a rigid designator in L if and
only if there is an object x such that for any (40)
sentence G(t) in which t occurs, G(t) is true if
and only if <x> satisfies G ( ).
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(40) should be contrasted with the modal definition that is like it save
for the last clause reading, 'necessarily G(t) is true if and only if
4x> satisfies G( ).' The logical connective in the last clause of (40)
is the material biconditional. Hence (40) is clearly nonmodal. The
question is whether it succeeds in capturing rigidity.
Consider first the case of a purely extensional language, L.
Let 'the F' be short in L for 'the x such that x invented bifocals.'
According to (40), 'the F' is a rigid designator in L. For let G(t) be
a sentence of L. Since L is purely extensional, substitution of co-
referring expressions preserves truth in L. Hence, if G(the F) is true,
then <Franklin> satisties G( ); and if <Franklin> satisfies G( ), then
G(the F) is true. In other words, in an extensional language something
is true of Franklin if and only if it is true of Franklin as picked out
by a description. The argument clearly generalizes: every denoting definite
description in a purely extensional language satisfies (40). (40) is
therefore too weak. In the case of extensional languages, it would have
us relinquish the distinction between designators and rigid designators.
A similar result holds for certain nonextensional languages.
Let L' be a language like L except for having modal operators at Quine's
third grade of modal involvement. As before, let 'the F' be short for
'the x such that x invented bifocals.' Now consider the open sentence
G( )--'necessarily x is identical with Franklin'--derived from 'necessarily
Franklin is identical with Franklin.' Under what conditions is G(the F)
true? It depends on how the scope ambiguity in G(the F) is resolved.
G(the F) can be read as (41) or (42):
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G(3x)f(Vy)(Fy Sy=x) & (x=Franklin)] (41)
(3x)[(Vy)(Fy E y=x) & O(x=Franklin)] (42)
As is evident on inspection, (42) is true if and only if <Franklin>
satisfies G( ). Moreover, the reasoning does not depend on our choice of
G( ). Hence, if 'the F' is always read with wide scope vis-a-vis modal
operators in L', then for any open sentence H( ), H(the F) is true if and
only if <Franklin> satisfies H( ). The argument clearly generalizes:
every denoting definite description always read with wide scope vis-a-vis
modal operators in L' satisfies (40). Again (40) is too weak. In the
case of certain nonextensional languages it could force us to concede that
even some paradigmatic nonrigid designators are rigid.
The arguments of the last two paragraphs exploit a point we
made when discussing how other notions give rise to rigid designation.
The gist of (40) is to require of t that it designate the same object in
every sentence in which it occurs. But as we noted earlier, in the
right sort of language a singular referring expression may invariably
designate the same object and yet not be a rigid designator. For example,
consider a language in which the reference of every singular referring
expression, regardless of context, is determined solely on the basis of
what is actually the case. In such a language, any singular referring
expression that happens to denote will invariably denote the same object.
This is the point the arguments exploit. In a purely extensional language,
the reference of Russellian definite descriptions is determined on the
basis of what is actually the case; and to read a definite description with
wide scope in a modal language is tantamount to determining its reference
on the basis of what is actually the case. But just because a singular
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referring expression invariably designates the same object does not mean
that it is a rigid designator. To think so is to confuse a motive for
having rigid designators with the criterion that distinguishes them. A
rigid designator is one that, even if things other than language had been
different, would have denoted the object it now does, provided that
object would still have existed; and it would in any case have denoted no
other object. 'The inventor of bifocals' is not rigid because it would
have denoted Jefferson if he had invented bifocals. And whether 'the
inventor of bifocals' occurs in a purely extensional language or is
always read with wide scope does not alter this fact. (40) is too weak,
therefore, because it fails to impose a constraint on what t would have
denoted if things had been different. If (37) is to define rigidity,
the explication of 'the truth condition for G(t)' will have to yield such
a constraint.
Peacocke notwithstanding, the obvious way to impose such a
constraint is to use modal notions. But this must be done with care.
For consider the strengthened version of (40) in which the connective in
the last clause is the strict biconditional--i.e., the version in which
the last clause reads 'necessarily G(t) is true if and only if <x> satis-
fies G( ).' This definition imposes on t the constraint that, even if
things had been different, still G(t) would be true if and only if <x>
were to satisfy G( ). The strengthened definition thus indeed imposes
a constraint on what t would have denoted if things had been different.
The trouble is that it imposes too strong a constraint. A singular term
t will satisfy the modified definition only if t bears to the object it
denotes a relation that is essential to this object. But no terms of
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languages of interest bear to the objects they denote a relation that is
essential to these objects.40 Hence, none will satisfy the modified
definition. Strengthening (40) this way accordingly does not yield an
alternative to our definition of rigidity. The modification goes too far.
A rigid designator is one that would have denoted no other object even
if things other than language had been different. The strengthened version
of (40) drops the italicized qualification.
We originally introduced (40) as a plausible way of spelling
out the meaning of 'the truth condition for G(t)' in Peacocke's first
definition of rigidity, (37). Now (40) is not something that Peacocke
proposes. To the contrary, he expressly notes that the troublesome
phrase must be explicated "in a way that prevents the notion of a truth-
condition of a sentence from collapsing into that of a material equivalent
of it."42  Nevertheless, (40) and the strengthened version of it have
served a purpose. They have helped us to see what the problem is in
rephrasing (37). The basic problem is to impose the proper constraint
on what t would have denoted if things had been different. An adequately
rephrased definition must be stronger than (40), but weaker than the
strengthened version of it. For Peacocke, there is of course an added
dimension to the problem: the constraint must be imposed without resort-
ing to modal notions.
How does Peacocke end up rephrasing (37)? It would not be
helpful to quote his final definition here. In spelling out what he
means by 'the truth condition for G(t)', he introduces elaborate technical
apparatus. Some aspects of the apparatus remain rough. Much of it is
designed to accommodate languages that include indexicals. To present
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his apparatus in sufficient detail to make his final definition intelligible
would take us far afield. Happily, however, not every aspect of his
apparatus is crucial from our point of view. Accordingly, instead of
quoting his definition and providing the background it requires, we will
sketch it only in enough detail to permit us to assess it as an alternative
to ours.
Peacocke's strategy is to replace the notion of truth-conditions
for sentences with the notion of a "Tarski-Davidson" truth theory for a
language. Indeed, his final definition gives a criterion not for a term's
being a rigid designator, but for its being treated as a rigid designator
43by such a truth theory. His account of truth theories is largely standard.
A truth theory contains for each sentence A of the object language a
preferred derivation terminating in a theorem of the form
A is true 8B
where A is a structural-descriptive name of A, and B is a suitable trans-
lation of A in the metalanguage. (For example, if A contains no "semantical"
predicates like 'true' and 'satisfies', then B must contain none to be
suitable). The preferred derivation for A is the shortest one yielding
a theorem of the required form. The resources used to effect such
derivations are the usual ones: a function that translates the predicates
and constants of the object language into predicates and constants of the
metalanguage; a definition of truth in terms of satisfaction; axioms that
recursively characterize what it is for a sequence of objects s to satisfy
a sentence; and an evaluation function val that, given a sequence of ob-
jects and a term of the proper sort, picks out an object. The evaluation
function is used at the base of the recursion to characterize satisfaction
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for atomic predications. That is, it enters derivations via biconditionals
like
s satisfies Pt P'val (s,r)
where PT is a structural-descriptive name, P' is the translation of the
object language predicate in the metalanguage, and val(s,r) is the object
from s assigned to t.
Peacocke's account is distinctive primarily in that his evalua-
tion function provides for indexicals. It is defined roughly as follows:
.th ththe i object in s if ' is the i variable of
the object language.
the kth object demonstrated by the speaker at
the time the sentence is uttered if r is
val(s,)kth
the k placeholder of the corresponding
reduced sentence.
the object denoted by the translation of f if 1
is a constant.
(The reduced sentence is obtained from the original sentence by replacing
anaphorically distinct indexicals with distinct special terms called'
"placeholders.")
Peacocke's final rephrasing of (37) fixes on preferred deriva-
tions. Consider all of the sentences G(t) in which a term t occurs.
According to Peacocke, a truth theory treats t as a rigid designator if
and only if t gets treated in a certain way in the preferred derivations
for these sentences. Stated informally, the treatment of t must satisfy
two conditions:
i. The evaluation function must be applied either to t
or to a term that exactly corresponds to t (e.g.,
a placeholder).
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ii. The evaluation function must not treat t as a
44
variable.
For a first order language without indexicals, Peacocke's definition boils
down to this: a truth theory treats t as a rigid designator if and only
if the preferred derivation for each sentence G(t) in which t occurs
treats t as a constant.45
The whole point of this definition, as far as I can see, is to
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deny that Russellian definite descriptions are rigid. A truth theory
treats a singular term as a Russellian definite description if and only
if the term becomes expanded in the usual way during the course of
preferred derivations. But once expanded, there remains no term to which
the evaluation function becomes applied that exactly corresponds to the
original term. The evaluation function ends up being applied to terms--
namely variables--that represent parts of a Russellian definite descrip-
tion, and not to a term that corresponds to the entire description. Con-
sequently, no Russellian definite description will satisfy Peacocke's
final definition of rigidity.
This will not do. The paradigm of a rigid designator, 'the
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square root of 25', is a Russellian definite description. In other
words, if there are any rigid designators, then certain Russellian
definite descriptions are among them. Hence, Peacocke's proposed defini-
tion does not capture the notion dubbed "rigid designation" by Kripke.
Peacocke's efforts seem directed toward a different notion, one for which
he has infelicitously chosen the name Kripke used. Peacocke seems pre-
occupied with the notion of a term's occurring only in singular term
positions in the underlying logical form of any sentence. He speaks of
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"genuine singular terms" and of "a criterion of rigid designation or
genuine reference," 4 where 'genuine reference' is presumably meant to
contrast with reference that includes descriptive or predicative elements.
Peacocke may have adequately characterized such a notion. We have not
provided enough details of his account to discuss the matter. He may even
have given a sufficient condition for rigidity, although arguments are
clearly needed to support this claim. But he has definitely not given a
necessary condition for rigidity. Consequently, his final definition is
not an alternative to ours. Nor is it in any way evidence that (37) can
be rephrased to capture rigidity successfully without resorting to modal
not ions.
VI
Peacocke is not alone in taking rigid designation to be akin to
pure reference. In "On Predicating Proper Names" Michael Lockwood speaks
of "the Kripke-Donnellan conception of proper names as "rigid designators"
,50
or purely referential devices.,50 As the wording suggests, Lockwood
considers Kripke's distinction between rigid and nonrigid designators to
be closely related to Donnellan's distinction between referential and
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attributive uses of singular terms. But he does not think that the
two distinctions are quite the same. For example, he grants that 'the
cube of 408' is rigid even when used attributively. Still, he hastens
to add that "the rigidity of 'the cube of 408' here stems from an
irrelevant source....Here we have a term whose rigidity is insured, quite
independently of the speaker's intentions, by the necessity of a certain
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mathematical proposition." 52  On his view, then, referential uses of
singular terms form the salient subclass of rigidly designating uses.
Cases in which a singular term is used attributively and yet rigidly are
aberrations. Nevertheless, having conceded that modal considerations
make 'the cube of 408' always rigid, Lockwood might be expected to adopt
a modal definition of rigidity. But instead, he offers a nonmodal defini-
tion along lines suggested to him by Peacocke:
Let S(t) be a sentence, containing a definite singular
term t. In uttering this sentence, by way of making
an assertion, a person will be using t as a rigid
designator if and only if it is a necessary and (43)
sufficient condition of the truth of what S(t) is
being used to assert that x satisfy the predicate ex-
pressed by the context S( ).53
This definition is like (40) except that Lockwood drops the universal
quantification over sentences in order to extend his definition to
languages with ambiguities. Since (43) is a weakened version of (40),
it is open to the objections we gave earlier. Notice here that our (40)
is not entirely a straw man. Once one chooses (in Peacocke's words) to
base rigid designation on "the idea of a certain object entering the
truth conditions" of the sentences in which the designating term occurs,
(40) lurks nearby.
It is difficult to see why anyone would confuse Kripke's rigid
designation with a notion of pure reference. In "Identity and Necessity"
and "Naming and Necessity" Kripke does claim both that proper names are
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rigid designators and that proper names are nonconnotative. But
these two claims need not amount to the same thing. Similarly, in one
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footnote he uses the phrase, "both a 'referential' (rigid) and a non-
rigid reading of the description." 55  But the scare-quotes around
'referential' should warn against quick conclusions. Besides, the
textual evidence against identifying rigid designation with pure reference
is clear and overwhelming. As we have said repeatedly, Kripke's paradigm
of rigid designation is not purely referential. Also, in a footnote in
"Identity and Necessity" he plainly indicates that Russellian definite
descriptions can be rigid:
Some logicians have been interested in the question
of the conditions under which, in an intensional
context, a description with small scope is equivalent
to the same one with large scope. One of the virtues
of a Russellian treatment of descriptions in modal
logic is that the answer (roughly that the description
be a 'rigid designator' in the sense of this lecture)
then often follows from the other postulates for
quantified modal logic.56
Furthermore, there is clear textual evidence against identifying Kripke's
distinction between rigid and nonrigid designators with Donnellan's
distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite de-
scriptions. In "Naming and Necessity" Kripke calls attention to Donnellan's
distinction. But he then elects to confine his remarks to attributive
uses--i.e., to uses for which 'the referent of the description' means
"the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite descrip-
tion. ' 57  Donnellan's referential uses of definite descriptions may well
be rigidly designating uses, as Peacocke and Lockwood think. But nowhere
in "Identity and Necessity" or "Naming and Necessity" does Kripke make
this claim. 8
Perhaps the tendency to confuse rigid designation with pure
reference comes from taking proper names to be paradigms of rigidity.
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This in turn may be prompted by confusing the thesis that proper names
are rigid with the claim that they are nonconnotative. These latter
mistakes are serious. They deserve comment even though it requires a
brief digression. For these mistakes significantly misrepresent what
Kripke is doing in "Identity and Necessity" and "Naming and Necessity."
Most notably, they rob some of his central arguments of their force.
For example, in both works Kripke argues that "an identity
statement between names, if true at all, is necessarily true"--e.g., if
'Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus' is true, then 'If Hesperus exists,
Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus' is necessarily true. 5 9  His
argument has the following form:60
(i) Denoting proper names are rigid designators.
(ii) Any identity statement between rigid designators,
if true, is necessarily true. (44)
(iii) .'. Any identity statement between denoting proper
names, if true, is necessarily true.
The notion of necessary truth here is the weak notion exhibited in the
above example. Kripke's defense of premiss (ii) is straightforward.
A rigid designator denotes the same object in every possible world in
which that object exists, and it denotes no other object in any possible
world. Hence, if two rigid designators denote the same object in the
actual world, then they denote the same object in every possible world in
which that object exists and they denote no other objects in any possible
world. The premiss can also be defended without explicitly resorting to
possible world reasoning. From (iv) and (v) below and our definition of
rigidity, (33), we can derive (vi) via "standard", intuitive modal reasoning
(e.g., within less controversial parts of standard modal predicate logics): 6 2
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(iv) '7xFx' and 'iyGy' are rigid designators
(v) ixFx=7yGy
(vi) G[((3x)Fx v (3y)Gy) (3!x)(3!y)(Fx & Gy x=y)]
Accordingly, in (44) the premiss that carries the weight of the argument
is (i). If one is to disagree with Kripke's conclusion, then short of
objecting generally to standard modal reasoning, one must disagree with
the thesis that proper names are rigid designators.
This thesis seems no less crucial to Kripke's argument against
strong versions of the cluster theory.6 3 At least it is crucial to my
reconstruction of the argument. Let X be a denoting proper name and let
the 4's be the properties in the cluster that, according to the theory,
determines the reference of X. Strong versions of the theory are those
that include (i):
(i) rIf X exists, then X has most of the 0's
expresses a necessary truth.
Kripke contends that the proponent of a cluster theory must grant some
lattitude in the choice of X and the O's. In particular, they can be so
chosen that, for someone's idiolect, the O's all hold contingently (if
at all) of the individual having most of them in the actual world. Kripke
makes the point this way: "it does not seem that it should be trivially
true on the basis of a theory of proper names" that, for example, some
of the properties commonly attributed to Aristotle are properties that
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are essential to him. Accordingly, X can be so chosen that the pro-
ponent of (i) must allow a stipulation of (iii) along with his stipula-
tion of (ii): 6 5
(ii) In the actual world the individual denoted by
X, and only this individual, has most of the k's.
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(iii) The individual that has most of the *'s in
the actual world might still have existed and
yet had none of the *'s.
I take the form of the argument to be that, since proper names
are rigid designators, such an X is a counterexample to (i). We thus add
one more premiss:
(iv) Denoting proper names are rigid designators.
Since X is a denoting proper name, from (iv) we get (v), and from (ii)
and (v) we get (vi):
(v) X is a rigid designator.
(vi) With respect to any possible world w, X desig-
nates the individual that has most of the 4's
in the actual world, provided this individual
exists in w.
But (vii) is a consequence of (i) and (vi):
(vii) With respect to any possible world w, if the
individual that has most of the 4's in the
actual world exists in w, then this individual
has most of the O's in w.
And (vii) contradicts (iii) since (iii) can be paraphrased as (viii):
(viii) There is some possible world w in which the
individual that has most of the *'s in the
actual world exists and yet has none of the O's.
Therefore, since (ii) and (iii) are true for X by stipulation, (i) is
false.
Now without (iv) we do not get (vi). But without (vi), (i),
(ii), and (iii) are compatible. They can be reconciled with one another
in the context of counterpart theory. That is, if with respect to every
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possible world w, X denotes the individual (if any) that has most of
the O's in w, then (i), (ii), and (iii) are clearly compatible.66
Accordingly, like the argument on the necessity of identity statements,
the argument in "Naming and Necessity" against (i) seems to hinge on
the thesis that proper names are rigid. If the proponent of (i) is to
respond, then short of resisting the stipulation of (iii) or short of
objecting to the modal reasoning, he must disagree with this thesis.67
Of course, the thesis that names are rigid is not the only
major claim about names put forward in "Identity and Necessity" and
"Naming and Necessity." Prominent in the lectures are other claims
needed to support this thesis. For example, there is the claim that
proper names are nonconnotative. The exact claim here is not clear. For
present purposes the following approximation will suffice: proper names
are not synonymous with any definite descriptions (or clusters of
descriptions) that are suitable for determining their reference. The
"suitability" restriction is meant to exclude descriptions like 'the
68individual identical with Benjamin Franklin'. Now, we seem to know of
no description, suitable for picking out an entity not yet named, that
is necessarily and necessarily uniquely true of any contingent entity.
Hence, if a proper name of a contingent entity were synonymous with a
description (or a cluster), the description (or cluster) in question
would have to be contingently or contingently uniquely true of the
individual picked out. But then this proper name would not be a rigid
69designator. Similar reasoning applies to the claim that the reference
of a proper name can be fixed via a description without giving the name
a meaning. Kripke concedes that the reference of some names may be
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fixed via descriptions that are only contingently or contingently uniquely
true of the individuals names. But if fixing reference in this way were
to give names meaning, then those names whose reference is so fixed would
not be rigid.70
Accordingly, given that we do not know of suitable descriptions
that are necessarily and necessarily uniquely true of contingent entities,
and given that the reference of some names may nonetheless be fixed via
contingent marks of the entities names, Kripke needs these other claims
to retain the thesis that names are rigid. But these claims are never-
theless logically independent of this thesis. They could be false, and
yet it be true. For, it is logically possible for the reference of each
proper name to be fixed by means of a description that is necessarily and
necessarily uniquely true of the individual named. In this case proper
names would be rigid even if they were connotative and even if the way
in which their reference is fixed gave them their meaning. Consequently
these other claims should not be confused with the thesis that proper
names are rigid. Only the latter is crucial to the two arguments just
discussed.
Consider now the consequences of taking proper names to be
paradigms of Kripke's notion of rigid designation. If they are paradigms,
then any explication of rigidity will be constrained by their having to
satisfy it. Hence, if they are paradigms, the claim that they are rigid
is trivially true (if anything is rigid). But arguments central to
"Identity and Necessity" and "Naming and Necessity" turn on this claim.
If this claim is trivially true, these arguments can amount to little more
than bare assertions of their conclusions. Therefore, to take proper
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names to be paradigms of rigidity, as Peacocke and Lockwood perhaps do,
is to rob some of the central arguments in the text of their force. Even
if Peacocke and Lockwood do not take names to be paradigms of rigidity,
I suspect that they have underestimated how much weight the thesis that
proper names are rigid carries in Kripke's lectures. It is a strong
thesis. It says that in salient respects proper names are like certain
definite descriptions, viz. those that are necessarily and necessarily
uniquely true of the objects they denote. Thus to think that no Russellian
descriptions are rigid or even to think that rigidity is akin to pure
reference is to distort and weaken the thesis. The pivotal role this
thesis plays in the lectures is strong evidence that Peacocke and
Lockwood have misconstrued Kripke's notion. 71
VII
The preceding digression should have put Peacocke's definition
to rest. Since Russellian definite descriptions can clearly be rigid
if anything can, Peacocke's definition is wrong. But what about his
approach? Can the apparatus he uses to rephrase (37) provide a nonmodal
definition of rigidity? That is, can rigid designators be precisely
characterized in terms of the way they are handled in the preferred
derivations of Tarski-Davidson truth theories?
The answer appears to be no, if the preferred derivations do no
more work than they do in standard Tarski-Davidson truth theories. In a
standard theory the working steps of preferred derivations give satisfaction
conditions for molecular constituents of sentences in terms of the
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components of these constituents. Every preferred derivation thus con-
stitutes a step-by-step compositional analysis of what the theory takes to
be the logical form of a sentence. Accordingly, how preferred derivations
handle a term depends first on what the theory takes to be the term's
logical form and second on what the theory takes to be the way the term
contributes to the logical form of sentences. But as we have noted, the
difference between rigid and nonrigid designators does not seem to be a
matter of their logical form or of the way they contribute to the logical
form of sentences. Some Russellian descriptions are rigid, and some are
not. The differences between those that are and those that are not fail
to be systematically reflected in the logical form of sentences. How then
are rigid designators to be discriminated in preferred derivations?
This objection can be made precise. Consider "Russellian
English", a language like English except that it is restricted to purely
extensional, first order sentences and all definite descriptions in it
are read as Russellian descriptions. Both 'the number of pardoned
Presidents' and 'the number of even primes' occur in it. A standard
truth theory for it will construe these two comparably--i.e., the preferred
derivations will handle them comparably. Yet 'the number of pardoned
Presidents' is intuitively nonrigid, and 'the number of even primes' is
intuitively rigid. That one is rigid, and not the other, is not altered
by their occurring in Russellian English rather than in English. The
same point can be made about other syntactically like pairs: e.g.,
'the number of books in Aristotle's Metaphysics' and 'the number of
modalities in Lewis's 54', or 'the set of golden mountains' and 'the set
of composite primes'. Now, rigid designators can be precisely characterized
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in terms of how they are handled in the preferred derivations of standard
truth theories only if the preferred derivations of each'such theory
handle rigid designators in a way that is distinctively different from
the way they handle nonrigid designators. The truth theory for Russellian
English fails this necessary condition. Accordingly, rigid designation
cannot be defined on the basis of the way terms are handled in the pre-
ferred derivations of standard Tarski-Davidson truth theories.
Can Peacocke's approach be saved by extending Tarski-Davidson
truth theories? That is, can the work done in preferred derivations be
increased to the point where they might handle rigid designators distinc-
tively? Perhaps. However, even if it can, this seems an ill-motivated
way of saving the approach. Consider how truth theories would have to be
extended. Standard preferred derivations do not handle rigid designators
distinctively for a good reason. A standard Tarski-Davidson truth theory
is a purely linguistic theory. It does not tell us which sentences are
true; it only gives us the conditions under which sentences are true. But
the difference between definite descriptions that denote and those that
do not--and a fortiori the difference between those that rigidly designate
and those that do not--is in crucial respects extralinguistic. Hence,
preferred derivations will not be able to handle rigid designators
distinctively unless they include steps warranted by extralinguistic con-
siderations. In other words, to make Peacocke's approach work, the domain
of Tarski-Davidson truth theories will have to be extended to various
extralinguistic matters.
Of what significance is the apparent failure of Peacocke's
approach? Should we draw any conclusion from it? To answer these
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questions, we must examine the reason for framing the definition in terms
of what happens in preferred derivations. Why pursue this indirect way
of using the notion of a truth theory? A definition like (45) is an
obvious, more direct approach to using this notion to render (37) precise:
A singular term t of a language L is treated as a
rigid designator by a truth theory of L if and only
if there is an object x such that, according to the (45)
truth theory, any sentence G(t) in which t occurs is
true if and only if <x> satisfies G( ).
(45) has some virtues. It is not modal. Its notion of truth conditions
is not obscure. And it does not require preferred derivations to handle
rigid designators distinctively. It has, however, a decisive fault. It
is open to the same objections as (40). For instance, every denoting
definite description of a purely extensional language satisfies it.
Peacocke expressly recognizes this.72 He turns to a definition
in terms of preferred derivations in the effort to get a criterion that
is not satisfied by nonrigidly designating definite descriptions. His
appeal to preferred derivations is accordingly in response to a primary
desideratum. It is intended to accomplish without modality what the
modal clauses of other definitions accomplish, viz. to impose the proper
constraint on what a term would have denoted if things besides language
had been different. Earlier we identified the problem of satisfying this
desideratum as the problem that is basic to rephrasing (37) without using
modal notions. Indeed, we examined (40) just to bring this problem out.
It is easy to eliminate the obscurity of (37). The problem is to avoid
resorting to modal notions and yet formulate the constraint that excludes
nonrigidly designating definite descriptions. The significance of the
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failure of Peacocke's approach is thus apparent. The failure puts us back
where we began, with an obscure (37) and an inadequate (40).
What conclusion should we draw from the failure of Peacocke's
approach? The issue is whether (37) can be rephrased somehow to yield
an exact criterion of rigidity without resorting to modal notions. So
far we have shown only that Peacocke has given no evidence that it can.
We have not yet shown that it cannot. However, we do have some evidence
pointing to the stronger conclusion. There is a pattern to the failures
of the various attempts to rephrase (37). Both Peacocke's approach and
definitions like (40) and (45) fail in the same respect: they do not
mark the distinction between rigidly and nonrigidly designating definite
descriptions. If a denoting definite description could have denoted
some object other than the one it does had things other than language
been different, then it is a nonrigidly designating definite description.
If, to the contrary, it could have denoted no other object and would
still have denoted the object it does provided that object still existed,
73then it is a rigidly designating definite description.
The modal clause in our definition, (33), specifically marks
this distinction. It requires rigidly designating definite descriptions
to be necessarily and necessarily uniquely true of the objects of which
they are true. The modal clauses in the definitions of exclusive and
inclusive rigidity, (1) and (4), also mark this distinction, although
they draw the boundary at slightly different places. For a definite
description to be rigid, it must satisfy some modal condition--either ours
or one much like it. The attempts to rephrase (37) simply fail to come
up with a nonmodal condition that will be satisfied only if a modal
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condition like ours is satisfied. These attempts thus fail exactly where
they should if there is no way to rephrase (37) successfully without
resorting to modal notions. The pattern of failure hence gives us some
evidence confirming our suspicion that (37) cannot be rephrased success-
fully without using modal notions.
Two questions prompted our looking at Peacocke's paper in detail.
First, is his definition of rigid designation in any way preferable to
the one we defended at length in the last section? Our conclusion is no.
Second, and more important, is there reason to doubt that rigid designation
is a de re modal notion, as our definition and the others we examined
earlier imply? Our study of Peacocke has given us no reason to doubt
and some reason to believe that rigid designation is an intrinsically
modal notion. But is the modality de re modality? The need for modality
is clearest in connection with discriminating between rigidly and non-
rigidly designating definite descriptions. We have found that this dis-
tinction can be marked naturally by a de re modal condition. But does it
have to be? Can it instead be marked by means of a de dicto modal con-
dition? That is, for each denoting definite description, is there a
proposition such that the description is rigid if and only if the pro-
position is necessarily true?
An obvious candidate for such a de dicto condition is given
in (46):
A denoting definite description of the form
the x such that Fx
is a rigid designator if and only if the proposition
expressed by the corresponding sentence of the form (46)
~I ___ I_ _ _~ I_ _ I
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the object that happens to satisfy F satisfies
and uniquely satisfies F
is necessarily true.
Symbolically, the condition is:
F()xFx) & (yy)(Fy -_ y=(7xFx)) is necessarily true. (47)
This condition admits of two readings, depending on whether we interpret
'necessarily true' in the usual strong way or in the weak way Kripke
suggests. Consider the strong reading first, as given by (48), with
the definite description operators having narrow scope:
0 F(IxFx) & (Vy)(Fy - y=( xFx))] (48)
Once the description operators are expanded, (48) simplifies to (49):
D(3x)4Fx & (Vy)(Fy =E y=x)] (49)
But (49) amounts to nothing more than an instance of the schema governing
"unfailing designation,." as defined by (17). The strong reading of (47)
fails to mark the distinction between rigidly and nonrigidly designating
descriptions for the same reason that unfailing designation is not exten-
sionally equivalent to rigid designation. (49) says that the predicate
F must be satisfied by some object; but it fails to say that the predicate
must be satisfied by the very object that happens to satisfy it.
Consider now the weak reading of (47), in which 'necessarily
true' is taken roughly as 'necessarily true provided the object that
happens to satisfy F exists'. The condition in this case is given by
(50), again with the description operators having narrow scope:
S~(3x)(Fx & (V'y)(Fy " y=x)) (50)
(F(1xFx) & (Vy)(Fy 3 y=(ixFx)))]
Once the description operators are expanded and the expression simplified,
the necessitated clause is found to be a tautology:
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[(3x)(Fx & (Vy)(Fy 3 y=x)) (51)
(3x)(Fx & (Vy)(Fy y=x))J
Hence, the weak reading of (47) fails to mark the distinction between
rigidly and nonrigidly designating descriptions since every definite
description satisfied it. (51) can be revised to avoid this objection:
[(3x)(Fx & (Vy)(Fy = y=x)) (52)
o (3x) (Fx & (Vy)(Fy S y=x))3
But (52) is like (49) in failing to say that the predicate F must be
satisfied by the very object that happens to satisfy it.
Thus the simplest proposals for a de dicto distinction between
rigidly and nonrigidly designating definite descriptions do not work.
Perhaps there is a subtler way to construct a de dicto condition marking
the distinction. I do not see how to close off this possibility, though
we should keep in mind the failure of other attempts to replace de re
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with de dicto modality. At any rate, our use of de re necessity in (33)
is naturally motivated. It is the natural way to mark the distinction
between rigidly and nonrigidly designating descriptions. By contrast, the
attempts we have examined to fashion a nonmodal or a de dicto distinction
fail to specify that the description must be satisfied by the very same
object that happens to satisfy it. The de re modal distinction succeeds
where these approaches fail. This was the upshot of the long argument in
Section II: the de re modal aspect of rigid designation specifically shuts
off possibilities left open by the nonmodal notion of designation simpliciter
and by the de dicto modal notion of unfailing designation.
The conclusion is clear. All the evidence we have is that,
for better or worse, rigid designation is intrinsically a de re modal
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notion. Earlier we concluded that (33) is clearly preferable among the
suggested de re modal definitions of rigidity. We now further conclude
that (33) is the preferred definition among those in the literature
generally. (33) is the best working definition we have.
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25 Kripke, op. cit., p. 146.
26 This line of argument was suggested by Ali Akhtar.
27 Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," p. 270.
28 A completely rigid designator may have a redundant description com-
ponent and hence have superfluous details. For example, 'the number
which is the successor of 8 and the square of 3' contains more detail
than is needed for it to designate 9 rigidly. But the superfluous
details of a completely rigid designator are ones that can never affect
reference.
29 One argument will be given in the next chapter.
30 Several points are in controversy here: whether to take a realistic,
in contrast to heuristic, view of possible world interpretations; whether
to interpret the possibility operator followed by the existential quan-
tifier as existence of an object in some possible world; and what the
truth conditions are for the formula.
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This question--for if so, which one?--is the one we are claiming may
well remain open even if there are possible, nonactual objects satisfy-
ing the description of a potentially rigid designator in some possible
world.
33 Cf. Kripke, ibid., p. 764.
34 Christopher Peacocke, "Proper Names, Reference, and Rigid Designation,"
in Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, ed. Simon Blackburn, (Cambridge:
Cambridge U. Press, 1975), pp. 109-132.
35 Ibid., p. 110. The constraint against indexicals is removed later
in Peacocke's article (as we shall see), but the constraint against
ambiguities remains.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 114. Peacocke uses 't' as a name of a term and as a
term. I trust the reader can sort out any potential use-mention
confusions deriving from this double duty.
39 Ibid. Again I trust the reader can sort out any potential use-
mention confusions in the quoted passage.
40 I qualify this remark because perhaps there is a language in which
the denotation relation is the identity relation, in which case terms
would bear essential relations to their denotata.
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appears to be no small task; but our definition, (33), is just such an
intermediate, stated in a less confining framework.
42 Peacocke, op. cit., p. 115.
43 The presentation in the text is rather sketchy. A more thorough
presentation of the standard account can be found in "On the Frame of
Reference," by John Wallace, in Semantics of Natural Language, ed.
Harman and Davidson.
44 Two phrases in this characterization make it informal: 'corresponds
to t' and 'as a variable'. Correspondence is problematic because con-
stituents like 'Ft' may be replaced by constituents like 'Gt & Ht' during
a preferred derivation. Exact correspondence is not easily made formally
precise because of such expansions. Treatment of a term as a variable
in a preferred derivation is more readily made formally precise, but
somewhat tediously. I trust the characterization in the text is
adequate for the purposes at hand. For those interested, Peacocke's
actual definition is as follows:
Truth theory T treats expression e of language L as a rigid
designator iff for any sentence G(v) of L containinge , given
as premisses specifications of the objects demonstrated by
person p at time t, then: in any maximally short derivation
in T from those premisses of a target biconditional of the
form
T(G(w) ,p,t) A
where A does not contain sats, the evaluation function of
T is applied to some expression e (e.g. d. itself or a place-
holder) which occupies the. place of this occurrence of a
via the application of the satisfaction axiom for the atomic
predicate in which the given occurrence of % features as
argument in the original sentence G(*.); where the evaluation
is such that either given p, t, and the fixing of the
indexical referents, there is a sequence of objects so such
that evaluation of e only with respect to s o occurs in
maximally short derivations, or e is such that the result of
evaluating it with respect to any sequence of objects is
always the same. (P. 125.)
The next to last clause is intended to distinguish between variables
and indexicals, and the final clause, between variables and constants.
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The definition assumes that the original sentence is expressed in terms
of atomic predicates, so that the problem alluded to above is avoided.
45 Presumably, Peacocke wants to restrict his definition to denoting
constants. However, if we follow Church's terminological conventions,
the added qualification is gratuitous. (Cf. Church, Introduction to
Mathematical Logic, (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1956), p. 4.
46 Restricting this claim to Russellian definite descriptions is crucial.
Peacocke distinguishes between two kinds of definite descriptions,
Russellian and "entity-invoking." The entity invoking use of a definite
description is something I am not altogether clear about. Peacocke says
the following: "if, in an utterance of "the F is G", what is strictly
and literally said would equally and appropriately be said by an utterance
of "that F is G", then "the F" functioned as a rigid designator. I shall
label this an entity-invoking use of the description." (Op. cit., p.
117.) He introduces the apparatus for indexicals in order to account
for entity-invoking uses of definite descriptions being rigid while
Russell ian uses are not. That Peacocke definitely wants to deny that
Russellian definite descriptions are rigid can be seen at many places
in his article; for example, see p. 110, p. 117ff, p. 122ff.
47 I am being somewhat presumptuous here in claiming that Kripke
intended 'the square root of 25' to be Russellian. Some people may
want to claim that it is for example Strawsonian. But notice that either
way it comes out to be rigid, if anything is rigid. (This is subject
to our earlier proviso that Kripke is talking about the domain of posi-
tive integers.) Kripke's use in no way seems entity-invoking. Indeed,
throughout the lectures, as we shall see shortly, Kripke shows a
distinct preference for reading definite descriptions in Russell's way.
48 Peacocke, op. cit., p. 126.
49 Ibid., p. 119.
50 Michael Lockwood, "On Predicating Proper Names," Philosophical
Review, LXXXIV, (October, 1975), pp. 471-498.
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51 Donnellan's distinction is between referential and attributive uses
of definite descriptions. Lockwood extends the distinction, and we
follow him for the sake of discussion. Lockwood wants to claim that
proper names occur in attributive uses.
52 Ibid., p. 487.
53 Cf. ibid., pp. 485 and 487.
54 What Kripke expressly claims in "Naming and Necessity" is that
Mill is "more-or-less right about 'singular' names" (p. 322), and he
later says that "the present view endorses Mill's view of singular
terms." (P. 327.) I have chosen to express this position in terms
of Mill's 'nonconnotative'; I do not think that Kripke uses this term.
55 Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," p. 149n.
56 Ibid., p. 140n. I presume that this footnote is where Peacocke's
idea that rigid designators are scopeless comes from. But scopeless
in what sense? Let 'txFx' be a rigid designator. Consider 'aG(CxFx)'.
This admits of three readings:
(3x)((y)(Fy E y=x) & OGx)
(3x)O((QVy) (Fy " y=x) & Gx)
1(3x)((Vy) (Fy -- y=x) & Gx)
Surely it is not Kripke's view that these three have the same truth
value in all instances. For the last can be false even when the
others are true on standard interpretations of ''. We will return
to this footnote and the question of the relation between scope and
rigid designation in some detail in the next chapter.
57 Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," p. 254. Kripke is careful in
presenting Donnellan's distinction. He does not generalize it in the
manner of Lockwood and Peacocke.
58 Elsewhere ("Identity and Necessity," p. 14 9n), in considering the
view that definite descriptions in English can be used both rigidly
and nonrigidly, Kripke remarks that those who call the nonrigid or
innermost scope reading of a description "attributive" are "following
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Donnellan, perhaps loosely." He also distinguishes between Donnellan's
distinction and the distinction between the purportedly alternative
readings of definite descriptions in English.
59 Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," p. 310. The form of the identity
statement is given on p. 311.
60 Cf., for example, "Identity and Necessity," p. 154.
61 Cf. ibid. or "Naming and Necessity," p. 306.
62 (vii) and (viii) can also be derived from (iv) and (v):
(vii) (3x) (y)O((Vz)(Fz z=x) & (Vz)(Gz - z=y) & x=y)
(viii) (3x)(3y)((Vz)(Fz - z=x & (Vz)(Gz = z=y) & cx=y)
In some respects (vii) captures Kripke's weak sense of necessity as
well as (vi) does. But (vi) has modality de dicto, whereas (vii) has
modality de re; and Kripke seems to want to claim that if an identity
statement is true, then a certain de dicto statement involving identity,
viz. (vi), is true.
63 The argument to which I refer is presented compactly in "Naming and
Necessity," pp. 287-289. It is initially developed in pp. 270-281.
64 Cf. ibid., p. 287. Also, on p. 279, Kripke remarks, "Many people
just have some vague cluster of his most famous achievements. Not
only each of these singly, but the possession of the entire disjunc-
tion of these properties, is just a contingent fact about Aristotle."
65 A version of the argument that gives the proponent of the cluster
theory less room to maneuver is obtained if (i) is replaced by (i') and
(iii) by (iii'), with appropriate adjustments elsewhere:
(i) r'If X exists, then X and X alone has most of the *'s'
expresses a necessary- truth.
(iiiP) The individual that has most of the O's in the actual
world might have existed and yet not been the individual
that has and alone has most of the #'s.
The proponent of the cluster theory will find the stipulation that (iii")
is true for some X harder to dispute than the stipulation that (iii) is
true.
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66 I take this to explain why Kripke argues against counterpart theory
while developing his case against (i).
67 1 remind the reader that resisting the stipulation of (iii) is not
an easy way out, if only because a like argument can be run off of
(i') and (iii'), and the stipulation of (iii') is hard to resist.
68 1 do not see how to characterize those descriptions that are not
suitable for determining the reference of names. This is the respect
in which the claim has been only approximately stated.
69 This is an argument that the proper names of contingent entities
would not be rigid if they were so synonymous. In "Naming and Necessity"
Kripke extends the claim to names of necessary entities like iT (Cf.
p. 278). However, he does not give an argument. Furthermore, as he
notes, whether the claim is true of names of necessary entities does
not matter to the lectures.
70 Kripke's causal "picture" of fixing the reference of proper names
also supports the thesis that proper names are rigid. For it suggests
a way of accounting for how the reference of proper names can be deter-
mined so that they would still denote the same object, if they denote
anything, even had things been different.
71 Of course, arguments in "Identity and Necessity' and "Naming and
Necessity" pertaining to common names turn on a like thesis, viz. that
they too are rigid designators.
72 Cf. Peacocke, op. cit., p. 116. Peacocke offers the following
criterion that closely resembles that of (45):
(3U)(for all sentences GT~T of L IT(G(t)) • <<>sats G(f))
His main reason for rejecting this is as follows: "Provided TL is
cast in a free logic, it is possible to write out a truth theory for
a first-order extensional language that evaluates definite descrip-
tions directly (as terms), and which contains as theorems sentences of
the form
T(G-lx) Fx) = <(Ix)Fx> sats G(")"
He also objects to it on the grounds that it will exclude his entity-
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invoking uses of definite descriptions--the ones for which he intro-
duces his apparatus for indexicals. His final moves are thus in
response to these two objections to the above criterion, and hence
indirectly to (45).
73 1 here leave open the question whether definite descriptions that
are exclusively or inclusively, but not completely rigid should be
counted as rigid or nonrigid. The important issue concerns modality.
Exclusively, inclusively, and completely rigid descriptions must all
satisfy some modal condition.
74 Cf. M. J. Cresswell, "The Elimination of De Re Modalities," The
Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September, 1969), pp.
329-330; and Richard Cartwright, "Some Remarks on Essentialism,"
The Journal of Philosophy, LXV, No. 20 (October 24, 1968), pp. 615-626.
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Chapter ill
Scope and Rigid Designation
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The relationship between rigid designation and the scope of
modal operators is a matter of controversy. There is general agreement
that rigid designators have scope-related characteristics that distinguish
them from nonrigid designators. But what these characteristics are is
disputed. On the one hand, some hold that rigid designators always have
only wide scope with respect to modal operators. For example, in arguing
that proper names are not rigid designators, Michael Dummett contends that
rigid designators always have wide scope, whereas names can have either
wide or narrow scope. Tyler Burge appears to agree with Dummett about
rigid designators since he says that they are always taken to have
referentially transparent position in modal contexts.2 On the other hand,
some hold that rigid designators can have either wide or narrow scope
with respect to modal operators; but they add that these scope differences,
unlike the corresponding ones for nonrigid designators, do not affect
truth-value. Thus, Christopher Peacocke says that the truth conditions
of modal sentences containing rigid designators are the same whether
these designators are read with wide or narrow scope. 3 Michael Slote
says that rigid designators enable one to argue with appropriate existence
qualifications from modality de dicto to modality de re and conversely.4
If we view the difference between modality de dicto and modality de re as
a difference in the scope of designators vis-a-vis modal operators, then
Slote is suggesting that, with appropriate existence qualifications,
rigid designators can be taken to have wide or narrow scope in modal con-
texts salva veritate. Leonard Linsky is explicit on this point. He
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remarks that the de re/de dicto distinction for modal propositions con-
taining rigid designators collapses.5 He then gives as a necessary and
sufficient condition for a designator a to be rigid that, for all
atomic F),rG#(4) have the same truth-value whether a be taken to have
6
wide or narrow scope.
Kripke sides with Peacocke, Slote, and Linsky. In the course
of a footnote in "Identity and Necessity," he comments:
Some logicians have been interested in the question of the
conditions under which, in an intensional context, a descrip-
tion with small scope is equivalent to the same one with large
scope. One of the virtues of a Russellian treatment of descrip-
tions in modal logic is that the answer (roughly that the
description be a 'rigid designator' in the sense of this
lecture) then often follows from the other postulates for
quantified modal logic; no special postulates are needed, as
in Hintikka's treatment. Even if descriptions are taken as
primitive, special postulation of when scope is irrelevant can
often be deduced from more basic axioms.7
These comments are reminiscent of the discussion of theorems 14.3 to
14.34 in Principia Mathematica. There Whitehead and Russell show that
"when E!(x)(4x), the scope of (Tx)( x) does not matter to the truth-
value of any proposition in which (lx)(+x) occurs" in an extensional
context.8
There is an obvious name to be given to singular terms satis-
fying the condition that Whitehead and Russell identify:
An instance of the schema
(7x)(*...x *..)
is a designator if and only if the corresponding ()
instance of the schema
(x)(Vy)(...y... - y=x)
is true.
Suppose or is a definite description in a first order quantificational
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language all of whose sentential connectives are truth-functional. Let A
be any sentence in which . occurs with its scope unmarked; and let B and
B' be any two sentences obtained from A via Russellian expansions of o.
(In the cases of interest B and B' will reflect different construals of
the scope of oL in A.) What Whitehead and Russell show is that if 4 is a
designator, then B and B' are materially equivalent. One claim Kripke
makes in the quoted footnote is that when certain modal sentential con-
nectives are added to the quantificational language, the analogue of the
Whitehead-Russell condition is (roughly) that 1 be a rigid designator.
This claim about rigid designators is comparatively precise.
At least it is precise if we ignore the qualifier 'roughly' and if we
specify which modal languages we are talking about. We are best off
deciding whether it is correct first. We can subsequently return to the
general question of the relationship between scope distinctions and
rigid designation.
For now, then, we will adopt Russell's treatment of definite
descriptions. The question is whether rigidly designating definite
descriptions in modal languages are the analogue of designating definite
descriptions in truth-functional languages. We will consider two families
of modal languages, one described in detail and the other alluded to
in passing in Kripke's "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic." We
will consider the scope of definite descriptions vis-a-vis the four dis-
tinct higher modalities of S5, symbolized by 'O', 'c', '~ ', and '~4'. We
will also consider weak necessity and contingency operators corresponding
to the weak notion of necessity Kripke employs in "Naming and Necessity"
and "Identity and Necessity." The question is whether rigidly designating
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definite descriptions can be read with contrasting scope with respect to
these operators without affecting.truth-value.
The answer is slightly surprising. The analogue of the Whitehead-
Russell condition turns out not to be rigid designation, but to be what
Kripke calls "strongly rigid designation." In the case of the languages
Kripke discusses in detail in "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic,"
rigid designation is not sufficient for truth-value to be unaffected by
scope for any of the six modal operators we consider. In other words,
rigid designators as a class exhibit no salient scope-related character-
istics in the modal languages most discussed in the recent literature.
However, they do exhibit salient scope-related characteristics in the
modal languages Kripke alludes to in passing. Even in the case of these
languages, rigid designation is not sufficient to make truth-value immune
to scope for the strong necessity and contingency operators, 't' and
'~0'; and in a wide range of contexts it is not sufficient to do so for
any of the six operators. Nevertheless, in what may appropriately be
called "simple standard" contexts in these languages, rigid designation
is sufficient for truth-value to be unaffected by scope for all of the
operators we consider except strong necessity and contingency. Kripke
undoubtedly meant to exclude these strong operators in his original
claim. With suitable qualifications about contexts, then, Kripke's
claim is correct if taken as applying to the languages he alludes to in
passing. But it is incorrect if taken as applying to the languages we
more often associate with him.
Developed in detail, these results are more significant than
they at first may appear to be. Scope considerations have sometimes been
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advanced in an effort to motivate the notion of rigid designation. One
consequence of our results is that, while scope considerations can be
used to motivate the stricter notion of strongly rigid designation, they
are an ill-conceived way of motivating the notion of rigid designation.
Substitution of co-referring designators in modal contexts salva
veritate and elimination of a type of referential ambiguity in counter-
factual descriptions provide much sounder bases for motivating rigidity
simpliciter. Rigid designators are not the logical analogue of standard
constants in modal languages; strongly rigid designators are.
How then are we to account for the fact that rigid designators
are widely thought to have distinctive scope-related characteristics in
modal contexts? The most striking consequences of our results are in
response to this question. If we construe informal essentialist talk
along the lines of the formal languages Kripke develops in detail in
"Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic," we have no way of accounting
for the mistaken views other than to attribute them to confusion. But
if we construe this talk along the lines of the formal languages Kripke
alludes to in passing, we can readily account for them. For, so long as
necessity and contingency are taken weakly, rigid designators have just
the right sort of scope-related characteristics in these other languages.
The preferred regimentation of essentialist talk remains a matter of
controversy. A second consequence of our results is that intuitions about
the scope behavior of rigid designators are evidence in favor of these
other languages. This, along with other points brought out below, in-
dicates that these languages deserve more attention than they have yet
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received. They may well be the best formal languages for regimenting
essentialist talk.
These languages and the contrast between weak and strong
necessity and contingency account for many mistakes about the logic of
rigid designators. But they do not account for all of them. A further
source of error is the predilection to view constants as paradigms of rigid
designation. Constants in standard logic have three sets of features:
i. A distinct logic, involving scope and instantiation as
well as the substitutivity of identity.
ii. Distinct referential features, best summarized by the
claim that constants are comparable to denoting proper
names in natural languages.
iii. A distinct relation to free variables, often expressed
by the claim that free variables are like generalized
constants, but perhaps better expressed by the claim
that constants are like fixed-valued free variables.
A third consequence of our results is that in philosophically interesting
modal languages constants can have at most one of these three sets of
features. Mistakes result from thinking that they can have more--mistakes
not just about rigid designation, but also about the construal of free
variables in modal contexts. To put the point differently, philosophi-
cally interesting modal languages cannot include constants of the sort
found in standard nonmodal languages. The tendency to think otherwise
is a special source of trouble in quantified modal logic.
Since the chapter is long, a brief outline of the rest of it is
called for. The next three sections pose the question about the "scope
neutrality" of rigid designators in formal languages in a full and precise
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way. The fifth section then answers this question in detail, and the
sixth applies the answer to the claim Kripke makes in the footnote
quoted earlier. The following three sections critically examine a
variety of claims that have been made about the logic of rigid designa-
tors. Finally, the tenth section addresses the problem of constants in
quantified modal logic, and the last section offers a few remarks about
the regimentation of de re modality.
II
Our initial question is not yet precise. We need to specify
which modal languages we will be considering, and we need to give a formal
criterion under which definite descriptions are rigid designators. Some
may object to the latter on the grounds that definite descriptions--
particularly Russellian definite descriptions--are never rigid designa-
tors. The footnote from "Identity and Necessity" quoted earlier is clear
evidence that Kripke thinks they can be. Also, his paradigm of a rigid
designator is 'the square root of 25', and nothing in his lectures dis-
courages us from taking it to be Russellian. If further justification
is wanted, our criterion and its consequences will show that one can
talk coherently about rigidly designating definite descriptions.
We here require only a necessary and sufficient condition for
definite descriptions to be rigid designators. Criteria for the rigidity
of other kinds of singular terms do not matter. Indeed, since the modal
languages Kripke discusses in "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic"
lack constants, contextually expanded definite descriptions are the only
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means for singular reference available in them. Still, we should note
in passing that the criterion we give for definite descriptions may
suffice for other kinds of singular terms as well. For example, Quine's
method for eliminating names from regimented languages via special predi-
cates like 'Socratizes' offers a means for applying our criterion to names.
If Quine is correct about the eliminability of names, a criterion for the
rigidity of definite descriptions may be all that will ever be needed.9
We will use the formal criterion for rigidity developed and
defended in the preceding chapter:
An instance of the schema
(Ix)(..*x**.)
is a rigid designator if and only if the (2)
corresponding instance of the schema
(.x) [(Vy)(..y** =0 y=x) & o(Vy)(...y*.. y=x)]
is true. 10
The criterion requires several comments. First, although as stated the
criterion applies literally only to expressions containing an )-operator,
it is meant to apply to definite descriptions in general, and not just
to those that happen to be symbolized in this customary way. Second, the
redundant initial clause of the schema is included to emphasize that on
this criterion a definite description must be a designator in order to
be a rigid designator. In this respect, the criterion should be con-
trasted with one in which 'O' is prefixed to the entire schema. Third,
since '~' occurs within the scope of a quantifier, it is of course to be
taken as expressing necessity de re. If our criterion is correct, rigid
designation is, for better or worse, a de re modal notion. Fourth, the
instances of the defining schema are formulas in the metalanguage. They
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need not be formulas in the object language. Thus the criterion says
that a certain expression in the object language is a rigid designator
just in case a certain related expressipn in the metalanguage is true.
The criterion therefore applies to definite descriptions in nonmodal as
well as in modal languages. Of course, when the criterion is applied
to a modal quantificational language, homophonic translation may make the
instances of the defining schema formulas in the object language too. We
will be taking advantage of such homophonic translation below. Finally,
as the criterion stands, 'El' in the schema remains an uninterpreted modal
operator, to be read 'it is necessary that' or 'necessarily'. Thus
according to the criterion, a definite description is a rigid designator
if and only if, informally speaking, there exists an object that necessarily
and necessarily uniquely satisfies the description.12 Here the interpreta-
tion of 'necessarily' is left open. In the context of a specific modal
language, 'a' in the schema will receive a more precise interpretation.
In particular, in the context of the modal languages that we will be con-
sidering, the criterion for rigid designation will admit of a "possible
world" model-theoretic interpretation.
Rigid designation should be distinguished from what Kripke calls
"strongly" rigid designation:
An instance of the schema
(7x)(---x-..)
is a strongly rigid designator if and only
if the corresponding instance of the schema (3)
(3x) (Vy)(...y... .y=x) & U(Vy)(...y...* y=x) &
i (3x)(truxe.)
is true.
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A strongly rigid designator thus rigidly designates a necessarily existing
object. This notion will be important below.
There are several arguments in favor of our criterion. One is
based on Kripke's account of rigidity. On the standard possible world
interpretations of our criterion, a designator is rigid just in case
there is an actual object that it designates with respect to every
possible world in which that object exists; and with respect to other
worlds it designates nothing. But this is precisely what Kripke says in
"Identity and Necessity." 1 3 A second argument is based on Kripke's
intuitive test for distinguishing rigid designators. Our criterion
exactly captures the test he means to use, namely that ra.might not have
been o' be false on the reading in which the first occurrence of a. has wide
scope and the second, narrow scope with respect to the modal operator.
Another argument concerns descriptions of counterfactual situations. The
reference of singular terms in such descriptions can be determined either
on the basis of the actual situation or on the basis of the supposed
counterfactual situation. Our criterion singles out essentially just
those designators whose reference can be determined on either basis
without affecting the truth of the counterfactual descriptions in which
they appear. Other arguments turn on more formal considerations. For
example, as (3) shows, our criterion yields a perspicuous formal state-
ment of the distinction between strongly and weakly rigid designators.
Such arguments in support of (2) have been developed in con-
siderable detail in the preceding chapter. Other proposed criteria
for rigidity have also been examined there. For present purposes, the
preceding sketches of the arguments will have to suffice.
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III
Next we have to identify the modal quantificational languages
we will be considering. A word of warning is needed here. We will rely
on possible world model theory to characterize the languages. Hence,
there will be much talk below of possible worlds, of objects existing in
possible worlds, and the like. Nothing we do will require any of this
talk to be taken literally. It is only an heuristic substitute for the
purely mathematical characterizations of the languages that the model-
theoretic definitions of truth provide. The model-theoretic definitions
themselves are given in an appendix. Model theory will enable us to
determine whether certain formulas are valid in the different languages.
Of course, if a formula is valid in a language and the logic of that
language is axiomatizable, then the formula is derivable from the axioms.
Accordingly, our proofs of validity and invalidity will also have a
bearing on a further claim Kripke makes in the footnote quoted earlier,
namely that with a Russellian treatment of descriptions, the adequacy of
rigid designation for eliminating scope difficulties "often follows
from the other postulates for quantified modal logic."
We will be considering two families of modal languages. One
consists of those languages that admit of the definition of truth Kripke
gives in detail in "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic." 14 This
definition has two distinctive features. First, the truth-value of a
quantified formula with respect to a given possible world is evaluated
with the quantified variable ranging only over the objects that exist in
that world. Second, the function that assigns T and F to formulas with
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respect to possible worlds (given an assignment of objects from the
universe of discourse to the variables) is a complete function. Thus,
if a predicate is not satisfied with respect to a possible world by an
object in the universe of discourse, then the complement of this predicate
is satisfied by the object with respect to that world, even if the object
fails to exist in it. An example will help. Consider a possible world
in which Socrates does not exist. Even with respect to this world,
Socrates is either in the extension of 'Q is a philosopher' or in the
extension of 'Ois not a philosopher'. Moreover, given the first dis-
tinctive feature of the truth definition, Socrates may be in the extension
of '$ is a philosopher' with respect to this world, and yet the formula
'(3x)(x-is a philosopher)' still be false with respect to it. Another
consequence of the truth definition is that an object satisfies an open
formula 'oGx' only if it is in the extension assigned to 'G$' with res-
pect to every accessible world, even those in which it fails to exist.
We will call the members of this family "the K-languages." They
differ from one another model-theoretically by having different admissible
model-structures. First, they do not place the same restrictions on the
accessibility relation among possible worlds. For some of the languages
the relation only has to be reflexive, in the manner of T, while for
others it has to be, for instance, symmetric and transitive as well, in
the manner of S5. Second, the languages do not place the same restrictions
on which objects exist in different worlds. Among the K-languages is the
naive extension of S5 in which both the Barcan and the converse Barcan
formulas are valid. 1 7 This language requires the same objects to exist
in all worlds. Also among the K-languages are the ones Kripke sets out in
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"Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic." In these neither the Barcan
nor the converse Barcan formulas are valid. These languages place no
restrictions on which objects exist in different worlds (other than that
each object in the universe of discourse exists in at least one world).
The quantified version of T for which Kripke specifies axioms is the weak-
18
est of the K-languages. Its valid formulas are included among those of
all of the other K-languages.
Our second family of modal languages springs from an alternative
truth definition Kripke mentions while discussing the converse Barcan
19formulas. Unlike the definition just reviewed, this one renders these
formulas--'o(Vx) (Fx) (Vx) (aFx)' and '(3x) (*Fx) 0 Q(3x) (Fx) '--valid even
for model-structures in which there are no special restrictions on which
objects exist in different worlds. This definition differs from the other
one in two ways. First, only objects that exist in a possible world
satisfy atomic predicates or their complements with respect to that world.
Thus, for these languages, the function that assigns T and F to formulas
with respect to worlds need not be complete. For some assignments of
objects from the universe of discourse to variables, the function may
fail to assign either T or F to certain formulas for some worlds. The
second respect in which this truth definition is different compensates
for the first. Instead of OrAý being assigned T just in case A is
assigned T with respect to every accessible world, QA' is assigned T (if
it is assigned a value at all) just in case A is assigned F with respect
to no accessible world. This treatment of 'U' leaves the usual "de Morgan
relations" between '=' and '0' intact. But on this definition, unlike
the other, an existing object satisfies an open formula 'PGx' provided
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merely that it is in the extension assigned to 'Ge' with respect to all
accessible worlds in which it exists.
The striking feature of this alternative truth definition,
then, is that it allows what might be called "satisfaction gaps." That
is, open formulas may fail to have a truth-value with respect to a world
for some assignments of objects to variables. For example, when Socrates
is assigned to 'x', the formula 'x is a philosopher' will not have a
truth-value with respect to any possible world in which Socrates does not
exist. However, since quantified variables still range only over the ob-
jects that exist in a world, every closed formula will still have a truth-
value with respect to every possible world. Hence the phrase "satisfac-
tion gaps" rather than "truth-value gaps."
Our second family consists not of languages that satisfy this
alternative truth definition, but of ones that satisfy a slightly modified
version of it. The trouble with the truth definition as it stands is
that too many of the languages satisfying it are philosophically deviant.20
To appreciate this, consider the closed formula '(3x)(vO(3y)(y=x))'.
Normally this is taken as asserting that at least one object exists whose
existence is contingent. In terms of possible worlds, it is taken as
asserting that at least one object that exists in the actual world fails
to exist in some other accessible world. But it cannot be taken this
way when it occurs in a language that satisfies the alternative truth
definition. For '(3x)(~O(3y)(y=x))' would not be true in such a language
even when some object that exists in the actual world fails to exist in
some accessible world. In order for this closed formula to be true in
such a language, the open formula 'O(3y)(y=x)' would have to be false of
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some object--say Socrates--that exists in the actual world. But this
open formula is false when Socrates is assigned to 'x' only if there is
some accessible world with respect to which the open formula '(3y)(y=x)'
is false when Socrates is assigned to 'x'. This last formula, however,
is never false of any object with respect to any world in such a language.
For, according to the alternative truth definition, when Socrates is
assigned to 'x', '(3y)(y=x)' is true with respect to those worlds in
which Socrates exists, and it lacks a truth-value with respect to all
other worlds. In other words, regardless of which objects exist in
which worlds, '(Vx)(u(3y)(y=x))' is true in all languages satisfying the
alternative truth definition as it stands. But then in these languages
'(Vx)(D(3y)(y=x)' cannot be taken as it normally is, viz. as asserting
that every object is a necessary existent.
This point can be generalized. The usual way of constructing
predicates for contingent and necessary existence does not work for the
languages in question because in them 'y=x' has a truth-value only when
the objects assigned to both variables exist. But the point does not hang
on the identity predicate. Let 'EO' be an existence predicate--i.e. let
'Ex' be true of an object with respect to a world just in case the object
exists in that world. Then the natural way to express contingent and
necessary existence is via formulas like '~~CEx' and 'IVEx', respectively.
But such formulas do not express contingent and necessary existence in
languages satisfying the alternative truth definition. For according to
this definition, 'Ex' will lack a truth value with respect to any world in
which the object assigned to 'x' does not exist. Thus 'Ex' will never be
false of any object with respect to any world. Hence 'SEx' will be true
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of every object that exists in the actual world, regardless of which other
worlds these objects exist in. According to this truth definition, then,
'(Vx)(DEx S Ex)' is logically true and '(3x)(~vEx)' is logically false.
But surely then ',i3Ex' and 'OEx' should not be taken as expressing con-
tingent and necessary existence in these languages.
This is not to say that languages satisfying the alternative
truth definition cannot express contingent and necessary existence at all.
For let 'Cx' be true of an object with respect to a world just in case
the object exists in that world and not in some accessible world. Then
'Cx' will express contingent existence. The trouble is that the modal
relationship between existence and contingent existence--as expressed by
'(Vx)(Cx' .~:~Ex)'--cannot be affirmed in these languages (except vacuously,
when there are no contingent objects). It is the inability to affirm this
relationship in these languages that makes them philosophically deviant.
Again, this is not to say that the existence and the contingent
existence predicates will not be related to one another in the right way
in these languages. In fact, the open formula 'Cx' will be true of an
object with respect to a world if and only if the open formula 'Ex' is not
true of that object with respect to some accessible world. Therefore, the
requisite modal relationship between 'Cx' and 'Ex' can be affirmed in a
suitable metalanguage. The trouble is that this relationship cannot be
(non-vacuously) affirmed in the languages themselves. This is what makes
them philosophically deviant. The incongruity of the object languages
and metalanguages in this regard underscores the deviance of the object
languages.
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The deviance of these languages would be of less concern here
if it did not extend to our criterion for rigid designation. But it is
easy to see that it does. Intuitively, a designator is rigid only if it
would in no circumstances designate any object other than the one it
designates in the present circumstances. In possible world terms, a
definite description, '()x)(Fx)' is a rigid designator only if, with
respect to every accessible world, the open formula '(Vy)(Fy _ y=x)' is
true of no object other than the one it is true of with respect to the
actual world. But if our criterion for rigidity is interpreted in
accordance with the alternative truth definition, it fails to secure this
requirement. For let 'Gx' be uniquely true of some contingent object--
say Socrates--with respect to every world in which that object exists; and
let it be uniquely true of some other object--say 0--with respect to
every other world.21 Since by hypothesis '()x)(Gx)' will designate the
number 0 with respect to some accessible world, it does not satisfy the
indicated requirement for rigidity. Yet it does satisfy our criterion
for rigidity when that criterion is interpreted in accordance with the
alternative truth definition. For according to this definition,
'O(Yy)(Gy f y=x)' will be true of Socrates since, with respect to every
accessible world, '([y)(Gy S y=x)' either will be true or will lack a
truth-value when Socrates is assigned to 'x'. In other words, our
criterion, so interpreted, fails to require the definite description to
denote nothing with respect to worlds in which the designated object does
not exist.
The point can be put in another way. When '(3x)(O(Vy)(Fy 3 y=x))
is taken to be a sentence in a language that (non-trivially) satisfies the
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alternative truth definition, it does not express the necessary and
sufficient condition under which '(7x)(Fx)' is a rigid designator. Worse,
no sentence in such a language can express this condition. For no sentence
in such a language can express the requirement that the definite descrip-
tion denote nothing with respect to worlds in which the designated object
does not exist. These languages simply have no way to require either that
something be true of or that something be false of an object with respect
to a world in which it does not exist. They have no way of saying any-
thing about an object with respect to a world in which it does not exist.
Of course, the inexpressibility of the necessary and sufficient
condition for rigidity does not prevent these languages from containing
rigid designators. Their rigid designators can even be picked out by our
criterion when it is expressed in an appropriate metalanguage. Hence we
could perfectly well study the scope-related characteristics of rigid
designators in these languages. But we will not do so. Instead we will
turn to languages that satisfy a slightly modified version of the truth
definition. Although a little more complicated, these languages avoid
the shortcomings we have been discussing. Moreover, we can turn to them
without sacrificing anything of note. In particular, our study of rigid
designators in them will straightforwardly determine the scope-related
characteristics of rigid designators in the languages satisfying the un-
modified alternative truth definition.
The way to change the truth definition is evident. The identity
predicate should be handled differently from the standard predicates. The
basic change we need is for the case in which the object assigned to but
one of the variables does not exist. Specifically, an open formula of
106
the form 'y=x' should be false with respect to a world if the object
assigned to one of the variables exists in that world and the object
assigned to the other variable does not. One way to accomplish this change
is to have 'y=x' be true with respect to a world so long as the same ob-
ject is assigned to both variables, and false otherwise. The identity
predicate would then be handled exactly as it is in the K-languages, so
that 'x=x' would invariably be assigned T with respect to all worlds.
Another way to accomplish the basic change is to introduce it directly, but
still have 'y=x' lack a truth-value with respect to worlds in which the
objects assigned to both variables do not exist. This way is somewhat
more in keeping with the spirit of the alternative truth definition since
the self-identity predicate would still be neither true nor false of
22
nonexisting objects. For our present purposes, the choice between
these two ways of achieving the basic change is of no consequence. We
will therefore leave the choice open, though where definiteness is needed,
we will proceed as if identity is handled in the second way.
The change, regardless of how it is made, is easy to motivate.
It is not so peculiar to hold that 'y=x' is true when the same object is
assigned to both variables, even should the object not exist. At worst,
this is comparable to saying that 'Athena is identical with Minerva' is
true. Equally, it is not so peculiar to hold that 'x-x' and 'y=x' lack a
truth-value when the objects assigned to the variables do not exist. At
worst, this is comparable to saying that 'Pegasus is identical with Pegasus'
and 'Athena is identical with Minerva' lack a truth-value. By contrast,
it is definitely peculiar to hold that 'y=x' lacks a truth-value when the
object assigned to 'y' exists and the object assigned to 'x' does not.
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This is comparable to saying that 'Socrates is identical with Pegasus'
is not false. If an object exists in a world, then surely it is distinct
from any object that does not exist in that world. Indeed, for 'y=x' to
lack a truth-value in this case is so peculiar that one is likely not to
notice that the alternative truth definition Kripke mentions requires
this of the identity predicate. And in missing it, one is likely also
to miss the philosophic deviance of the languages satisfying this truth
definition.
This one change will remedy the points of deviance we called
attention to. In all the languages we are considering, binding a variable
automatically restricts its range with respect to each world to just those
objects that exist in that world. Hence, with the truth definition
changed to treat '=' as we have suggested, the open formula '(3y)(y=x)'
will never exhibit any satisfaction gaps. Furthermore, since it will be
false wherever it had no truth-value before, 't•((y)(y=x)' and '"D( y))(y=x)'
will now successfully express necessary and contingent existence. Similarly,
with the truth definition changed, open formulas of the form '(Vy)(Fy y=x)'
will exhibit no satisfaction gaps. As a consequence, our criterion for
rigidity will no longer fail to express the proper necessary and sufficient
condition. In particular, '(Ix)(Fx)' will now satisfy our criterion only
if, with respect to every accessible world, '(Vy)(Fy = y=x)' is true of no
object other than the object it is true of in the actual world. Indeed,
with the change, our criterion will express basically the same necessary
and sufficient condition for rigidity in all of the languages we will be
considering. Of course, different languages have different admissible
models. But consider a class of admissible models in which the existent
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objects that 'Fx' is true of with respect to each world remain fixed. On
these models '(3x)(O(Vy)(Fy y=x))' will be true according to the revised
alternative truth definition if and only if it is true according to the
truth definition for the K-languages. 2 3
The change does complicate matters. The new languages contain
two distinct kinds of open formulas, one standard and the other not.
The standard open formulas have a truth-value with respect to a world
just in case the objects assigned to their free variables exist in that
world. Open formulas of this kind are what the alternative truth defini-
tion was set up to provide. By contrast, the nonstandard or special open
formulas are permitted to have a truth-value with respect to worlds in
which an object assigned to one of their free variables does not exist.
The nonstandard open formulas thus do not display satisfaction gaps in at
least some circumstances in which the standard ones must. The open formu-
las discussed in the preceding paragraph, '(3y)(y=x)' and '(Vy)(Fy y=x)',
are nonstandard in the extreme since they never display any satisfaction
gaps. Corresponding to the distinction between standard and special open
formulas is a distinction between standard and special predicates. Thus
'FR' and '(FO• GO)' are standard predicates, while '(3y)(y=0)' and
'(vy)(Fy y=o)' are special.
The distinction between the two kinds of predicates becomes
significant only in the case of de re modal contexts. So long as the
variables associated with a predicate are not bound from outside the
scope of a modal operator, any closed formula containing the predicate
will have the same truth-value whether the predicate is taken to be
standard or special. But when a variable is bound from outside the scope
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of a modal operator, a closed formula can have one truth-value if the
predicate is taken to be standard and a contrasting truth-value if it is
taken to be special. Suppose, for example, that 'FO' and 'FO' have
identical extensions with respect to each world, where 'FO' is standard
and 'F@' is not. Then, as we have seen, '(3x)(GFx)' can be true even when
'(3x)(1 x)' is false. The standard predicates thus stand out in de re
modal contexts. Indeed, what the alternative truth definition gives us
is a family of languages whose standard predicates exhibit a logic in de
re modal contexts distinctly different from that exhibited by the predicates
of the K-languages.
The contrast in the handling of modality de re in the two families
is more significant than it may first appear to be. To see this, consider
the notion of essential predication. Essential properties are usually
deemed to be those an object has to have if it exists at all. In a footnote
in "Identity and Necessity," Kripke remarks that "an exception must be made
for existence itself; on the definition given, existence would be trivially
essential. We should regard existence as essential to an object only if
the object necessarily exists. Perhaps there are other recherche pro-
perties, involving existence, for which the definition is similarly
24
objectionable."2 (I take it that existence predicates also underlie
Kripke's opposition to the converse Barcan schema insofar as he wants to
allow 'o(Vx)(3y)(x=y)' to be true without having '(Vx)O(3y)(y=x)' be true.)
In the present context it is better to talk not about essential
properties, but about predicates being essentially true of an object.
Suppose we say that 'Fe' is essentially true of an object just in case
'aFQ' is true of it. Then a standard predicate in the languages satisfying
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the alternative truth definition will be essentially true of an object if
and only if it has to be true of the object if the object exists at all.
In other words, the standard predicates will conform to the usual way of
defining 'essential' in metaphysics. But the nonstandard predicates will
not. (Nor will K-language predicates.) In particular, the existence
predicate, '(3y)(y=0)', will be essentially true of just those objects
that necessarily exist. Perhaps the fact that the usual definition fits
the standard predicates in the new languages, and not the nonstandard
predicates, is no accident. Perhaps these languages closely mirror our
usual way of talking about essential properties. If so, this is a key
feature that makes them philosophically interesting.
There is a further, related virtue to the languages that satisfy
the alternative truth definition. Many who talk about essential properties
also want to hold that a relation can be "internal" to one relatum and not
to the other. For example, suppose '0 is the offspring of& ' is true of
a pair of objects, s and t. Then many want to hold that the relational
predicate '0 is the offspring of t' is essentially true of s, but 's is
the offspring of (' is not essentially true of t. Given the definition of
'is essentially true of' proposed in the preceding paragraph, such an
asymmetry is straightforwardly expressible in the languages satisfying the
alternative truth definition (presuming that '0 is the offspring ofQ ' is
a standard predicate). But the asymmetry is not expressible in the K-
languages except under a definition of 'is essentially true of' on which
the existence predicate will be essentially true of everything.
The languages of our second family contain an unlimited number
of nonstandard as well as standard predicates. However, the only
III
nonstandard atomic predicate we will require them to contain is the iden-
tity predicate. Perhaps it is the only nonstandard atomic predicate there
is any reason for them to contain. But whether it is will not matter here.
We will permit the languages to include any number of other nonstandard
atomic predicates, so long as all of them are marked in the syntax as non-
standard. They can be marked by resorting to special symbols, as we have
done with '=', or by using qualified predicate letters, as we did with
'F' in the preceding paragraph. Unmarked atomic predicates will always
be taken to be standard. Marking the nonstandard atomic predicates in
the syntax will enable us to take advantage of the following restricted
rule of substitution:
Suppose a logically true closed formula A contains
one or more occurrences of an unmarked n-place
atomic predicate c. Then any closed formula obtained
from A by replacing all occurrences of Cr with an n-
place standard predicate is also logically true.
Since the standard and nonstandard predicates differ logically in de re
modal contexts, the languages of our second family, unlike the K-languages,
will not in general allow an unrestricted rule of substitution. But this
restricted rule will suffice for our purposes.
Let me summarize. Our second family consists of modal languages
that satisfy the modified version of the alternative truth definition
Kripke calls attention to. In these languages roA1 is assigned T
(should it be assigned a value at all) if and only if A is assigned F with
respect to no accessible world. But rCA could just as well be handled in
this way in the K-languages too. The real contrast between the two
families comes from their handling atomic predicates differently. Unlike
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the truth definition Kripke develops in detail, our other truth definition
distinguishes between two kinds of atomic predicates, standard and non-
standard. On this truth definition, an atomic open formula formed with a
standard predicate is assigned T or F with respect to a world if and only
if the objects assigned to its free variables exist in that world. As a
result, the standard open formulas of these other languages, unlike those
of the K-languages, display satisfaction gaps. That is, they display
satisfaction gaps unless the same objects exist in every world.
The nonstandard predicates of these languages contrast less
sharply with the predicates of the K-languages. Their principal and per-
haps their only nonstandard atomic predicate is the identity predicate.
This predicate can be handled in either of two ways without affecting any
of our results. On the one hand, it can be treated as a K-language predi-
cate. In this case, an open formula of the form 'y=x' is assigned T
with respect to a world w if and only if the same object is assigned to
both variables; and it is assigned F otherwise. On the other hand, it
can be treated more in keeping with the standard predicates. In this case,
an open formula of the form 'y=x' is assigned T with respect to a world w
if and only if the same object is assigned to both variables and this
object exists in w; it is assigned F with respect to w if and only if
different objects are assigned to the variables and at least one of these
objects exists in w; and it is assigned neither T nor F if and only if the
object or objects assigned to the variables do not exist in w. Either way,
as a result of the special handling of the identity predicate (and of any
other nonstandard atomic predicates), the languages contain various non-
standard open formulas--open formulas that may have a truth-value even with
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respect to worlds in which the objects assigned to their free variables
do not exist. These nonstandard open formulas do not have to be entirely
comparable to the open formulas of the K-languages. They can still display
satisfaction gaps, as 'y=x' would on the second approach to identity when
the objects assigned to 'x' and 'y' do not exist. But some nonstandard
open formulas--e.g. '(3y)(y=x)' and '(Vy)(Fy y=x)'--display no satis-
faction gaps in these languages. The predicates corresponding to these
open formulas are completely comparable to the predicates of the K-
languages.
Since our second family of languages derives in some part from
the work of Prior and Hintikka, we will call its members "the PH-languages."
Like the K-languages, they differ from one another model theoretically in
placing different restrictions on the accessibility relation and on the
existence of objects from world to world. One of the PH-languages is the
naive extension of S5 that requires the same objects to exist in all worlds.
Consequently, our two families overlap at their strong ends. But they do
not overlap at their weak ends. The weakest of the PH-languages is one
for which the accessibility relation is just reflexive and no restriction
is placed on which objects exist in different worlds (again, other than
that each object exist in at least one world). This language is not a
K-language since '(Vx)(O(Fx (3y)(Fy)) = (oFx -- (3y)(Fy)))'--i.e.,
Kripke's distribution axiom schema--is not valid in it.25  Furthermore,
the K-languages Kripke sets out in "Semantical Considerations on Modal
Logic" are not PH-languages since '(3x)(OFx) ' (3x)(Fx)' is not valid in
them. The validity of '(3x)(OFx) > 0(3x)(Fx)' and 'O(Vx)(Fx) > (Vx)(OFx)'--
114
i.e. the converse Barcan formulas with standard predicates--is a salient
feature of all PH-languages. Notice, however, that the first version of
the converse Barcan formula is not valid when the predicate is the non-
existence predicate, '#(3y)(y=0)'; and the second version is not valid when
the predicate is the existence predicate, '(3y)(y=0)'. The validity of the
converse Barcan formulas with standard predicates and the invalidity of
them with such recherche predicates as existence is no small virtue of most
of the PH-languages. In this respect these languages conform with intui-
tions in a way that none of the K-languages do. This is another feature
of the PH-family that makes it philosophically interesting.
IV
We can now make our principal question precise. We want to
know whether rigidly designating definite descriptions can be read with
contrasting scope without affecting truth-value. Let 'u' be replaceable
by '1', l'8', '8', ''-', '1', and ','--where '9', to be defined in the
next section, corresponds to Kripke's weak notion of necessity. Consider
formulas of the following form:
(3x) (VYy) (Fy ' y=x) & (Vy) (Fy y=x)] (4)
[,s(3x)((Vy)(Fy S y=x)&Gx) 3 (3x)((Vy)(Fy - y=x) &SGx)]
The schema embodies the following claim: if a Russellian definite descrip-
tion is a rigid designator, then a secondary occurrence of it vis-a-vis 4
will yield the same truth-value as the corresponding primary occurrence.
We ask our principal question of each of our two families of languages
separately: are all formulas of the form of (4) valid in all languages
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of the family? Different answers give rise to different subsequent
questions. If the answer is yes, then will a weaker satisfiable ante-
cedent still secure validity across the board? If the answer is no,
then for which modal operators and for which members of the family does
validity fail? Further, how must the antecedent of (4) be strengthened
to secure validity across the board for the family?
The point of considering the two families separately will become
evident as we proceed. But a few words are needed now about the way we
put the issue. Suppose first that some formulas of the form of (4) are
not universally valid in a family. Then rigid designation would not be
the analogue of the Whitehead-Russell condition in the case of modal
languages generally since it would not be the analogue in the case of
certain PH- or K-languages. It would remain then to show that this result
is not just a consequence of some idiosyncratic feature that should dis-
qualify these particular languages from consideration. This is the point
of our subsequent questions should the answer to our principal question
be no.
Now suppose instead that all formulas of the form of (4) are
universally valid in a family. Of what significance would such a positive
result be? To answer we need to make some terminology precise. Suppose
'1' stands for an operator, modal or extensional. A definite description,
'(ix)(Fx)', will be said to have a primary occurrence vis-a-vis o in
formulas of the form
(3x)[y)(Fy - y=x) & dGx]
Correspondingly, it will be said to have a secondary occurrence vis-a-vis 5
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in formulas of the form
O(3x) [(Vy)(Fy E y=x) & Gx]
When formulas of the indicated forms occur embedded in further contexts,
'(7x)(Fx)' will have neither a primary nor a secondary occurrence vis-a-
vis 9 (though it will still have wide and narrow scope vis-a-vis -). We
are thus reserving the notions of primary and secondary occurrence vis-a-
vis - to the appropriate Russellian expansions of nonembedded formulas of
the form r .((ix)(Fx)) 26 The notions cease to be pertinent once
rC-o((?x)(Fx))1 is embedded in a further context.
Suppose now that all formulas of the form of (4) are valid
throughout a family. The significance of such a result would depend on
the family. In the case of the K-family, we could conclude that any
secondary occurrence of a rigid designator vis-a-vis a modal operator will
yield the same truth-value as the corresponding primary occurrence. But
in the case of the PH-family, a positive result for (4) would generalize
only to rigid designators occurring in standard contexts--i.e., to
occurrences as in )((Ux)(Fx)) , where V(Y) is a standard open formula.
That is, we could only conclude that a secondary occurrence of a rigid
designator vis-a-vis a modal operator in any standard context in a PH-
language will yield the same truth-value as the corresponding primary
occurrence. The question then would be whether rigidity is sufficient
to assure like truth-values for corresponding primary and secondary
occurrences vis-a-vis modal operators in nonstandard contexts. However,
since the most extreme nonstandard predicates in the PH-languages are just
like K-language predicates, this question will turn out to be answered
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when we answer our principal question for the K-family. Hence, our way of
addressing the issue will end up covering all cases of concern for non-
embedded formulas.
For either modal family, then, a positive result for (4) would
be of some significance. Nevertheless, obtaining a positive result for
(4) for a family would not be tantamount to showing that rigid designa-
tion is the analogue of the Whitehead-Russell condition for the family.
To show this, we would have to extend the generalizations discussed in the
preceding paragraph to cases in which rY((7x)(Fx))I is embedded in further
contexts. For only then could we conclude that the scope of a rigid
designator will never affect the truth-value of any formula in any language
of the family. Of course, the generalizations can be extended straight-
forwardly to cases of yY((ix)(Fx))I embedded in extensional contexts.
For materially equivalent formulas can be substituted for one another in
extensional contexts salva veritate. However, they cannot in general be
substituted for one another salva veritate in modal contexts. Hence, we
have no offhand reason to think that the generalizations of the preced-
ing paragraph can be extended to cases of r.V((ix)(Fx))' embedded in
modal contexts. Rather than resolve this matter now, I want to postpone
considering cases of A.((ix)(Fx)) embedded in modal contexts until the
end of the next section of the paper. By then the question whether rigid
designation is the analogue of the Whitehead-Russell condition will be
moot for both of the modal families under discussion.
A positive result for (4) would be of considerable interest
even if it cannot be extended to cases of rYf((1x)(Fx))' embedded in
modal contexts. Modal formulas embedded in modal contexts are scarcely
~ __ _1____11____ 1 I I
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the basis for our intuitions about rigid designation. An important
question to raise, given a positive result for (4) is whether it can
be used to motivate the notion of rigid designation. This is the point
of asking about weaker antecedents when the answer to our principal
question is yes. Indeed, this question of weaker antecedents is worth
pursuing even should all formulas of the form of (4) be universally
valid in a family for just some one modal operator. Because of this, we
will want to look at each modal operator separately.
V
The best way to attack our principal question is to examine
each combination of operator and family in turn. The detail we generate
as we proceed in this way may at the time seem cumbersome. But in the
long run it will help us to develop a number of points, both about
rigid designation in the formal languages we are considering and about
the relationship between scope and rigid designation generally.
Consider first '0' and the PH-languages. Suppose '(7x)(Fx)'
is a rigid designator. Then (5) has the same truth-value as (6) in
every PH-language: 2 7
(x) C(Vy)(Fy y=x) S Gx (5)
0(3x) [(Vy) (Fy - y=x) & Gx] (6)
(5) is true in a PH-language if and only if in the actual world there
exists an object that satisfies 'Fx' uniquely, and this object satisfies
'Gx' with respect to some accessible world in which it exists. (6) is
true in a PH-language if and only if in some accessible world there exists
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an object that satisfies both 'Fx' uniquely and 'Gx'. But '(7x)(Fx)'
is a rigid designator. Hence, in the actual world there exists an
object that satisfies 'Fx' with respect to every accessible world in
which it exists, and in no accessible world does there exist any other
object that satisfies 'Fx'. Thus, because '(?x)(Fx)' is a rigid
designator, both (5) and (6) are true in a PH-language if and only if the
object satisfying 'Fx' in the actual world satisfies 'Gx' with respect
to some accessible world in which it exists.
The reasoning here is general. When ' ' replaces 'F', all
formulas of the form of (4) are valid in every PH-language. Consequently,
in all standard contexts in PH-languages, any secondary occurrence of a
rigid designator vis-a-vis '0' yields the same truth-value as the corres-
ponding primary occurrence.
Can the antecedent of (4) be weakened, yet the schema obtained
when 'O' replaces 'F' still be valid in all PH-languages? First, suppose
'(?x)(Fx)' is not a designator. Then (5) is false regardless of the
extensions assigned to 'Ge'. But (6) is then false regardless of the
extensions assigned to 'Ge' just in case no accessible world contains
an object that satisfies 'Fx' uniquely. Thus there is a way to weaken
the antecedent of (4) and still have a schema valid in all PH-languages
when 'O' replaces W''. For let the antecedent be (7):
(3x){(Vy) (Fy y=x) & O(Vy)(Fy E y=x)] v 0(3 x)(Vy)(Fy _ y=x) (7)
However, weakening the antecedent in any other way so that it no longer en-
tails that '()x)(Fx)' is a designator will yield a schema that is not valid
in many PH-languages. In particular, weakening it to allow '(7x)(Fx)' to
single out a "possible-yet-not-actual" object will yield a schema that is
~ _ ~I _~_ I _I I I
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not valid in most PH-languages. As will become clear below, the schema
thus obtained is also not valid in most K-languages.
These results are of some note. Weakening our criterion for
rigid designation by prefixing 'O' to it will simply insure that, in
most of the languages we are considering, rigid designators fail to
render scope ambiguities innocuous. Those who prefer such a weaker
criterion for rigidity should be mindful of this. Similarly, weakening
the criterion in the manner of (7) will simply insure that rigid
designators fail to render ordinary truth-functional scope ambiguities
innocuous. If rigid designation is to be an extrapolation of the Whitehead-
Russell condition to modal languages, then rigid designators must at least
satisfy this condition. Accordingly, we will give no further considera-
tion below to (7).
Next suppose '(lx)(Fx)' is a designator, but not a rigid
designator. We need to consider the several different ways in which
this can happen. The last way we consider will be the sole exception to
the general pattern.
First, suppose the object satisfying 'Fx' in the actual world
fails to satisfy 'Fx' with respect to some other accessible world in
which it exists. Then (5) could be true even though (6) is false. For
suppose 'GO' is a contrary of 'F&'. Then (6) will be false since in no
accessible world will there be an object that satisfies both 'Fx' and
'Gx' Nevertheless, the object that satisfies 'Fx' in the actual world
might exist and satisfy 'Gx' in some accessible world in which it does
not satisfy 'Fx'. Thus (5) could still be true.
_ ~II_ _ I _ I _ _ ~I _ ~ I_ _ _ ~
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Next, suppose '(7x)(Fx)' is a nonrigid designator by virtue of
one of more "errant" objects satisfying 'Fx'. That is, suppose that (i)
the object satisfying 'Fx' in the actual world properly satisfies 'Fx' with
respect to every accessible world in which it exists; yet (ii) some other
object--i.e. an "errant" object--both exists and satisfies 'Fx' in some
accessible world. There are two cases to consider. On the one hand, it
may be the case that in some accessible world there is an errant object
that satisfies 'Fx' uniquely. Then (6) could be true even though (5) is
false. For suppose the object that satisfies 'Fx' in the actual world
does not satisfy 'Gx' with respect to any accessible world in which it
exists. Then (5) will be false. Nevertheless, an errant object might
satisfy 'Gx' in an accessible world in which it is the sole existing object
that satisfies 'Fx'. Thus (6) could still be true.
On the other hand, it may be the case that in every accessible
world in which an errant object satisfies 'Fx', more than one object
satisfies 'Fx'. Again there are two cases to consider. First, the
object that satisfies 'Fx' in the actual world may exist and satisfy
'Fx' in an accessible world in which an errant object does the same.
Then (5) could be true even though (6) is false. For suppose 'Gx' is
satisfied only in those accessible worlds in which there exists more than
one object satisfying 'Fx'. Then (6) will be false. Nevertheless, the
object that satisfies 'Fx' in the actual world may exist and satisfy
'Gx' in one of these worlds. Thus (5) could still be true.
Second, the object that satisfies 'Fx' in the actual world may
not exist in the accessible worlds in which multiple errant objects
satisfy 'Fx'. This final case furnishes the only exception. In it
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accessible worlds fall into three distinct groups. Some contain the ob-
ject that satisfies 'Fx' in the actual world; in these worlds, it and it
alone satisfies 'Fx'. Other worlds contain more than one object
satisfying 'Fx', but they do not contain the object that does so in the
actual world. Finally, perhaps some accessible worlds contain neither
an object satisfying 'Fx' nor the object that does so in the actual
world. Only worlds in the first group can render either (5) or (6) true
in any PH-language. From this it is easy to see that both (5) and (6)
are true in a PH-language if and only if the object that satisfies 'Fx'
in the actual world satisfies 'Gx' in some accessible world. In this
one case, then, (5) and (6) must match in truth-value in all PH-languages
even though '(7x)(Fx)' is a nonrigid designator.
In sum, weakening the antecedent of (4) in the manner of (8)
yields a schema that is still valid in all PH-languages when 'O'
replaces ',':
(3x)f(Vy) (Fy - y=x) & O.(~Vy)(Fy = y=x) v [('((3y)(y=x) &
(3y)(Fy)) (3y)(3z)(Fy & Fz & y#z)]J
Moreover, should the antecedent be further weakened, yet still entail
that '()x)(Fx)' is a designator, then the resulting schema would be
invalid in some PH-languages. Let us call a nonrigid designator
'(?x)(Fx)' a semi-rigid designator just in case (8) is true. A
semi-rigid designator is a nonrigid designator that picks out the same
object with respect to every accessible world in which it exists, but
fails to pick out a single object with respect to other accessible
worlds. Perhaps not all semi-rigid designators are curiosities. Consider
'the individual that grew from r', where 'r' names the zygote from which
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Socrates developed. Some claim that it is essential to Socrates that
he grew from the zygote he did. One might also plausibly claim that
had this zygote produced identical twins, Socrates would not have been
one of them. If both claims are correct, then 'the individual that grew
from r' is a semi-rigid designator.
Earlier, we showed that if '(7x)(Fx)' is a rigid designator,
then (5) and (6) must match in truth-value in every PH-language. We
have now extended the result to semi-rigid designators, and we have
shown that it holds for designators only of these two kinds. We have thus
answered our questions for '"' and the PH-languages. Every secondary
occurrence of a designator vis-a-vis 'O' is guaranteed to yield the same
truth-value as the corresponding primary occurrence in standard contexts
in all PH-languages if and only if the designator is either rigid or
semi-rigid.
This pairing of rigid and semi-rigid designators will continue
to hold throughout our results. Furthermore, the natural ways of motivat-
ing the notion of rigidity do not isolate it from semi-rigidity.29 From
a theoretical standpoint, then, semi-rigid designation is not entirely a
curiosity.
Now consider '"' and the K-languages. The possible world
interpretation of our criterion for rigid designation is the same in
both families of languages. Nevertheless, the rigidity of '(ix)(Fx)' is
not sufficient to assure that (5) and (6) agree in truth-value in every
K-language. Unlike the PH-languages, the K-languages generally permit an
open formula like 'Gx' to be satisfied with respect to a world even by
objects that do not exist in that world. As a result, even when '(7x)(Fx)'
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is a rigid designator, (5) could be true in some K-languages while (6) is
false. For suppose that the object rigidly designated by '(Ix)(Fx)' does
not satisfy 'Gx' with respect to any accessible world in which it exists.
Then (6) will be false since in no accessible world will there exist an
object that satisfies both 'Fx' and 'Gx'. But the designated object
may still satisfy 'Gx' with respect to some accessible world in which it
does not exist. Thus (5) could still be true. Accordingly, the schema
obtained from (4) when 'O' replaces ' ' is not valid in some K-languages.
The counter-model to the schema exploits the fact that the
converse Barcan formulas are invalid in some K-languages. Any counter-
model to '(3x)(OGx)> (3x)(Gx)' furnishes a counter-model to the schema
so long as one of the relevant objects that exists and satisfies 'OGx'
in the actual world can be rigidly designated. Furthermore, if '(Ox)(Fx)'
is rigid, (5) and (6) can differ in truth-value in a K-language only if
'(3x)(OGx)' can be true without '0(3x)Gx' being true. Therefore, the
schema obtained from (4) when 'O' replaces 'A' is valid in just those
K-languages in which the converse Barcan formulas are valid. Kripke
has shown that these formulas are invalid unless the K-language requires
each object to exist in every world accessible from any world in which it
exists. 30 Our counter-model thus equally exploits the fact that
'()x)(Fx)' can designate a "contingently existing" object--i.e., an
object that fails to exist in some accessible world. This tells us how
to strengthen the antecedent of (4) to obtain a schema that is valid in
all K-languages. The object rigidly designated by '(7x) (Fx)' must be
required to exist in all accessible worlds. In other words, the ante-
cedent must entail that '(7x)(Fx)' is a strongly rigid designator.
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This completes the answers to our questions in the case of '0'
and the K-languages. Every secondary occurrence of a designator vis-a-vis
'O' is guaranteed to yield the same truth-value as the corresponding
primary occurrence if and only if the designator is strongly rigid. Simple
rigidity does not suffice unless the converse Barcan formulas are valid.
As remarked earlier, the most extreme of the nonstandard
predicates of the PH-languages are just like K-language predicates.
The other nonstandard predicates fall between these and the standard
predicates--i.e., they display some satisfaction gaps, but not everywhere
that standard predicates would. A distinctive feature of all of the
nonstandard predicates is that the converse Barcan formulas formed with
them are invalid in those PH-languages that permit contingently existing
objects. In particular, '0(3x),(3y)(y=x)' is invariably logically false,
while '(3x)O~(3y)(y=x)' is true so long as there is at least one con-
tingently existing object. Accordingly, the preceding results for the
K-languages also give us results for the nonstandard contexts in the
PH-languages. The rigidity of a designator is not enough to make truth-
value unaffected by the scope of 'O' in nonstandard contexts in many PH-
languages. The designator must be strongly rigid. In other words, every
secondary occurrence of a designator vis-a-vis '0' is guaranteed to yield
the same truth-value as the corresponding primary occurrence in all con-
texts in all PH-languages if and only if the designator is strongly rigid.
Our earlier positive result for '0' and the PH-languages holds for rigid
and semi-rigid designators only in standard contexts. When this restric-
tion is dropped, the result no longer holds.
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The striking conclusion about '-' is the contrast between the
two families of languages. (9) is valid in all PH-languages, but not in
all K-languages:
(3x) [(Vy) (Fy y=x) & o(Vy)(Fy y=x)] (9)
o(3x) ((Yy) (Fy y=x) & Gx) 3 (3x)((Vy)(Fy y=x) S&Gx)]
The K-languages in which it is not valid are among the philosophically
more interesting in that they sanction rigid designation of contingent
objects. To obtain a schema valid in all K-languages, the antecedent of
(9) must be strengthened, as in (1), to entail that '()x)(Fx)' is a
strongly rigid designator:
{(3x) [(V'y)(Fy y=x) & Oi(Vy)(Fy S y=x)] & [(3x)(Fx)1 = (10)
[O(3x)((Vy)(Fy 3 y=x) & Gx) = (3x)((Vy)(Fy 2 y=x) & Gx)]
Next consider 't' and the PH-languages. Suppose '()x)(Fx)' is
a rigid designator. Even so, (11) and (12) need not match in truth-
value in some PH-languages:
(3x) C(Vy) (Fy - y=x) & DGx] (11)
n(3x) [(Yy) (Fy _ y=x) & Gx] (12)
For suppose the rigidly designated object fails to exist in some
accessible world. Since '()x)(Fx)' is rigid, no object existing in that
world will satisfy 'Fx'. Thus (12) will be false. Nevertheless, the
object that satisfies 'Fx' in the actual world may satisfy 'Gx' in every
accessible world in which it exists. Thus (11) could still be true.
For that matter, (11) could still be true in the K-languages. For the
object that exists and satisfies 'Fx' in the actual world may satisfy
'Gx' with respect to all accessible worlds, including those in which it
does not exist. But (12) will be false in K-languages when the rigidly
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designated object does not exist in all accessible worlds. Therefore,
for neither family of languages is rigidity sufficient to guarantee that
differences in the scope of a designator with respect to 'u' do not
affect truth-value. Both in some PH-languages and in some K-languages,
the schema obtained from (4) when 'a' replaces ',' is not valid.
The counter-models to the schema in this case require '(rx)(Fx)'
to designate a "contingently existing" object. Indeed, when '(7x)(Fx)'
is rigid, (11) and (12) can differ in truth-value in any of the languages
we are considering if and only if 'O" ( Fx) ' is true. Presumably, any
of the languages that permits contingently existing objects also permits
rigid designation of some of them. If so, the schema is valid in just
those PH- and K-languages that bar contingent objects. But in these
languages rigid designation is tantamount to strongly rigid designation.
This shows that to obtain an always valid schema when 'O' replaces 'A',
the antecedent of (4) must be strengthened to entail that '(ix)(Fx)' is
a strongly rigid designator. If '(7x)(Fx)' is strongly rigid, then
both (11) and (12) are true in any PH- or K-language just in case the
object that satisfies 'Fx' in the actual world satisfies 'Gx' with respect
to every accessible world whatever. Thus, in all of the languages we
are considering, every secondary occurrence of a designator vis-a-vis 'O'
is guaranteed to yield the same truth-value as the corresponding primary
occurrence if and only if the designator is strongly rigid.31
In the case of 'o', then, the results are the same for both
families of modal languages. (13) is not valid in those languages in
each family that sanction rigid designation of contingent objects; but
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(14) is valid in every one of the languages:
(3x) (Vy)(Fy = y=x) & O(Vy) (Fy y=x)]
13(3x)((Yy)(Fy- y=x) & Gx) - (3x)((Vy)(Fy y=x) &uGx)]
{(3x) [(Vy) (Fy E y=x) & O(Vy)(Fy Y y=x)] & O(3x) (Fx)j z (14)
[O(3x)((Vy) (Fy y=x) & Gx) (3x)((Vy) (Fy e y=x) & OGx)]
This conclusion is so easily established that it is unclear why anyone
might think that rigidity alone would suffice. The only hope I see for
holding that rigid designators are neutral with respect to the scope of
'a' when they designate contingent objects is to adopt a free-logic in
which definite descriptions are not Russellian. But Kripke is clearly
not talking about such logics in the footnote quoted earlier. Rather,
he must be excepting 'a' from his claims.
Our conclusions about '0' must be circumscribed to prevent
confusion. As interpreted in the languages we are considering, '0'
expresses necessity de re in (11) and de dicto in (12). So far we have
shown that, even if '()x)(Fx)' is a rigid designator, (11) and (12) need
not be materially equivalent. However, this is not to say that no purely
de dicto modal formula is guaranteed to have the same truth-value as
(11) when '(7x)(Fx)' is rigid. To the contrary, in all PH-languages--
though, as we shall see, not in all K-languages--(15) is such a formula:
o[(3!x)(Fx) = (3x)((Vy)(Fy - y=x) & Gx)] (15)
For suppose '(7x)(Fx)' rigidly designates the object s. With respect to
any accessible world in which s does not exist, the bracketed portion of
(15) is true by virtue of the falsity of its antecedent. Therefore, when
'(7x)(Fx)' is rigid, (15), like (ll), is true in a PH-language if and
only if s satisfies 'Gx' with respect to every accessible world in which
it exists.
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Furthermore, if '(7x)(Fx)' is a nonrigid designator, then un-
less it is semi-rigid, (11) and (15) need not agree in truth-value in some
PH-languages. Case-by-case reasoning like that which led us to identify
semi-rigidity during the discussion of (5) and (6) will establish this
result. (Simply reversing truth and falsity in the models used to con-
trast (5) and (6) will yield models on which (11) and (15) contrast in
truth-value.) But we do not have to proceed exhaustively through all of
the types of nonrigid designators to see why the result holds. The upshot
of the case-by-case reasoning is that, if '(Ix)(Fx)' is a designator, it
must meet two conditions before (11) and (15)--or (5) and (6)--are
guaranteed to agree in truth-value in all PH-languages. First, the
designated object must satisfy 'Fx' uniquely with respect to every
accessible world in which it exists. Second, there must be no object
that satisfies 'Fx' uniquely with respect to any other accessible world.
Rigid and semi-rigid designators are the only ones that meet both con-
ditions. They differ merely in the way they meet the second condition.
Rigid designators meet it because no existing object satisfies 'Fx' with
respect to accessible worlds in which the designated object does not
exist; semi-rigid designators meet it because no one existing object
satisfies 'Fx' with respect to these worlds. Nonrigid designators of
other types fail to meet one of the two conditions and thereby open
certain PH-languages to models on which (11) and (15) contrast in truth-
value.
(15) is reminiscent of the weak notion of necessity that Kripke
uses in "Identity and Necessity" and "Naming and Necessity." The weak
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notion is illustrated by parsing (16) as (17):
Necessarily, Hesperus is self-identical. (16)
'Hesperus is self-identical, if it exists' is a (17)
necessary truth.
The antecedent in (17), like that in (15), renders the conditional
trivially true should the designating expression in the consequent fail
to denote. Let us use 'a' to represent such a weak necessity operator.
rSA1 is to be read along the lines of 'it is necessary that A is true
unless a designating expression in A lacks reference'. The general
approach to characterizing '61' model-theoretically is obvious: rsA' is
assigned T just in case A is assigned F with respect to no accessible
world in which there exist objects denoted'by the designating expressions
in A. The difficulty lies in picking out the designating expressions in
A after, for example, definite descriptions have been expanded in the
manner of Russell. To a first approximation, '()x)(Fx)' is a designating
expression in A if and only if there is an open formula *( ) such that
rA - 0(()x)(Fx))7 is valid when '(7x)(Fx)' has maximal scope. Several
refinements are needed, but so far as I can see, they can be introduced
only rather clumsily. 32  Fortunately, the approximate characterization
will suffice for our present purposes.
Two minor consequences of this way of characterizing the desig-
nating expressions in a formula should be noted. First, free variables
are not designating expressions. Second, a definite description can be
a designating expression in a constituent of a formula without being a
designating expression in the overall formula. For example, ' (x)(Fx)'
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is not a designating expression in '(3!x) (Fx) (3x) ((Vy) (Fy _ y=x) & Gx)'
though it clearly is one in the consequent of this formula.
With '9' thus characterized, (18) and (19) are respectively
equivalent to (11) and (15) in every language we are considering:
(3x) (Vy)(Fy - y=x) & Gx] (18)
3(3x4x)(Vy) (Fy . y=x) & Gx] (19)
Moreover, 'GO' can be replaced by any predicate, standard or nonstandard,
that contains no designating expressions, and the equivalences between
(11) and (18) and (15) and (19) will continue to hold in all PH- and K-
languages.
Given such equivalences, our earlier results for (11) and (15)
imply that (18) and (19) must match in truth-value in every PH-language
if '(7x)(Fx)' is a rigid or semi-rigid designator. Specifically, when
'(?x)(Fx)' is rigid or semi-rigid, both (18) and (19) are true in any
PH-language just in case the designated object satisfies 'Gx' with
respect to every accessible world in which it exists. In the PH-languages,
therefore, (18) and (19) are related to one another in the same way as
(5) and (6). Furthermore, since 'GO' is in the scope of '9' in both
(18) and (19), this result holds for any standard predicate replacing
'GO'. Thus with regard to scope, '9' is just like ' ' in the PH-languages.
(20), the schema obtained from (4) when '9' replaces 'h', is valid in all
of these languages:
(3x) (Vy)(Fy y=x) & O(Vy)(Fy y=x)] = (20)
{1 (3 x)((Vy)(Fy = y=x) & Gx) = (3x)((Vy)(Fy " y=x) & BGx)
More generally, every secondary occurrence of a designator vis-a-vis '9'
is guaranteed to yield the same truth-value as the corresponding primary
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occurrence in standard contexts in all PH-languages if and only if the
designator is either rigid or' semi-rigid.
'l' also behaves like 'O with regard to scope in the K-languages.
Even when '(Qx)(Fx)' is a rigid designator, (11) and (15) need not agree
in truth-value in some K-languages. For suppose the rigidly designated
object satisfies 'Gx' with respect to every accessible world in which it
exists. Then (15) will be true. Nevertheless, the designated object might
fail to satisfy 'Gx' with respect to an accessible world in which it does
not exist. Thus in some K-languages (11) could still be false. But (11)
and (15) are respectively model-theoretically equivalent to (18) and (19)
in every K-language. Hence, even when '(7x)(Fx)' is a rigid designator,
(18) and (19) need not match in truth-value in some K-languages.
The contrast between the K-languages and the PH-languages is
accordingly the same for 'a' as for 'O'. (20) is valid in all PH-languages,
but it is not valid in those K-languages that permit rigid designation of
contingent objects. As before, to get a schema that is valid in all K-
languages, the antecedent of (20) must be strengthened, as in (21), to
entail that '()x)(Fx)' is a strongly rigid designator:
{(3x) (Vy) (Fy y-x) & o(Vy) (Fy y=x)] & O(3x) (Fx) (21)
B(3x)((Vy)(Fy y=x) & Gx) - (3x)((Vy)(Fy y=x) & Gx)]
More generally, every secondary occurrence of a designator vis-a-vis '8'
is guaranteed to yield the same truth-value in all K-languages as the
corresponding primary occurrence if and only if the designator is
strongly rigid. 3 3
(15) was first introduced as an example of a purely de dicto
modal formula that is materially equivalent in every PH-language to
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(ll), a purely de re modal formula, when '(7x)(Fx)' is a rigid designator.
But (15) is not an example of such a formula in the case of the K-languages.
In fact, if '(ix)(Fx)' is a designator, then unless it is strongly rigid,
no purely de dicto formula of the form roAl will be materially equivalent
to (11) in every K-language. 34  For consider the K-languages in which
'()x)(Fx)' rigidly designates a contingent object, s. In these languages
the truth of (11) will depend in part on whether s satisfies 'Gx' with
respect to worlds in which it does not exist. Hence, if rUA were
materially equivalent to (11) in all of these languages, its truth
would also have to depend on whether s satisfies tGx' with respect to
such worlds. However, there is no way for the truth of 1rA) to depend
on this. Since rDA is by supposition a purely de dicto modal formula,
A contains no free variables. And, with respect to any particular world,
the quantified variables in A range only over objects that exist in that
world. Hence, no variable in A will range over s with respect to a world
in which it does not exist. Consequently, with respect to every such
world, the truth of A will be independent of whether s satisfies 'Gx'.
But then the truth conditions for rIA' will differ from those for (11)
in the K-languages in which '(Ix)(Fx)' rigidly designates s. 3 5
Accordingly, no purely de dicto modal formula of the form QbA1
will be materially equivalent to (11) in all K-languages when "(ix)(Fx)'
is a rigid, but not a strongly rigid designator. Of course, if it is
strongly rigid, then (12) is a formula of the desired form that is
equivalent to (11) in all K-languages. Again, however, the important
result is the contrast between the two families of modal languages. In
standard contexts rigid designators bridge the truth-value gap between
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de re and de dicto (strong) necessity in all PH-languages; but they do
not do so in all K-languages.
The relationship between (11) and (15) provides some further
results. (11) is model-theoretically equivalent to (22) in all of the
languages we are considering:
(3x) [(Vy)(Fy - y=x) & ~O~ Gx (22)
(15) is likewise equivalent to (23), which in turn simplifies to (24):
"o{•, (3x)(Vy)(Fy - y=x) v (3x)[(Vy)(Fy E y=x) & Gx]3 (23)
SG(3x)[ (Vy)(Fy = y=x) & -Gx] (24)
With no loss of generality, 'H' can be substituted for 'MG' in (22) and
(24) to get (25) and (26):
(3x)I(Vy) (Fy = y=x) & ',9Hx] (25)
0"(3x)[(Vy)(Fy = y=x) & Hx] (26)
Therefore, (25) and (26) must be related in the same way in the various
languages as (11) and (15). That is, if '(7x)(Fx)' is a designator, then
(25) and (26) must match in truth-value in all PH-languages if and only
if '(?x)(Fx)' is rigid or semi-rigid. By contrast, they must match in
truth-value in all K-languages if and only if it is strongly rigid.
Therefore, (27)--the schema obtained from (4) when the impossibility
operator, '~O', replaces 'A'--is valid in all PH-languages, but not in
all K-languages:
(3x) [(Vy)(Fy = y=x) & 3(Vy) (Fy y=x)] (27)
r ,, (3x)((Vy) (Fy - y=x) & Gx) (3x)() y)(Fy y=x) % FGx)1
To get a schema that is valid in all K-languages, the antecedent of (27)
must be strengthened to entail that '()x)(Fx)' is strongly rigid.
135
The contrast between the PH- and the K-languages is thus the
same for '~"' as for '0'. Every secondary occurrence of a designator
vis-a-vis ',*' is guaranteed to yield the same truth-value as the corres-
ponding primary occurrence in standard contexts in all PH-languages if
and only if the designator is either rigid or semi-rigid. But to guarantee
matching truth-values in all K-languages, the designator must be strongly
rigid.
It is instructive to make the same move with (12) as we made
with (11) and (15). Just as (15) is model-theoretically equivalent to
(24) in all of the languages we are considering, (12) is equivalent to
(28):
0~,(3x) [(Vy)(Fy - y=x) & Gx] (28)
(28) should not be confused with (24), for the second occurrence of ','
has wide scope in (28) and narrow scope in (24). Since (15) is also
equivalent to (19), the contrast between (28) and (24) parallels that
between (12) and (19). The contrast between (28) and (24) thus shows
that, in the languages we are considering, the difference between the
de dicto ' ' and the de dicto '8' is akin to the difference between
outer and inner negation.
That '-9' behaves in the same way with regard to scope as 'O'
should not be surprising. Interchanging truth and falsity in our arguments
about 'O' will trivially yield parallel arguments about ' ~'. This point
holds equally for '~0' and 'oe'. That is, in the languages we are con-
sidering, the strong and weak contingency operators behave respectively
in the same way with regard to scope as the strong and weak necessity
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operators. Thus, neither in all PH- nor in all K-languages is (29)
valid:
(3x) •(y)(Fy y=x) & Q(Vy) (Fy yx)]
~3o(3x)((Vy)(Fy - y=x) & Gx) E (3x)((Vy)(Fy E y=x) &DGx (29)
To get a schema that is valid in all of the languages in either family,
the antecedent of (29) must be strengthened to entail that '()x)(Fx)' is
a strongly rigid designator. Hence, in the languages we are considering,
every secondary occurrence of a designator vis-a-vis '~O' is guaranteed
to yield the same truth-value as the corresponding primary occurrence
if and only if the designator is strongly rigid.
In the case of ',B', we get the usual contrast between the two
families of languages. (30) is valid in all PH-languages, but not in all
K- Ianguages :
(3x) (Vy)(Fy E y-x) & (V) (Fy ) y=x) ] (30)
~S(3x)((Vy) (Fy y=x) & Gx) (3 x)((Vy)(Fy y=x) &*SGx)]
To obtain a schema that is valid in all K-languages, the antecedent of
(30) must be strengthened to entail that '()x)(Fx)' is a strongly rigid
designator. More generally, every secondary occurrence of a designator
vis-a-vis '.9' is guaranteed to yield the same truth-value as the corres-
ponding primary occurrence in standard contexts in all PH-languages if
and only if the designator is rigid or semi-rigid. But the designator
must be strongly rigid to guarantee matching truth-values in all K-
languages.
The results for '9)', 'A'0', and '-iB' thus add little to our
earlier findings. However, the fact that '•' and 'uO* ' do not have the
same scope characteristics in the PH-languages does call attention to
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something we have so far ignored. If '(7x)(Fx)' is a designator, then
(31) and (32) must have the same truth-value:
(3x) [(y) (Fy I y=x) & ~Gx] (31)
(3x) [(Vy)(Fy = y=x) & Gx] (32)
But when either 'O' or 'O' is prefixed to both (31) and (32), '(7x)(Fx)'
must be a strongly rigid designator to assure that the resulting two
formulas match in truth-value. Thus, for example, (33) will be trivially
false while (34) will be true in all those PH- and K-languages in which
'(7x)(Fx)' is a rigid, but not strongly rigid designator:
O (3x) (Vy) (Fy = y=x) & vFx (33)
y(3xx) (y)(Fy w =x) & Fx] (34)
Similarly, if 'Fx' is a logical contrary of 'Fx', then (35) will be false
and (36) will be trivially true in these languages:
E (3x) [(y)(Fy -y=x) & -"Fx (35)
0o(3x) [(Vy) (Fy -- y=x) & Fx (36)
Of course, if '()x)(Fx)' is a strongly rigid designator, (33) and (34)
will both be false, and (35) and (36) will both be true in every language
we are considering.
'W' is not the only operator that has different scope character-
istics when it occurs embedded in modal contexts. Earlier we showed that
(5) and (6)--i.e., '(3x)[(Vy)(Fy - y=x) &OGxJ' and '*(3x)[(Vy)(Fy . y-x)
& Gx '--must match in truth-value in all PH-languages when '(lx)(Fx)' is
a rigid designator. But (37) and (38) need not match in truth-value in
all PH-languages when '()x)(Fx)' is rigid:
S(3x) [(Vy)(Fy -_ y=x) &#GxJ (37)
D o (3x) [(Vy)(Fy - y-x) & Gx] (38)
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For example, consider PH-languages in which the actual world is acces-
sible from all other worlds. Suppose the object designated by '(7x)(Fx)'
satisfies 'Gx' only with respect to the actual world. Then (38) would
be true; but (37) would be false unless the designated object exists
in all accessible worlds. In other words, (37) and (38) need not
match in truth-value in the PH-languages in question unless '(Ix)(Fx)'
is a strongly rigid designator. However, if it is strongly rigid, then
(37) and (38) will match in truth-value in all PH-languages, for then
'(3x) [(Vy) (Fy 4 y=x) &'Gx]' and 'O(3x)(Vy) (Fy - y=x) & Gx]' will match
in truth-value with respect to every accessible world.36
The contrast between (37) and (38) when '()x)(Fx)' is rigid,
but not strongly rigid, resolves a matter we left open at the end of the
preceding section of the paper. The positive results we have obtained
for the scope of rigid designators vis-a-vis modal operators in the PH-
languages are limited. They do not generalize to the case of modal
formulas embedded in modal contexts. They do not genera'lize any more
than Whitehead's and Russell's positive results for the scope of designa-
tors vis-a-vis truth-functional operators generalize to the case of
truth-functional formulas embedded in modal contexts. Of course, such
positive results do generalize to the case of formulas embedded in
extensional contexts. But this generalization requires only that
'(3x)[(Vy)(Fy . y=x) & iGx]' and 'o(3x)[(Vy)(Fy - y=x) & GxJ' always
be assigned matching values with respect to the actual world.3 7 By
contrast, the generalization to embeddings in modal contexts requires
that '(3x) (Vy)(Fy - y=x) & )Gx3' and 't(3x)[l(dy)(Fy 3 y=x) & Gx3'
always be assigned matching values with respect to every accessible
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world. In the PH-languages, as well as in the K-languages, this last
requirement is met if and only if '(ix)(Fx)' is a strongly rigid desig-
nator.
This conclusion can be stated formally. Let 'o' stand for an
operator, modal or extensional. Then all formulas of the form of (39)
are valid both in all PH-languages and in all K-languages:
(x) [f(Vy)(Fy S y=x) & DOC(Vy) (Fy y=x)j & O(3x) (Fx) (39)
1O3 (3x)[(Vy) (Fy S y-x) & Gx] S (3x)(YVy)(Fy = y=x) & -Gx] 9
However, if the antecedent of (39) is weakened so that it no longer en-
tails that '(ix)(Fx)' is a strongly rigid designator, then some formulas
of the resulting form will not be valid in some PH-languages and in some
K-languages.
What condition, then must a definite description satisfy to
assure that its scope never affects the truth-value of any formula in
any language in one of our modal families? The answer is the same for
both of our families: the definite description must be a strongly rigid
designator. Earlier one might have thought that strong rigidity is the
answer in the case of standard contexts in the PH-languages only because
of our insistence on interpreting '0' strongly. But the contrast
between (33) and (34), which do not contain 'O', shows otherwise. The
requirement of strong rigidity comes from deeper considerations. Our
crucial examples have all turned on the same model-theoretical feature
of the PH- and K-languages, viz., that with respect to any world, bound
variables range only over the objects existing in that world. If one
wants to weaken the requirement of strong rigidity, this feature is the
appropriate one to abandon.
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VI
The principal question we have been addressing is whether all
formulas of the form of (4) are valid in either all PH- or all K-
languages:
(3x) [(Vy) (Fy S y=x) & O(Vy) (Fy y=x) (4)
[[j(3x)((Vy)(Fy y=x) & Gx) (3x)((Vy)(Fy y=x) &SGx)]
The answer for both families of languages is no. We found that all such
formulas are valid in a PH- or K-language just in case (40) is valid in
that language:
But (40) is not valid in PH- and K-languages that permit rigid designa-
tion (in the sense of (2)) of objects whose existence is contingent.
The validity of (40) is required for the validity of (4) because
of the way the PH- and K-languages treat variables occurring in contexts
governed by '0'. For suppose . rigidly designates a contingent object in
a PH- or K-language in which (40) is not valid. Then in this language
an open formula Y(C) can be necessarily true of the object . designates
without the corresponding closed formula Y(L) being a necessary truth.
This can happen because the PH- and K-languages treat variables that are
bound from within the scope of '0' differently from those that are not.
In particular, in the PH- and K-languages that countenance contingent
objects, 'C3x)(OGx)' can be true without '0(3x)(Gx)' being true. Of
course, this treatment of variables does not lack motive. It is the basis
for claiming that the PH- and K-languages need only one modal operator to
capture both de re and de dicto necessity.
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The requirement that (40) be valid provides the answer to a
follow-up question we posed--viz., how must the antecedent of (4) be
strengthened to transform the schema into one that is valid for all modal
operators in all PH- or all K-languages? The answer for both families of
languages is that the antecedent must entail that '(7x)(Fx)' is a strongly
rigid designator.
Our principal question was put forward as a step toward answer-
ing another question: with regard to scope distinctions, are rigidly
designating Russellian definite descriptions the analogue in modal
languages of designating Russellian definite descriptions in truth-
functional languages? Unless our definition of rigid designation is
radically in error, again the answer is no. In the case of PH-like or
K-like modal extensions of standard quantificational languages, the
analogue of Whitehead's and Russell's "scope equivalency" condition is
not that the definite description be a rigid designator, but that it be
a strongly rigid designator. This result is worth stating precisely.
Suppose U. is a definite description in a PH- or K-language. Let A be
any sentence in which a occurs with its scope unmarked; and let B and B'
be any two sentences obtained from A via Russell ian expansions of a. Then
B and B" are guaranteed to be materially equivalent just in case 4 is a
strongly rigid designator.
Although the general result is the same for both families of
languages, the results in the case of individual modal operators are
different. This is not surprising. The two families construe occurrences
of modal operators outside of the scope of quantifiers in basically the
same way; but they construe occurrences inside quantifiers differently.
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To appreciate the difference, consider a PH- and a K-language with the same
vocabulary, both of which countenance contingent objects. Let them be
sufficiently comparable to one another that both can be interpreted on all
the same models, with like extensions assigned to their atomic predicates
with respect to every world. Then, on individual models, some formulas
like '(3x)(UGx)'--and hence also like '(3x)(SGx)'--will be true in the
PH-language, yet false in the K-language; and some formulas like '(3x)(OGx)'
will be true in the K-language, yet false in the PH-language. However, on
each model the truth-value of any formula like ',"(3x)(Gx)' will be the same
in both languages. Moreover, on each model the same definite descriptions
will be rigid designators in both languages. Therefore, the relationship
between rigid designators and the scope of modal operators must not be
the same in the two languages.
In the K-family, designators are "scope neutral" in all exten-
sional contexts, and strongly rigid designators are "scope neutral" in all
contexts, But as a class, rigid designators--i.e., rigid Russellian defi-
nite descriptions--exhibit no distinctive scope-related characteristics. A
secondary occurrence of a designator vis-a-vis any of the modal operators we
are considering need not yield the same truth-value as the corresponding
primary occurrence in all K-languages unless the designator is strongly
rigid. Specifically, (4) is invalid regardless of the modal operator re-
placing 'L' in just those K-languages in which the converse Barcan formulas
are invalid. Accordingly, the failure of rigid designators to exhibit distinc-
tive scope characteristics across the family of K-languages can be viewed as
a consequence of the converse Barcan formulas being invalid in some of these
languages. But the model theory for the family provides another, perhaps
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more instructive way of viewing it. Rigidly designating definite descrip-
tions have an important model-theoretical characteristic in all the
languages we are considering: only with respect to those worlds in which
an object exists does it fulfill a definite description that rigidly
designates it. However, whether an object satisfies 'jLGx' in the K-
languages may depend on all accessible worlds, including those in which
it does not exist. Consequently, in the K-languages a rigid designator
may fail to pick out the designated object with respect to some of the
worlds it must in order to block contrasts in truth-value associated with
scope ambiguities. Metaphorically speaking, the reference of a rigid
designator may not extend widely enough in the K-languages.
The model-theoretical situation is different in the PH-family.
Whether an object satisfies 'iGx', where 'Gx' is standard, does not depend
on worlds in which it fails to exist. Instead, it depends on just those
worlds with respect to which the object fulfills any definite description
that rigidly designates it. A rigidly designating definite description is
thus an apt way of referring to an object in standard contexts in the PH-
languages. Of course, the more privileged status of rigid designators in
the family of PH-languages can also be viewed as a consequence of the con-
verse Barcan formulas being valid in all of these languages. But regardless
of how the matter is viewed, (4) is valid in all PH-languages for many modal
operators. Among the modal operators we are considering, the only excep-
tions are 'U' and '~'. With these exceptions, every secondary occurrence
of a rigid designator vis-a-vis the modal operators we are considering is
guaranteed to yield the same truth-value as the corresponding primary
occurrence in standard contexts in all PH-languages.
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Thus, as a class, rigid designators do exhibit some special
scope-related characteristics in the PH-family. But these characteristics
are nonetheless not distinctive since in this family semi-rigid designators
exhibit the very same characteristics. Therefore, their scope characteris-
tics cannot be used to differentiate rigid designators even in the case
of the PH-languages.
Among the claims Kripke makes in the footnote we quoted at the
beginning of the paper are: (i) ambiguities in the scope of a definite
description have no effect on truth-value in modal contexts if the
definite description is a rigid designator; (ii) roughly, the condition
that a definite description must satisfy for it to be thus scope neutral
is that it be a rigid designator; and (iii) when definite descriptions
are treated in the manner of Russell, (i) and (ii) often follow from the
other postulates of quantified modal logic. One difficulty in assessing
these claims is that it is not clear which modal quantificational languages
Kripke had in mind. All three claims are true of those strong languages
that form the intersection of the PH- and K-families. But these languages
are not of much philosophic interest, since their domains of discourse are
restricted to objects whose existence is necessary. Moreover, the claims,
though true, are somewhat misleading in the case of these languages. The
distinction between rigid and strongly rigid designation is too important
to be glossed over. Yet the claims are true of rigid designators in
these extreme languages just because rigidity in them is tantamount to
strong rigidity. Hence, if these are the languages Kripke had in mind,
it would have been more appropriate for him to phrase his claims to be
about strongly rigid designators.
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Kripke's claims are of more note if they are about rigid
designators in languages in which rigidity and strong rigidity diverge.
But which languages of this sort might he have had in mind? Even with
qualifications his claims are not in the least true of rigid designators
in any K-language of this sort. In such K-languages ambiguities in the
scope of a rigid designator can affect truth-value regardless of which of
the customary modal operators forms the modal context. In particular,
then, the claims are in no way true of the minimal K-language that Kripke
presents in detail in "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic." To be
true of this language, the claims would have to single out not rigid,
but strongly rigid designators.
Strictly speaking, the claims are also not true of rigid
designators in any PH-language in which rigidity and strong rigidity
diverge. Again, they would have to be modified to single out strongly
rigid designators. Nevertheless, the claims are in a sense more true for
these PH-languages than they are for the corresponding K-languages. For
they can be made to hold for rigid designators in these PH-languages by
adding four qualifications. First, scope ambiguities occurring embedded
within broader modal contexts must be excepted in (i) and (ii). Second,
the claims must be restricted to definite descriptions occurring in
contexts formed with standard predicates. Third, '0' and '-0' must be
excepted. Finally, the 'roughly' in (ii) must allow for the fact that
semi-rigid designators have the same scope-related characteristics as
rigid designators. With all of these qualifications, (i), (ii), and (iii)
become true in the case of the PH-languages in which rigidity and strong
rigidity diverge.
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Perhaps, then, these are the languages Kripke had in mind. How-
ever, if they are, he again seems open to criticism. For the requisite
qualifications are far too significant to have been left unstated. Hence,
as far as I can see, unless Kripke had entirely different formal languages
in mind, his claims about scope and rigid designators are at best mislead-
ing. But notice that once (i), (ii), and (iii) are revised to become
claims about strongly rigid designators, they become true for all of the
formal languages we have considered. Revising the claims in this way is
clearly the most reasonable move to make.
VII
At the very beginning of this chapter I called attention to a
number of conflicting claims regarding scope distinctions and rigid
designation. How do our results for the PH- and K-languages bear on
these comparatively broad claims? One advantage of focusing on precise
questions about specific formal languages, as we have been doing, is that
answers are often forthcoming. Now we must face a disadvantage. Drawing
conclusions of general interest from our results will require some
potentially controversial intervening assumptions. For example, we will
have to assume that our definition of rigid designation is correct. I
see no problem here, but others--e.g., Peacocke and Dummett--may. We
will also have to assume that name-free regimented languages employing
Russell's treatment of definite descriptions are not mere contrivances,
of no general significance. Since our results are for definite de-
scriptions that in fact denote, perhaps Russell's treatment will not be
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so controversial here as it sometimes has been made out to be in dis-
cussions of vacuous reference. Nevertheless, because many of our results
have turned on the existential implications of Russell's treatment, the
possibility of alternative treatments of definite descriptions is clearly
germane.
Finally, we will have to assume that at least one of our two
language families achieves a tolerable representation of relevant modal
notions. The burgeoning list of formal modal languages in the literature
40indicates that some will object to this assumption. Both of our families
represent de dicto modalities in basically the same way; but, as we have
noted, they treat de re modalities differently. To draw conclusions of
general interest, we will have to assume that their representation of
de dicto modalities is acceptable and that at least one of the families
represents de re modalities adequately. Each of the families has some-
thing to be said for it in regard to these assumptions. On the one hand,
the K-family derives from the most straightforward way of joining axioms
for normal modal propositional logic with ones for standard quantifica-
tional logic without in the process automatically validating the Barcan
41formulas. Hence, its easily motivated formalization weighs in favor of
the K-family. On the other hand, as I tried to indicate in passing while
defining it, the PH-family avoids the salient counterintuitive ramifica-
tions of other approaches to formalizing de re and de dicto modalities
without resorting to separate operators. Hence, its apparent fit with
our informal intuitions weighs in favor of the PH-family. It is accord-
ingly not unreasonable to assume that at least one of our families achieves
a tolerable representation of the relevant modal notions. But until some
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agreement on quantified modal logic is reached in the literature, this
assumption is likely to be controversial. In particular, the possibility
of needing separate operators for de re and de dicto modalities cannot yet
be dismissed.
Too much space would be needed to defend these various inter-
vening assumptions here. Since none of them is eccentric, I suggest that
we put debate over them aside for now and turn to the ramifications of
our results, taken at face value. I will return to these assumptions
briefly at the end of the paper.
Consider first Linsky's claim that a designator oL is rigid if
and only if, for all atomic (r), r~(0 )1 has the same truth-value whether
a. is taken to have wide or narrow scope. If he intends rO((l) to be con-
strued as it would be in either the PH- or the K-languages, then he is
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mistaken. His condition is generally necessary and sufficient not for
a to be rigid, but for it to be strongly rigid. Indeed, so long as '3'
expresses strong necessity in a language that treats singular terms in
Russell's way, Linsky's condition will not be both necessary and suffi-
cient for * to be rigid unless the language also requires that nothing be
de re necessarily true of any contingent object.
Short of radical moves, I do not see how Linsky can save this
claim. Perhaps it can be saved by shifting to nonstandard languages--
e.g., to languages based on a free-logic or to languages in which a
Strawsonian treatment of singular terms leads to truth-value gaps. But
Linsky does not seem prepared to abandon Russell's treatment of definite
descriptions. Nor would I abandon it just to save this one claim about
rigid designation. Maybe he would prefer to interpret 'O' as expressing
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weak necessity. If his condition were stated in terms of r' )(4) instead
of O#(.) , then it would be a necessary condition for the rigidity of a
in the case of PH-like languages. But it would still not be a necessary
condition in the case of K-like languages. And even in the case of
PH-like languages, it would not be a sufficient condition since semi-
rigid designators would also satisfy it. Our results are clear on this
point. If the modalities are represented tolerably in either the PH-
languages or the K-languages, then no scope-based condition will be both
necessary and sufficient for a Russellian definite description to be a
rigid designator. Scope considerations are ideal for demarcating
strongly rigid designators; but they cannot serve to demarcate rigid
designators.
Next, consider Linsky's claim that rigid designators collapse
the de re/de dicto distinction. If he means by this what he appears to,
viz. that ambiguities in the scope of a rigid designator never affect
truth-value, then he is mistaken as before. But this claim he can save.
To see this, consider Slote's similar, but more guarded suggestion that,
with appropriate existence qualifications, inferences from de dicto to
de re and vice versa are legitimate when rigid designators are used.
Unfortunately, as it stands this suggestion puts no limits on what can
count as an appropriate existence qualification. Thus if Slote means to
require the rigid designators to be strongly rigid, then his suggestion
is true, but misleading and uninteresting. There are, however, inter-
pretations under which the suggestion is true and interesting. For
example, if Slote means only to be excepting strong necessity and
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contingency in favor of their weak counterparts, then although his sugges-
tion is false in the case of K-like languages, it is true in the case of
standard contexts in PH-like languages. Even better, it is true in the
case of standard contexts in PH-like languages, although again not in the
case of K-like languages, if by 'appropriate existence qualifications' he
simply means to require that an antecedent clause like the one in (15) be
introduced into de dicto cases involving strong necessity and contingency.
Thus, if taken to be about PH-like and not K-like languages, Slote's
suggestion is correct when suitably interpreted. Rigid designators do
license inferences across the de re/de dicto boundary in PH-like languages.
Hence, as Linsky claims, they do in a certain sense collapse the de re/
de dicto distinction in these languages. Again, however, they are not
alone in doing so, for semi-rigid designators license the same inferences.
Slote's suggestion is open to a more interesting interpretation
than those just considered. As last interpreted, it authorized clauses
like the one in (15) to be introduced into the premisses as well as the
conclusions of inferences. This enabled us to exploit our finding that
every purely de re modal formula involving a rigid designator in a
standard context is materially equivalent in PH-languages to a purely
de dicto modal formula. But suppose now that we allow such existence
qualifications to be introduced only into the conclusion of an inference,
and never into the premiss. Is Slote's suggestion correct under this
restriction? That is, can de re and de dicto conclusions, perhaps in-
corporating such existence qualifications, be respectively inferred from
unqualified de dicto and de re premisses when rigid designators are used?
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This version of Slote's suggestion is worth making more precise.
As we can see from what has gone before, permitting the categories of de
re and de dicto modality to include occurrences of modal operators embedded
within modal contexts will complicate the issue without improving the sug-
gestion's chances of being correct. Hence we will restrict these categories
for present purposes to occurrences of modal operators that are not them-
selves within the scope of a modal operator. Even so, such occurrences
can be simultaneously de re with respect to one designator (or variable)
and de dicto with respect to another--e.g. as in '(3x)[(Vw)(Fw - w=x) &
I[(3y)((Vw)(Gw . w=y) & Hxy)]'. Hence, we need to construe Slote's sug-
gestion to be about inferences between de re occurrences of an operator
with respect to a designator and de dicto occurrences of that operator
with respect to the same designator. Finally, we need to restrict ap-
propriate existence qualifications to clauses like the one in (15) that,
when introduced into a de re case, add no variables bound from within the
scope of the modal operator, and when introduced into a de dicto case,
add no variables bound from outside the scope of the operator. The idea
behind this last restriction is to bar the existence qualifications from
making a de re case more de dicto or a de dicto case more de re than it
would be without the added existence qualification.
I suspect that the version of Slote's suggestion we get with
these restrictions is the one he had in mind. It is clearly of some
interest. But is it correct? Of course, it is false just as before in
the case of K-like languages. Inferences between de re and de dicto
cases involving a rigid designator are generally not warranted in these
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languages unless the designator is strongly rigid. In particular, our
earlier results for the K-languages show that if the designator is not
strongly rigid, then even with existence qualifications of the sort
specified, we cannot infer de dicto from de re strong necessity.4 5
Equally then, this version of the suggestion is not true in the case
of nonstandard contexts in PH-like languages. What is slightly sur-
prising is that it is also not true in the case of standard contexts
in these languages. It is almost true. Existence qualifications of
the sort specified are all that is needed in this case to license the
inferences from de re to de dicto. (Our earlier results show that the
existence qualifications are not even needed except when going from
de re to de dicto strong necessity and contingency.) Moreover, with
one notable exception, the inferences from de dicto to de re are
legitimate in this case--indeed, without existence qualifications. The
exception is strong contingency. In PH-like languages, as well as in
K-like languages, such existence qualifications are not enough to license
inferences from de dicto to de re cases involving rigid designators and
strong contingency. A formula like (41) may be true in a PH-language
(or in a K-language) only because '()x)(Fx)' is not a strongly rigid
designator:
~O(3x)[(Vy)(Fy - y=x) & GxJ (41)
Accordingly, the form of qualification needed to license an inference
to a corresponding de re formula is not like the one in (15), but like
the one in (42):
Q(3x)(Fx) > (3x) (Vy)(Fy = y=x) & -0Gx] (42)
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This qualification, however, is tantamount to requiring the rigid
designator '(7x)(Fx)' to be strongly rigid.
So, the most interesting version of Slote's suggestion turns
out to be false not just for K-like languages, but even for standard
contexts in PH-like languages. Even with allowances for nonstandard
predicates, in neither kind of language can one always infer a conclusion
of opposite modality from an unqualified de re or de dicto premiss in-
volving a rigid designator. In both kinds of languages such inferences
are universally legitimate only if the designator is strongly rigid. In
a certain important sense, then, rigid designators do not collapse the
de re/de dicto distinction in either K-like or PH-like languages.
Sentences of the sort represented schematically in (43) through
(46) are commonly held to be open to two readings, one with the modal
phrase taken to be expressing modality de dicto and the other, modality
de re:
The x such that Fx had to be G. (43)
The x such that Fx did not have to be G. (44)
The x such that Fx might have been G. (45)
The x such that Fx could not have been G. (46)
What do our results show about how the alternative readings are related
to one another? In order for our results to show anything about such
sentences, we must first stipulate that the definite descriptions in
them can be construed in the manner of Russell without unacceptable
distortion. We must also stipulate that the treatment of madality de
dicto in the PH- and K-languages is adequate to capture the de dicto
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readings of the sentences. Then, if we ignore unsatisfiable definite
descriptions, our results show three things. First, if the de re readings
are construed as in the K-languages, then the definite descriptions in
the sentences must be strongly rigid designators in order to guarantee
that the alternative readings agree in truth-value. This conclusion
also holds if the de re readings are construed as in the PH-languages and
'G' is allowed to stand for a nonstandard predicate. Second, even if the
de re readings are construed as in the PH-languages and 'G' is taken to
stand for a standard predicate, the definite descriptions still must be
strongly rigid to guarantee like truth-values if the modal phrases in
sentences like (43) and (44) are taken to express strong necessity
and contingency. Finally, however, if the modal phrases in sentences
like (43) and (44) are taken to express weak necessity and contingency
and if the de re readings are construed as in the PH-languages with 'G'
standing for a standard predicate, then to guarantee like truth-values it
is both sufficient and necessary that the definite descriptions be rigid
or semi-rigid designators.
Intuitively, using rigid designators seems the right move to
make to avoid problems stemming from the de re/de dicto ambiguity of
sentences of the sort schematized in (41) through (44). Such intuitions
gain support from our results. But they do so only if four potentially
controversial points are acceded to, not the least of which is the
adoption of a PH-like construal of the de re readings.
With some stretching, these last results can be brought to bear
on Peacocke's claim that the truth conditions of modal sentences containing
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rigid designators are the same whether these designators are read with
wide or narrow scope. It is unclear whether he intends this claim to hold
when the alternative readings are both embedded within a modal context.
If he does, then his view is thoroughly incompatible with our findings for
the PH- and K-languages. Moreover, such a broad claim seems in trouble
independently of formal languages. Consider, for example, (47) and (48),
which employ Peacocke's method of exhibiting scope:
It might have been the case that: Heath (47)
is not human
It might not have been the case that: (48)
Heath is human.
These two appear to me to have different truth-conditions insofar as
(48), unlike (47), can be true simply because Heath's existence is con-
tingent. I suspect Peacocke would agree since in dealing with a related
example he feels it necessary to stipulate in a footnote that the 'not'
following the colon has narrow scope with respect to the designator.46
At any rate, none of his examples involve alternative readings embedded
within broader modal contexts. Hence, it is neither unreasonable nor
uncharitable for us to exclude such cases from his claim.
This still leaves us with Peacocke's idiosyncratic use of 'rigid
designator'. His rigid designators are closer to Russell's logically pro-
per names than to Kripke's rigid designators. Thus for him the paradigm
of a rigid designator in a regimented language is a constant, and all
Russellian definite descriptions are paradigmatically nonrigid. I will
discuss the scope characteristics of constants in modal languages in
two later sections. For reasons that will become increasingly clear then,
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I think that Peacocke's claim in no way turns on the special syntax of
constants. The examples he offers to illustrate and defend his claim
support this contention. These examples indicate that for him differences
in the scope of a rigid designator in a modal sentence amount basically
to what others have identified as the de re/de dicto distinction.
Furthermore, thanks to Quine's method for eliminating them, there seems
to be no crucial reason to have constants in any regimented language. I
am therefore going to take Peacocke's claim not to be about constants as
such, but to be about special definite descriptions that have the crucial
semantic characteristics of constants.
Once we agree that certain special definite descriptions--call
them "rigid designators"--can do the semantic work of constants, Peacocke's
claim takes on a different guise. He can then be appropriately viewed as
claiming that the truth conditions of alternative readings of sentences
of the sort schematized in (43) through (46) are the same provided that
the definite descriptions in them are of the special type. Furthermore,
once we allow special definite descriptions to replace constants, little
motivation remains for restricting rigid designation as severely as
Peacocke does. Instead, we can interpret his claim to be about rigid
designators in our sense. Then, since he treats singular terms in a
standard rather than in a Strawsonian or a free-logic way, our conclu-
sions about (43) through (46) become pertinent. Specifically, Peacocke's
claim is correct if he intends such sentences to be construed in the manner
of standard predications in the PH-languages and if he uniformly adopts the
weak reading of modal phrases expressing necessity and contingency. But
if he allows such phrases to express strong necessity or contingency or
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if he intends such sentences to be construed in the manner of the K-
languages, then his claim is wrong.
In putting his claim forward, Peacocke relies primarily on our
intuitions about some examples. What he says about these examples gains
support from our results. Again, however, it gains this support only
after certain major points concerning the semantics of modal sentences
have been acceded to--points that are not transparently at issue in his
examples. Admittedly, then, our results do not offer much in the way of
an argument on behalf of Peacocke. A more promising move to make at this
juncture is to turn the argument on its head. Our review of Peacocke's
claim, like our review of Slote's and Linsky's, suggests that our informal
intuitions about the scope characteristics of rigid designators ought to
be taken as evidence favoring a PH-like construal of modal sentences.
This last point deserves emphasis. Several philosophers--
Kripke, Linsky, Slote, and Peacocke among them--have claimed that rigid
designators are "scope neutral" in modal contexts. An adequate account
of the scope characteristics of rigid designators should do more than just
determine whether this claim is mistaken. It should also make clear why
philosophers would think that the claim is correct. Much of our attention
in this and the two preceding sections has been devoted to the latter
question. Part of the answer--a tendency to disregard modal sentences
embedded in further modal contexts--is of little philosophical interest.
A more significant part of the answer is the inclination to read informal
necessity and contingency statements weakly. This helps to explain why
obvious counterexamples involving 'O' and '~p' escape notice. But it is
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still not enough to explain why someone would think that rigid designators
are scope neutral. The main part of the answer thus seems to lie in the
PH-family. If we construe modal sentences in the manner of the K-languages,
we have no way to explain the scope neutrality claim other than to write
it off as a blunder. If, however, we construe modal sentences in the manner
of the PH-languages, we can readily explain why it is reasonable to have
thought that rigid designators are scope neutral. This, as I said, is
evidence that a PH-like construal is more in keeping with our informal
intuitions about rigid designation. And this in turn is evidence that the
PH-family offers the more attractive approach to regimenting de re modality.
VIll
So much for those who think that rigid designators, like other
singular terms, can have wide or narrow scope with respect to modal opera-
tors. What about those, such as Burge and Dummett, who think that rigid
designators have a peculiarly restricted logical syntax? Although our
approach to this claim will have to be different, we will again be con-
cerned with two questions. The immediate question is whether the claim
is mistaken; but the more interesting question is what would lead some-
one into thinking that it is correct. Differences between the PH-family
and the K-family have no bearing on either of these questions. Hence, we
will have to look elsewhere for answers. This will be our central con-
cern throughout the next three sections. It will lead us to another
important factor that has caused confusion both about rigid designation
and more significantly about the regimentation of de re modality.
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The first question, then, is whether Burge and Dummett are
correct in claiming that rigid designators have a restricted logical syn-
tax. Here, our formal results show little. True, in PH- and K-languages
rigid designators (as we have defined them) have the same logical syntax
as all other singular terms. Hence, on the surface our results stand
opposed to views like those of Burge and Dummett. But that they do so
was guaranteed beforehand. From the outset we asked our principal ques-
tion only of modal quantificational languages in which all singular terms
have the same logical syntax. Taken by themselves, therefore, our results
are either at cross-purposes with Burge and Dummett, or they beg questions
of concern to them.
Even so, we can develop an indirect line of argument against
Burge and Dummett. First, consider Dummett's position that a designator
is rigid just in case it always has wide scope with respect to modal
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operators. One consequence of this view is that no PH- or K-language
contains any rigid designators at all. Indeed, since Dummett holds that
names can have wide or narrow scope with respect to modal operators, he
must believe that virtually no formal modal language that has been put
forward contains any rigid designators. Rigid designation thus becomes
a rather empty notion on his view. Moreover, whether a designator is
rigid becomes an issue about its syntax within a given language, and not
an issue about the relationship between it and the object it denotes.
Thus, should there be a language in which 'the inventor of bifocals' is
always read with wide scope vis-a-vis modal operators, then even this
paradigmatically nonrigid designator will be rigid in that language,
_C_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ I_ _ I I _ _ I _ _
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even though it be accidental to Benjamin Franklin that he invented
bifocals. Worse still, Dummett's view is incompatible with Kripke's
intuitive test for rigid designation. For, according to Kripke's test,
. is a rigid designator provided that 'c might not have been v is false
on a reading in which the first occurrence of a has wide scope and the
second, narrow scope with respect to the modal operator.
In sum, Dummett's view departs radically form the usual approach
to rigid designation. As such, it calls for justification. Our results,
however, are evidence that any such justification will be difficult to
come by. For our results show that a reasonable account of rigid designa-
tion is possible without compromising, much less abandoning, the usual
approach. Our definition of rigidity is a formal restatement of Kripke's
test. On our definition, 'the inventor of bifocals' is a rigid designator
in any language only if it is essential to Benjamin Franklin that he
(uniquely) invented bifocals. And our definition does not outlaw rigid
designators in standard formal modal languages. What reason can there be,
then, for adopting Dummett's radical alternative?
One requirement Dummett places on his characterization of rigid
designation is that it be free of "the metaphor of possible worlds."
Another is that in sentences with modal operators a rigid designator still
refer to the object it refers to in sentences with no modal operators.
In the case of modal languages that treat bound variables in the manner
of the PH- and K-languages, Dummett's characterization meets the second
requirement trivially. For when a designator occurs with wide scope
with respect to modal operators in such languages, its reference is
determined in the very same way as when it occurs in a nonmodal context.
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By contrast, we do not insist that rigid designators have wide scope.
Nevertheless, on our characterization a rigid designator that has narrow
scope with respect to a modal operator still refers to no object other
than the one it refers to when it has wide scope. Thus, on our character-
ization, if a rigid designator occurs in a modal sentence, then whenever
it has reference, it refers to the same object as it does when it occurs
in a nonmodal sentence. The qualification allows for loss of reference
in the case of modal contexts that require the object in question not to
exist. With this one qualification, then, our characterization meets
Dummett's second requirement. Moreover, it meets it less trivially. On
our characterization, a nonrigid definite description fails to be rigid
not by virtue of special rules governing the logical syntax of individual
singular terms, but because the description is only accidentally true of
or accidentally uniquely true of the object it happens to be true of.
Dummett's syntactic characterization of rigidity is obviously
free of the metaphor of possible worlds. Though it may be less obvious,
our characterization is free of this metaphor too. Of course, our
characterization does include a modal operator. But to use a modal
operator in explicating a notion is by no means to invoke all the par-
phernalia of possible worlds. Modal operators in their own right provide
far less expressive power than is employed in possible world talk. For
example, there is no way to express 'there is an x that is an F with
respect to exactly two possible worlds' in any PH- or K-language.
Similarly, 'only with respect to the actual world is there an x that is
an F' cannot be expressed. 50 Those of us who resist viewing possible
worlds as anything more than a heuristic for a model theory are
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particularly skeptical about counting over these worlds and referring to
specific ones of them. But most formalisms with modal operators are
like the PH- and K-languages in having no way either to count over such
worlds or to refer to them individually. Modal operators as such, then,
should not be confused with "the metaphor of possible worlds."5 1
Moreover, resorting to a modal operator in characterizing rigid
designation may be unavoidable. We have no reason to think that modal
notions can be reduced to nonmodal ones. Hence, it is entirely appropriate
for a characterization of rigid designation to include a modal operator if
the notion is, as it appears to be, intrinsically modal. As far as I
can see, then, unless Dummett has requirements besides those he mentions,
he has no basis for objecting to our characterization of rigidity.
The contrast between Dummett's version of rigid designation
and ours can be sharpened by considering counterfactuals like (49):
Suppose the row of tomato plants had been
planted in reverse order; even so, the (49)
fourth plant from the right would have
had the greatest yield.
'The fourth plant from the right' is referentially ambiguous in (49).
Its reference can be based either on what is actually the case, so that
it denotes the tomato plant that is now fourth from the right, or on what
is counterfactually supposed to be the case, so that it denotes the one
that would have been fourth from the right had the row been reversed.
Furthermore, which one it denotes may affect the truth-value of (49).
(Perhaps their specific locations is the factor controlling the relative
yields of the plants in question.) Now both we and Dummett would insist
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that, unlike 'the fourth plant from the right', rigid designators exhibit
a certain invariance of reference in such counterfactual contexts. Dummett
would have rigid designators do this by having their reference always based
on what is actually the case. On his view, there would be special rules
applying to some, but not to all, singular terms. These rules would block
the reference of these terms from ever being based on what is counterfac-
tually supposed to be the case. In effect, then, he would have the grammar
of the language mark some singular terms with the feature of referential
invariance, and others not.
On our view, by contrast, the reference of any singular term
occurring in a position like 'the fourth plant from the right' in (49)
could still be determined on either of the two bases. But on either basis,
a rigid designator, unlike other singular terms, would always be assigned
the same referent whenever a referent is assigned to it at all. Rigid
designators would be thus referentially invariant not because of special
grammatical rules governing the way their reference is determined, but
because of the nature of the semantic relation they bear to the objects
they denote. That is, according to our version of rigidity, but not
Dummett's, the reference of rigid designators is in certain respects
insulated from the vagaries of how things happen to be. Even if things
besides language had been different, a rigid designator would still have
denoted the object it now does, had that object still existed; and regard-
less, it would have denoted no other object. Consequently, a rigid desig-
nator in a counterfactual like (49) can have its reference determined on
either of the two bases without giving rise to a true reading on one
basis and an untrue one on the other. This is an important feature of
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rigid designators, one that any characterization of them should secure.
But why tamper with the syntax of singular terms when it can be secured
in a theoretically more interesting, less artificial way?
The argument against Dummett's position, then, is directed at
the claim that rigid designators always have wide scope with respect to
modal operators, and not at the considerations that lie behind this claim.
I agree with him that rigid designators provide a safe, neutral--i.e.,
rigid--way of referring to objects in counterfactual contexts like (49).
Indeed, this feature can be exploited to motivate the notion of rigid
designation in the first place. It is easy to show that counterfactual
contexts like (49) engender referential ambiguities and that these am-
biguities can affect truth-value. The idea of a special kind of desig-
nator that never yields conflicting truth-values in any such context is
then a natural one. This is much the way Kripke motivates rigid designa-
tion in "Naming and Necessity" and "Identity and Necessity," although in
this case he resorts to talk of possible worlds where in general he prefers
to let the counterfactuals speak for themselves. Because it does not rely
on technical, formal considerations, this way of motivating the notion
has a comparatively direct and broad intuitive appeal. It is the best way
52I have found to motivate the notion. Still, it is not perfect. Since
semi-rigid designators have the very same sort of referential invariance,
it does not quite succeed in picking out rigid designators alone.
The argument against Burge closely resembles the one against
Dummett. Burge holds that, unlike other singular terms, rigid designators
occur only in referentially transparent positions. Specifically, he says
that what seems crucial to rigid designation "is that, in modal and related
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contexts, a term in the surface syntax always be taken in the semantical
representation to have referentially transparent position--or Frege's
'customary reference'.1 5 3 Of course, in the PH- and K-languages the dis-
tinction between surface syntax and semantical representation collapses
once definite descriptions are expanded or, what amounts to almost the
same thing, once their scope is marked. Furthermore, in these languages
every singular term can occur within the scope of 'o'; and all singular
term positions within the scope of 'O' are referentially opaque. Con-
sequently, if Burge is correct, the PH- and K-languages contain no rigid
designators whatever.
Indeed, if Burge is correct, there are no rigid designators in
most every formal modal language that has been put forward. For even
those formal modal languages that contain constants generally permit them
to occur in referentially opaque positions--e.g., in de dicto necessary
formulas. Burge's position is thus unusual. Perhaps he differs from
others in thinking that rigid designation is not so much a logical as a
linguistic notion, and therefore should not be exemplified in formal
languages designed to exhibit principles of logic. Or he may think that
a different kind of formal modal language is needed to capture the logic
of reference in modal contexts. Either way, his position calls for
justification. But here our results become pertinent, for they challenge
whether any compelling justification can be given. Our results show that
a reasonable account of rigid designation is possible without abandoning
the usual approach. Why then pursue an unusual approach? What reason can
there be for insisting that rigid designators--in Kripke's sense--occur
only in referentially transparent positions?
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Burge's remark is too brief for us to decide what he had in
mind. Nevertheless, his mention of Frege's "customary reference" does
suggest something. Frege attributes failures of the substitutivity of
identity to loss of customary reference. On Frege's view, then, co-
referring designators that always have customary reference can always be
substituted for one another salva veritate. Hence, Burge's intended point
may only have been that co-referring rigid designators can be substituted
for one another in modal contexts salva veritate. As the reader can
readily verify, in both every PH-language and every K-language, co-
referring designators that are rigid in our sense can be substituted for
one another in any context without disturbing truth-value. In this
respect, unlike in others we have noted, rigid designators behave the
same way in the K-languages as in the PH-languages. The substitutivity
of identity throughout each of these languages is a striking feature of
rigid designators. It is not, however, a feature that distinguishes them,
for semi-rigid designators exhibit it too.54  (We have yet to come upon a
more felicitous basis for defining rigid designation than the "essentialist"
one we used in (2).)
The principle of the substitutivity of identity for PH- and K-
languages is worth stating precisely:
For all singular terms a and AE and all formulas A
and A in a PH- or K-language, if
i. q is a rigid or semi-rigid designator
ii. ,s is a rigid or semi-rigid designator (50)
iii. a =,~ is true
iv. A is like A save for having an occurrence
of 4. where A has an occurrence of a
then AI is true only if A is true.
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Of course, conditions (i) and (ii) can be dropped if the occurrences of (
and p in A and A' are not within the scope of a modal operator.
An important consequence of (50) is that, in Kripke's words,
true identity statements between rigid designators are (weakly) necessar-
ily true. That is, for all singular terms d and A in a PH- or K-language,
if =a ' is true and * and ge are rigid designators, then the de dicto for-
mula rEL, 81 is true. This follows from (50) because the de dicto formula
r~~A= is valid in all of these languages. 55  The same, however, cannot
be said for 'O'. True identity statements between rigid designators
need not be strongly necessarily true, for the de dicto formula rodl=
56is not true unless . is a strongly rigid designator. A correct way of
putting the point in terms of 'O' is that (51) is valid in every PH- and
K-language (where the scope of each definite description is bounded by
the brackets within which it occurs):
{( 3x)O(Vy) (Fy y=x) & (3w)D(Vy)(Gy y-w) &
(1x)(Fx)=(iw) (Gw) O D1(3! )x)(Fx) v (51)(1 w) (Gw)] [(Ix)(Fx)=(iw) (Gw)]
This is another striking feature of rigid designators in the languages we
are considering. Again, however, it is not a feature that distinguishes
them. For if ~=,4 is true and either or both of a and ,e are semi-rigid
instead of rigid, then on our understanding of '8', the de dicto formula
r 57
roL=, is still true.
The last two paragraphs have described features rigid designa-
tors have in the PH- and K-languages. But we need not have confined the
claims to these languages. On our characterization, a rigid designator
is formed with a definite description predicate--i.e., one of the sort
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'(Vy)(Fy = y=O) '--that is special: the object denoted by a rigid designa-
tor could not exist and fail to have the predicate in question be true of
it; and no other object could exist and have the predicate be true of it.
But then the definite description predicates of co-referring rigid desig-
nators must be strictly equivalent. So long as strictly equivalent
predicates can always be substituted for one another in modal contexts
without disturbing truth-value, so too co-referring rigid designators can
always be substituted for one another in modal contexts without disturb-
ing truth value. That true identity statements between rigid designators
are always (weakly) necessarily true then follows.
If the substitutability of co-referring rigid designators was
what Burge had in mind, then our argument against him parallels our
argument against Dummett. That is, our argument against his position is
directed at the claim that rigid designators occur only in referentially
transparent position, and not at the considerations that lie behind this
claim. I agree that co-referring rigid designators can be substituted for
one another in modal contexts salva veritate. Indeed, this is another
feature that can be exploited to motivate the notion of rigidity. As
Quine has amply illustrated, it is easy to show that de dicto modal con-
texts resist the substitutivity of identity. The idea of a special kind
of designator for which the substitutivity of identity in modal contexts
is preserved is then a natural one. As before, however, this way of moti-
vating the notion does not do everything we would like it to do. Since
semi-rigid and rigid designators have the same substitution characteristics,
it too does not quite succeed in picking out rigid designators alone.58
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IX
The substitutivity of identity is not to be confused with
"scope neutrality." The condition co-referring designators must satisfy
to be everywhere substitutable for one another salva veritate is not the
same as the condition designators must satisfy for differences in their
scope never to affect truth-value. Of course, the two conditions do
amount to the same thing for extensional languages, and for virtually all
59intensional languages scope neutrality implies substitutivity.  These
facts alone, however, should not lead anyone to conclude that the two
conditions are equivalent. The main source of such a mistaken conclusion
in the case of modal languages is, I suspect, a tendency to liken rigid
designators to the constants of standard logic. It is natural to con-
ceive of rigid designators as those singular terms in modal languages that
behave in essentially the same way constants behave in standard quantifi-
cational languages. The trouble comes from thinking that the various
special features constants have in standard languages automatically go
hand in hand with one another. The substitutivity of identity and scope
neutrality are two such features. Constants are scope neutral in standard
languages not just in the trivial sense that their scope is syntactically
unmarked, but in the important sense that, regardless of what operator
replaces ' ', all formulas of the forms of both (52) and (53) are valid:
OFc - (3x)(x=c & oFx) (52)
Fc - OC3x)(x=c & Fx) (53)
Our formal results show clearly that substitutivity and scope
neutrality do not amount to the same thing in the PH- and K-families.
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Rigid and semi-rigid designators satisfy the condition for the substitu-
tivity of identity, but only strongly rigid designators satisfy the
condition for scope neutrality. This conclusion need not be confined to
the PH- and K-families. We have already seen that the substitutivity of
identity in modal contexts is a general trait of rigid and semi-rigid
designators. A similar point holds for scope neutrality and strongly
rigid designators. Intuitively, (54) is true, but (55) is false:
The planet Hesperus exists and is necessarily (54)
self-identical.
It is necessarily the case that the planet (55)
Hesperus exists and is self-identical.
On the natural reading of the formal notation, (56) is true, while (57)
is false unless '(Ix)(Hx)' denotes a necessarily existing object:
(3x) [(Vy)(Hy y=x) & Gx=x] (56)
O(3x) (Vy)(Hy = y=x) & x=x] (57)
From intuitive considerations alone, then, we should expect only strongly
rigid designators to be scope neutral. Indeed, on the natural reading,
(58) is true, while (59) is false unless 'c' denotes a necessarily exist-
ing object:
3x)(x=c &0x=x) (58)
S(3x) (x=c & x=x) (59)
Hence, we should not expect even constants to be scope neutral in modal
languages unless we are prepared to require them to denote necessarily
existing objects.
Since scope neutrality and the substitutivity of identity do
not amount to the same thing in modal languages, care is needed in liken-
ing rigid designators to the constants of standard logic. The idea of a
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special kind of designator that behaves in modal languages in essentially
the way constants do in standard languages is undoubtedly natural. But
it is a poor idea nonetheless since it induces confusion with strong
rigidity. For that matter, using standard constants as guides to fashion
any special category in modal languages risks confusion. Given our con-
clusion about (58) and (59), we have reason to doubt that any singular
terms in modal languages have all of the semantic features constants
characteristically have in standard languages. But if this is correct,
the idea of a modal counterpart of standard constants cannot be used with-
out qualifications even to motivate the notion of strongly rigid designa-
60tron.
Several factors have led to confusion in the literature on rigid
designation. Up to now we have concentrated on two of these factors--the
tendency to lose sight of the distinction between weak and strong necessity
and the failure to notice how much rides on the contrast between PH-like
and K-like languages. I suspect, however, that the principal source of
confusion in the literature is a predilection to think of rigid designators
as having all of the semantic features that constants have in standard
logic. As we will see, this predilection has ramifications not just for
rigid designation, but for quantified modal logic generally.
Likening rigid designators to standard constants has prompted
confusion where one would least expect to find it. Consider Quine's
remarks about rigid designators and quantified modal logic in his recent
article, "Intensions Revisited. Noting difficulties with substituting
constants for variables in contexts involving 'a', he recommends that
constants be dropped in favor of special definite descriptions, which "can
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be defined away in essentially Russell's way." He then asks "how singular
terms fare when restored definitionally as descriptions."6 2 Specifically,
he asks what the conditions for languages with modal operators are under
which singular terms qualify first for the substitutivity of identity and
second for instantiation of quantifications. Problems with substitutivity
in such languages are well known from his earlier papers on modal logic.
The problem he calls attention to with instantiation (which he says "is
under the same wraps as the substitutivity of identity"63) is that invalid
inferences like those from (60) to (61) and from (62) to (63) must be
distinguished from the parallel valid ones:
(Vx)lx is a number > (0(5 < x) v 0(5 - x))] (60)
1(5 . number of planets) v 0(5 a number of planets) (61)
(5 < number of planets) & ~0(5 < number of planets) (62)
(9x) 5< x &~0(5 x)] (63)
Quine's answer is that what qualifies a term "for the instantial role
in steps of universal instantiation and existential generalization in
64
modal contexts" is that it be a rigid designator. He then adds that
rigid designators also "lend themselves in pairs to the substitutivity of
simple identity."6 5 Thus, the impression--if not the claim--that he
leaves us with is that in languages with modal operators singular terms
qualify for instantiation and the substitutivity of identity just in
case they are rigid designators.
Before responding to this, I need to comment on the way Quine
characterizes rigid designators. He remarks that "a rigid designator
differs from others in that it picks out its object by essential traits.
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It designates the object in all possible worlds in which it exists."66
But his formal characterization is that of is a rigid designator just in
case r(3x)D(x=-.) is true. d. must have narrow scope in this expression
to avoid having every designator be rigid. Thus his condition is that
'(ix)(Fx)' is a rigid designator if and only if (64) is true:
(3x)o(3w) (Vy)(Fy yw) & w=x] (64)
Since he does not indicate otherwise, I assume that he intends variables
bound from within the scope of a modal operator to be handled as they
usually are--i.e., as they are in the PH- and K-languages. But then (64)
represents not the condition under which '(7x) (Fx)' is a rigid designator,
but that under which it is a strongly rigid designator. Perhaps the
trouble here is that Quine intended 'O' to express a weaker necessity,
as in (65):
(x)ofCruw)(w=x) v (3!w)(Fw)j (65)
(w) (Vy)(Fy y=x) & w=xJl
But (65) too does not represent the condition under which '(ix)(Fx)' is
a rigid designator; rather, it gives the condition under which '(ix)(Fx)'
is either a semi-rigid or a rigid designator. On either plausible
reading, then, Quine's formal characterization fails to pick out what
Kripke has called "rigid designators."
Now consider Quine's remarks about instantiation and the sub-
stitutivity of identity. Universally instantiating as in (61) involves
a shift from de re to de dicto and hence an implied shift in scope. To
put the point more graphically, from (66) we can always infer (67), but
not always (68):
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(3! x)(Fx) & (Vx)( Gx) (66)
(3x) [(Vy)(Fy : y=x) & OGx] (67)
C(3x)(VIy)(Fy - y=x) & Gx] (68)
Similarly, existentially generalizing as in (63) involves an implied
shift in scope, since we can always infer (69) from (70), but not always
from (71):
(3x) ('O Gx) (69)
(.x)(Vy) (Fy E y=x) &1O3Gx] (70)
~3O(.x)[(Vy)(Fy y=x) & Gx3 (71)
The inferences from (67) to (68) and from (71) to (70) are precisely
the ones we found were problematic in both the PH- and K-families unless
'(ix)(Fx)' is a strongly rigid designator. Therefore, as Quine sets up
the instantiation problem for modal languages, a designator qualifies
for the instantial role in universal instantiation and existential
generalization if and only if it is strongly rigid. This is the formal
condition he gives, interpreted as in (64). By contrast, as we have
seen, co-referring designators qualify for the substitutivity of identity
if and only if they are rigid or semi-rigid. This is the formal condi-
tion he gives, interpreted as in (65). But (64) and (65) are by no means
equivalent to one another, and neither represents the condition under
which '()x)(Fx)' is a rigid designator. I can only conclude that Quine
is confused about rigid designation.
What has misled him? The argument of the preceding paragraph
turned on the fact that rigid designators are not scope neutral. Never-
theless, I am not sure whether the main source of difficulty is his
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assuming that rigid designators are scope neutral or his assuming that
they have another feature constants have in standard non-modal languages,
viz. being like "fixed-valued free variables." Viewing constants as
fixed-valued free variables is to turn upside-down--or, perhaps better,
right side up--the familiar idea that free variables are "generalized
names." The difference between free variables and constants in standard
logic is that a free variable takes on different values, while the value
of a constant does not change. So long as the value of a free variable
remains the same, the difference disappears. A constant in standard logic
is accordingly just like a free variable whose value has become fixed.
In particular, in standard nonmodal languages an open formula 'Fx' is
true of the object denoted by 'c' if and only if the corresponding closed
67formula 'Fc' is true. Accordingly, given a specific assignment of
objects to variables, an open formula in these languages is akin to a
closed formula in which suitably denoting constants replace its free
variables. If an open formula is true when certain objects are assigned
to its free variables, then so long as there are constants denoting these
objects, there will be a corresponding true closed formula of the indicated
sort. The special relationship between free variables and standard con-
stants, summarized in the claim that constants are just like fixed-valued
free variables, thus secures a comparable special relationship between
certain open and closed formulas. This latter relationship is, of course,
widely exploited in a variety of formal methods in standard logic.
One virtue of this way of viewing the constants of standard
logic is that it helps in conceptualizing and explaining universal
instantiation and existential generalization. Both of these forms of
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inference, on this view,. are mediated by an intervening step, consisting
of an open formula whose relevant free variable has as its value the
object denoted by the instantial constant. For example, from the truth
of 'Fc', we first infer that 'Fx' is true of the object denoted by 'c';
given that free variables range only over existing objects, we then
infer the truth of '(3x)(Fx)' from the fact that 'Fx' is true for at
least one value of x. The parallel analysis of universal instantiation
is obvious. Given the interpretation of the quantifiers, then, the
instantial role of constants in standard logic can be viewed as a con-
comitant of their being like fixed-valued free variables.
As we saw in the discussion of (66) through (71), rigidity does
not always qualify a designator for the instantial role in universal in-
stantiation and existential generalization. It does not do so even in
the case of the PH- and K-languages in which free variables range only
over existing objects. By the argument of the preceding paragraph, how-
ever, fixed-valued free variables would be instantiable in these latter
languages. Therefore, in the languages we are considering, rigid desig-
nators are not just like fixed-valued free variables. Free variables in
the PH- and K-languages always occur in what Quine calls referential posi-
tion. Consequently, even when the value of a free variable has been fixed,
open formulas in which it occurs never express pure modality de dicto. To
say that "OYr(()': is true when a certain object is the value of the vari-
able is just to say that r ()1 is true of that object. By contrast,
r~oY((1x)(Fx))7 can be read as expressing pure modality de dicto even when
'(lx)(Fx)' is rigid. Thus, as we saw, -Dr((rx)(Fx)) can be true, yet
1DY(r) not be true of the object rigidly designated by '()x)(Fx)'. This
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simple point clearly established our conclusion. In modal languages of
the sort we are considering, fixed-valued free variables would be like
rigid designators in having invariant reference, and co-referring fixed-
valued free variables could be everywhere substituted for one another
salva veritate. Rigid designators, however, provide something that fixed-
valued free variables would not, viz. the power to express purely de dicto
strong necessity and contingency statements, like (68) and (71), in which
the singular terms have invariant reference and qualify for the substitu-
tivity of identity.
,,69At one point Quine says that variables "figure only de re,"
and at another he says that rigid designators enjoy "de re privileges in
,70a de dicto setting." This suggests that he does not think of rigid
designators as being just like fixed-valued free variables, so that his
claim about their instantial role must amount to the claim that they are
scope neutral. Still, he nowhere says that they are scope neutral, and
when illustrating their supposed instantial role, as in (60) through (63),
he simply exchanges the bound variable and singular term. This suggests,
to the contrary, that he does think of rigid designators along the lines
of fixed-valued free variables. But regardless of what has misled Quine,
the important thing to notice here is how two quite different ideas--that
rigid designators are scope neutral and that they are like fixed-valued
free variables--both can lead to the mistaken conclusion that they have
the instantial characteristics of standard constants. At the beginning
of the paper I pointed out that the literature on the scope behavior of
rigid designators divides into two camps, one holding that they are scope
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neutral, and the other, in effect, that they always occur de re. We now
see that both camps may well spring from the same mistaken belief about
the instantial behavior of rigid designators. If the idea that rigid
designators should be instantiable in modal contexts in the way that
constants are in nonmodal ones is given up, perhaps the two camps and
the controversy between them will disappear.
At any rate, the idea that rigid designators are like fixed-
valued free variables is undoubtedly what lies behind both Dummett's
claim that they always have wide scope and Burge's claim that they always
occur in referential position. The upshot of our argument against Dummett
and Burge is that in modal languages like those in the PH- and K-families,
which contain no constants, no singular terms whatever are just like
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fixed-valued free variables. Even strongly rigid designators, which
have the instantial characteristics of standard constants, occur in
referentially opaque de dicto as well as referentially transparent de re
positions, and hence are not exactly like fixed-valued free variables.
We have seen how four features constants characteristically
have in standard logic cease to go hand in hand with one another in modal
logics. In modal languages of the sort we have considered, the conditions
under which singular terms (i) lend themselves to the substitutivity of
identity, (ii) are scope neutral, (iii) qualify for the instantial role in
universal instantiation and existential generalization, and (iv) are like
fixed-valued free variables, though still related, are none entirely
extensionally equivalent. An obvious conclusion to draw is that rigid
designators should not be conceived of as modal counterparts of the
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constants of standard logic. Constants should not even be taken to be
paradigms of rigidity, as Peacocke takes them. The notion of rigidity is
better developed in other ways, employing modal languages that have no
constants.
X
Needless to say, then, I agree with Quine when he suggests that
allowing constants in regimented modal languages only engenders confusion.72
Still, since constants are so widely used, the difficulties we have called
attention to do invite the question, how are constants best introduced in-
to modal languages? In particular, how are they best introduced into the
PH- and K-languages? Evidently constants cannot have all of the features
in these languages that they have in standard nonmodal languages. Which
combinations of these features can they have?
We should specify the features more carefully before trying
to answer these questions. Substitutivity of identity for constants
amounts to all formulas of the form of (72) being valid:
c=d = (Gc Gd) (72)
Scope neutrality requires all formulas of the form of (73) to be valid,
regardless of the operator replacing '0':
(3x) (x=c & 3 Gx) 3 3(3x) (x=c & Gx) (73)
So long as strictly equivalent formulas can be substituted for one another
in all contexts salva veritate, scope neutrality can also be expressed by
the requirement that all formulas of the form of (74) be valid: 7 3
Gc (3x)(x=c & Gx) (74)
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The validity of these last formulas of course represents the "existential
presupposition" of standard constants. The instantial role of constants
in universal instantiation and existential generalization requires all
formulas of the forms of (75) and (76) respectively to be valid:74
(Vx)(Gx) . Gc (75)
Gc : (3x)(Gx) (76)
But this alone does not make constants instantiable in the stricter
sense Quine invokes with (60) through (63). For them to be instantiable
in this sense, all formulas of the form of (75) and (76) must be valid
when the constants in them are construed to have minimal scope.
The requirements for constants to be like fixed-valued free
variables are not so simple to spell out. The general idea is clear: a
formula like 'Gc' is to be construed just as the corresponding open for-
mula 'Gx' is when the object denoted by 'c' is the one assigned to 'x'.
Thus, as remarked earlier, part of what is implicated is that (77) hold
on all interpretations:
For all formulas *(I), ~(') is true of the
object denoted by the constant a. if and only (77)
if 0(4) is true.
Constants are not entirely like fixed-valued free variables, however, un-
less also they can be introduced in effect by fixing the value of a free
variable. Hence, (78) should also hold on all interpretations:
Suppose a is a constant letter that has not yet
been assigned an object. If *(J) is a formula
that is true of at least one object, then . can be (78)
introduced as a constant that denotes an object
of which #(f) is true (without introducing an
inconsistency).
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(77) and (78) together are the conditions that lie behind the use of con-
stants as "witnesses" in Henkin-style completeness proofs for standard
quantificational logic; the constants themselves or equivalence classes
75of them become the objects in the domains of the canonical models.
Hence, those inclined to prefer Henkin-style proofs will want (77) and
(78) to hold. These conditions also lie behind the use of constants in
inferences involving existential instantiation and, though less obviously,
universal generalization. When (77) and (78) hold for a language, they
comprise a comparatively weak sufficient condition for introducing new
constants. In this regard, (78) should be contrasted with, for- example,
(79), which probably comes closer to the condition under which new names
are introduced into natural languages:
Suppose a is a constant letter that has not yet
been assigned an object. If *( ) is a formular-
such that r(!3) (())( is true, then a can be
introduced as a constant that rigidly designates
the object of which 0(f) is true (without
introducing any inconsistency).
One last feature of standard constants should be noted. They
resemble natural language names not just in being syntactivally atomic, but
also in often having ambiguous scope. For example, '&.Gc' can be read as
predicating 'NGs' of the object denoted by 'c' or as the negation of the
closed formula 'Gc'. Of course, so long as constants are scope neutral,
such ambiguities are innocuous.
How then might constants be introduced into the PH- and K-
languages? I see little point in exploring approaches that abandon the
substitutivity of identity. This is not to say that such approaches are
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invariably incoherent. Thomason's Q3 has such constants, and if con-
stants were added to Lewis's counterpart version of quantified modal logic,
78it would have them. As these examples illustrate, however, the natural
way of introducing constants while abandoning the substitutivity of iden-
tity is to treat them as logically akin to abbreviations for definite
descriptions. But treating constants as abbreviations for definite de-
scriptions, without requiring the definite descriptions to satisfy any
special modal constraints, would clearly sacrifice virtually all of the
other features listed in the preceding paragraphs. Since our present
concern is to see how many of these features can be saved, approaches
that abandon the substitutivity of identity seem not worth pursuing.
As suggested earlier, the most straightforward way of intro-
ducing constants into the PH- and K-languages would be as strongly rigid
designators. This way of introducing them would save most of the features
listed, so that they would retain much of the logical character of standard
constants. It would obviously save the substitutivity of identity, scope
neutrality, and their full instantial role in existential generalization.
It would also save their full instantial role in universal instantiation
provided that at least one necessarily existing object is guaranteed in
every domain. It would even save (77), so that in a limited respect
such constants would be like fixed-valued free variables. But they would
not be like fixed-valued free variables in the respect expressed by (78).
Neither (78) nor (79) would hold, since in addition to the requirements
they impose, an object would have to be one whose existence is necessary
before a constant could denote it. This requirement of necessary existence
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is of course why such constants would be scope neutral and instantiable in
Quine's strict sense. Constants in standard quantificational languages
have these features precisely because they are required to denote existing
objects. Simply put, the counterpart of this requirement in the case of
the PH- and K-languages is necessary existence.
The trouble with introducing constants as strongly rigid desig-
nators is that they would be of little use or interest. For example,
they would not suffice as witnesses for Henkin-style completeness proofs
except in the case of the philosophically uninteresting languages that
require every object to exist necessarily. Equally, they would not suffice
for inferences involving existential instantiation and universal general-
ization except in the case of these languages. Moreover, most of the
resemblance between constants and natural language names would be lost.
Indeed, since it is at least disputable whether there are any necessarily
existing objects, there may not even be any strongly rigid designators.
So, if this is the best way of introducing constants into the PH- and K-
languages, they are probably not worth the bother. Strongly rigidly
designating constants would have the virtue of preserving the basic logic
of standard constants. No valid sentence schemata involving constants
would be lost in going from standard to modal languages, and the scope of
constants would still in general be ambiguous without the ambiguity affect-
ing truth-value. Such constants would thus especially be a reminder of the
relationship between the conditions for scope neutrality in standard and
in modal languages. But otherwise they would add nothing.
A second way of introducing constants into the PH- and K-
languages would be as rigid designators. Rigidly designating
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constants would still not suffice for such purposes as Henkin-style com-
pleteness proofs in the case of languages that permit "possible-yet-not-
actual" objects. But they would more closely resemble natural language
names. They would qualify for the substitutivity of identity, and presum-
ably (79) would hold for them, though not (78). Scope neutrality, however,
would be lost, so that many sentences containing such constants would be
nontrivially ambiguous--i.e. open to different readings that need not
match in truth-value. In this respect, rigidly designating constants
would be too much like natural language names. However tolerable such
nontrivial ambiguities may be in natural languages, they are unacceptable
in regimented languages.
The ambiguities in question could be eliminated if the scope of
constants were always marked or if a convention were adopted that would
always yield a univocal sentence. But marking the scope of constants in
an orthographically perspicuous way is easier said than done. Anyone who
is going to try to mark the scope of rigidly designating constants would
undoubtedly be better off adopting Quine's strategy of replacing names
with special Russellian definite descriptions. A major virtue of such
special definite descriptions is that their scope can always be indicated
perspicuously.
The troublesome ambiguities could be eliminated, at the sacri-
fice of some of the resemblance to natural language names, by adopting a
convention covering the scope of constants. The obvious move is for con-
stants always to have maximal or always minimal scope. If constants were
always to have maximal scope, then they would always occur in referential
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position, so that modal sentences containing them would never express
pure modality de dicto. There would still be sentences equivalent to any
de dicto reading--e.g., 'O(3x)(x=c & Gx)' with the convention would be
equivalent to the de dicto reading of 'OGc' in its absence. Also, since
both constants and free variables would always occur in referential posi-
tion, (77) would hold. Such rigidly designating constants would thus be
instantiable in the limited sense that all formulas of the form of (75)
and (76) would be valid. But of course they would not be instantiable in
Quine's sense. This failure reflects a deeper shortcoming. In keeping
with a point Kripke makes, if designating constants were always to have
maximal scope, a formula like 'QGc' would not assert the necessity of the
8O
closed formula 'Gc'. Consequently, strictly equivalent formulas could
not always be substituted for one another salva veritate. For example,
all formulas of the form of (80) would be valid, but not all of the form
of (81):
Gc E (3x)(x=c & Gx) (80)
DGc - a(3x)(x=c & Gx) (81)
This would be a lot to give up for so little in return.
The alternative remaining is that rigidly designating constants
always be taken to have minimal scope. Again no expressive power need be
lost since, for example, '(3x)(x=c & OGx)' with this convention would be
equivalent to the de re reading of 'DGc' in its absence. Unlike the
other convention, this one would not sacrifice the substitutability of
strictly equivalent formulas. In particular, all formulas of the form of
(81) would be valid, thereby providing a limited sort of existential
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generalization. But such constants would not be instantiable either in
Quine's strict sense or in the looser sense exhibited by (75) and (76).
Also, since rGY(f)' could be true of the object denoted by a without
r0 V((L)1 being true, (77) would not hold. As a result, such constants
would not suffice for existential instantiation, universal generalization,
or Henkin-style completeness proofs except in the case of the uninteresting
languages that require all objects to exist necessarily. If rigidly
designating constants are to be added to the PH- and K-languages, always
assigning them minimal scope is probably the best way to do it. But the
only thing gained would be a class of singular terms slightly resembling
natural language names, and even then the logic of these names would be
better captured by Quine's definite descriptions. Rigidly designating
constants would add nothing to the formal logic of the languages. Accord-
ingly, the gain would appear not to offset the attendant risk of confusion.
A third way of introducing constants into the PH- and K-languages
would be as fixed-valued free variables. Much of the resemblance between
constants and natural language names would be lost since, unlike names,
free variables occur only in referential position. But the special re-
lationship between free variables and constants would be saved, so that
(77) and (78) would hold along with the substitutivity of identity. In
the languages whose variables range only over existing--i.e. "actual"--
objects, such constants would be instantiable in the loose sense. General-
ly speaking, however, the logic of these constants would differ markedly
from the familiar standard one. Fixed-valued free variables would clearly
not be scope neutral in the sense of (73). Even in the languages whose
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variables range only over "actual" objects, the left-hand side of (82)
could be true and the right-hand side false unless all objects are re-
quired to exist necessarily:
(3x) (x=c & DGx) M (3x) (x=c & Gx) (82)
Hence, with the exception of the philosophically uninteresting languages
that require every object to exist necessarily, valid sentence schemata
involving constants would be lost in going from standard to our modal
languages. Accordingly, to the extent that preservation of standard logic
is a concern, introducing constants as fixed-valued free variables would
be open to objection.
In fact, such constants would have different nonstandard
logics in our two families. Consider the K-family first, for which this
way of introducing constants has been prevalent in the literature. Since
'Gx' is always either true or false of an object in the K-languages, 'Gc'
would always be either true or false; and since 'Gx' can be true of non-
existing objects, so too 'Gc' could be true, yet '(3x)(x:c)' be false.
Such constants would thus have a familiar logic in the K-family, viz.
free-logic. Hence, not all formulas of the form of (74) would be valid.
In part because of this, substitution of strictly equivalent formulas
would not be undermined when constants were introduced even though the
constants would in effect always have maximal scope. Since they would
lack "existential import," such constants would not be instantiable in
the sense exhibited by (75) and (76). But modified versions of universal
instantiation and existential generalization, as in (83) and (84), would
hold:
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(Vx)(Gx)) I(3x)(x=c) Gc] (83)
Gc [(x)(x=c) (3x)(Gx)] (84)
Such constants could also be used in free-logic versions of existential
instantiation and universal generalization. A further virtue of intro-
ducing constants as fixed-valued free variables in the case of the K-
family is that they would suffice as witnesses in Henkin-style completeness
81
proofs. The constructions for Henkin-style canonical models are com-
paratively straightforward. This is probably why this way of introducing
constants into the K-languages is prevalent in the literature. The fact
that fixing the value of a K-language variable results in a familiar free-
logic constant only makes the move more palatable.
To the best of my knowledge, the logic fixed-valued free vari-
ables would have in the PH-family is not one that has been explored in
the literature. Unfortunately, it would be quite complicated since free
variables occur in two kinds of contexts in the PH-languages--standard
and nonstandard. Occurrences of such constants in nonstandard contexts
would be like occurrences in the K-languages, so that free-logic would
82hold for them. Occurrences in standard contexts, however, would require
a Strawsonian logic. As a result, once such constants were introduced
into the PH-languages, the logic of closed formulas would cease to be
classically two-valued. A closed formula like 'Fc' could be true, false,
or lack a truth-value. The resulting complications are too involved to
pursue here. For example, whether instantiation formulas like (75) and
(76), with 'Gx' standard, would be valid would depend on whether 'valid'
would mean "always true" or "never false."8
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Since the logic of the constants would be both hybrid and not
classically two-valued, it would be dramatically different from standard
logic on two counts, even ignoring modal formulas. The question is whether
the added complications would yield an adequate return. The preferred
return would be simple deductive techniques or Henkin-style completeness
proofs for the PH-family. In deference to those who emphasize Henkin-
style proofs, let us examine this possibility; similar remarks apply to
the possibility of achieving simple deductions via such rules as existential
instantiation and universal generalization. Our condition on introducing
constants, (78), would have to be relaxed, for as it stands it would not
provide the "possible-yet-not-actual" witnesses needed to invalidate the
Barcan formulas. For example, it might be modified to allow an available
constant to be introduced whenever O(A,) or &(31()(r=t,  #( )) is true
of an object. Presumably nothing would then stand in the way of equivalence
classes of such constants being the needed witnesses in canonical models.
But the constructions required for the models remain unclear. At best,
then, it is an open question whether tractable and interesting Henkin-style
completeness proofs would emerge should constants be introduced as fixed-
valued free variables into the PH-languages. If not, and if simple deduc-
tion techniques would also fail to emerge, then the added complications do
not seem worth the bother.
These, in sum, appear to me to be the reasonable choices.
Constants can be introduced as strongly rigid designators, as rigid
designators, or as fixed-valued free variables. If they are introduced
as strongly rigid designators, then the standard logic of constants will
190
be preserved in the sense that the class of valid sentence schemata
involving constants will be a conservative extension of the class for
standard logic. But the range of values of the constants will be too
narrow for them to retain either their resemblance to natural language
names or their special relationship to free variables. If instead they
are introduced as rigid designators, then they will resemble denoting
proper names both in their range of values and in the fact that, unless
a convention is adopted, their scope will often be ambiguous. But their
range of values will still be too narrow to permit such things as Henkin-
style completeness proofs and rules of existential instantiation and
universal generalization; and they will not be instantiable and scope
neutral in the way standard constants are. Finally, if they are intro-
duced as fixed-valued free variables, then the special relationship between
them and free variables will remain. But their scope will not be ambiguous,
so that much of their resemblance to names will be lost; and again some
valid closed formulas of standard logic will cease to be valid. The stan-
dard logic of constants, their resemblance to denoting proper names, and
the relationship between them and free variables--at most one of these can
be retained when adding constants to the PH- and K-languages.
Some may wish to conclude, so much the worse for modal logic.
I think this would be a mistake. The appropriate conclusion, I think, is
that the combination of features found in standard constants is a happy
accident. Standard constants resemble denoting proper names in their
range of values, in their being syntactically atomic, and in their having
ambiguous scope in many contexts. Yet they enter into truth conditions
191
in a manner equivalent to that in which free variables whose values are
fixed enter. And since they are scope neutral, ambiguities in their scope
are no reason for them to give way, for purposes of regimentation, to
syntactically nonatomic terms whose scope can be marked perspicuously.
As standard logic attests, this is a nice combination of features to find.
But the lesson modal logic teaches us is that the possibility of this
combination of features is a special, parochial virtue of standard logic.
Various lines of argument against quantifying into modal con-
texts and hence against quantified modal logic can be detected in the
literature. One line objects to quantified modality on the grounds that
1185it "leads us back into the jungle of Aristotelian essentialism." Nothing
that has been said in this paper has any bearing on this line of argument.
Rather, we have presupposed the desirability of expressing essentialist
claims in a regimented language and have inquired into the logic under-
lying such claims in certain regimented languages. Hence, this is not
the place to respond to this line.
A second line of argument emphasizes the repeated failures to
come up with a quantified modal logic that fully conforms to our pre-
theoretical essentialist intuitions. I sympathize with this line because
it raises the issue whether de re/de dicto distinctions would be captured
better by resorting to separate modal operators than by relying on scope
86distinctions with single modal operators. Here, however, some of our
efforts have a bearing. The PH-languages, though initially fashioned to
account for mistakes about the scope characteristics of rigid designators,
appear not to have any of the counterintuitive features objected to in
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other modal quantificational languages. So perhaps the PH-languages
vitiate this line of argument.
The line of argument that has received the most attention in
the literature questions whether quantifying in is formally coherent.
This line stresses the need for restrictions on the substitutivity of
identity and on the instantiation of quantifiers in modal quantificational
languages. The need for such restrictions is a point well taken. The
issue is whether it is evidence that binding a variable from outside the
scope of a modal operator is in some way incoherent. Here our efforts
have their greatest bearing. As we have seen, the languages in the PH-
and K-families, which of course contain no constants, are in no way formal-
ly incoherent. The class of valid closed formulas in every one of the
languages in these two families is a conservative extension of the class
for standard logic without constants. And differences in the scope of
quantifiers vis-a-vis modal operators account for the differences between
referentially transparent de re and referentially opaque de dicto readings
of informal modal statements. Quine himself concedes as much. So, this
line of argument must ultimately come down to the claim that standard
constants cannot be coherently introduced into the philosophically in-
teresting languages of these families. With this I agree. But this seems
to me just to be evidence that one should be wary of constants when dealing
with modal languages.
The combination of features found in standard constants pre-
supposes an extensional logic and hence should not be expected in the
case of intensional languages. Equally the interpretation given free
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variables in modal languages should not be narrowly parasitic on standard
constants. The specific handling of free variables that fall within the
scope of modal operators appears to be the critical factor in constructing
a modal quantificational language. This is one of the more striking
lessons brought out by the contrast between the PH- and the K-families.
But then it is important that we be no less wary of letting standard con-
stants lead us into a parochial treatment of free variables in modal
languages.
XI
What morals should be drawn from all of this? Our basic tech-
nical result is firm. Under our definition of rigid designation, rigidly
designating Russellian definite descriptions need not be scope neutral.
To be scope neutral in all extensional and modal contexts, a Russellian
definite description must be a strongly rigid designator. One moral I
obviously want to draw involves the direct generalization of this result.
Rigid designators are not invariably scope neutral; but strongly rigid
designators are. Thus, strongly rigid designators, and not rigid desig-
nators, are the modal counterparts of Whitehead's and Russell's designators.
As a consequence, it is a mistake to think of rigid designators as if they
were logically akin to the constants of standard logic. The roots of the
notion of rigid designation lie elsewhere.
Some may question whether this is the appropriate moral to draw
from our basic result. Some, for instance, may prefer to conclude that
rigid designation, as we have defined it, is not the important referential
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notion one might have thought. But surely strongly rigid designation is
too restrictive a notion to be of much importance. Moreover, our rigid
designators do what such designators are primarily supposed to do--i.e.
they provide a way of referring rigidly to specific objects in modal and
counterfactual statements. The notion of rigid designation does not stand
or fall with scope neutrality. Scope considerations are, of course, ex-
tremely important in the case of modal contexts. Nevertheless, too much
can be made of them.
Again, some may prefer to take our basic technical result as
evidence that regimented modal languages should employ Strawsonian rather
than Russellian definite descriptions. On the face of it, Strawsonian
definite descriptions added to the K-languages appear likely to resemble
88Russellian definite descriptions in the PH-languages. So, this sugges-
tion is not entirely uninteresting. But to draw such a moral from our
findings nonetheless seems to me to be a mistake. One obvious drawback to
employing Strawsonian definite descriptions is that a new primitive will
have to be added to quantification theory. What is to be gained in return?
So far as I can see, no expressive power pertinent to the issues we have
discussed would be gained. Existence qualifications of the sort we intro-
duced in representing Kripke's weak necessity in terms of 'a' can provide
the same thing as Strawsonian definite descriptions would in modal contexts.
And such existence qualifications have the virtue of leaving standard
logic intact. It might be different if our basic result indicated a lack
of expressive power in modal languages of the sort we have considered.
But our result does not indicate this.
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I see no reason, then, to think that the direct moral I want to
draw is inappropriate. But there are other morals that I want to draw
too, ones that bear on the general question of how modality de re should
be represented in regimented languages. For example, consider Quine's
view that proper names of natural language are best represented by
special definite descriptions, and not by constants, in regimented
languages. His main reason is to avoid various difficulties arising
89
with names that lack denotation. But such difficulties arise in modal
contexts even with denoting names--e.g. as in 'Nixon could have failed
to exist'. Furthermore, as we have seen in some detail, constants are a
direct source of confusion in regimented modal languages. So, a second
moral I want to draw is that Quine's method of handling proper names
ought to be adopted in the case of regimented modal languages. Several
things are to be gained from doing so. Our definitions of rigid designa-
tion and related notions will then cover all forms of singular terms.
There will be no need for a special logic for the nonstandard constants
that would have to be introduced otherwise. It will be possible to
eliminate significant scope ambiguities in a perspicuous manner. And,
as I trust our efforts testify, no expressive power will be lost in the
process.
Lack of constants is not the only Spartan aspect of the modal
languages we have considered. These languages represent the simplest
extension of standard quantificational syntax to include unary modal
connectives. In effect, the list of unary connectives has just been
extended to include '0' and 'O' along with ''. As a result, scope
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differences are the only means available in them for expressing such
contrasts as that between modality de dicto and de re. Now, we have not
found this Spartan syntax unduly restrictive. To the contrary, it has
proved adequate for exploring and displaying the distinctive logic of
singular terms in modal contexts. Moreover, no logical difficulties
have arisen from quantifying into modal contexts. Indeed, we have
grounds to think that the difficulties often alluded to in this regard
are ones with constants, not ones with quantifiers and free variables.
So a third moral I want to draw is that there is no compelling reason
to turn to a more elaborate syntax for purposes of regimenting de re and
de dicto modality. In particular, there is no compelling reason to
introduce different operators for the two kinds of modality.90 Modal
considerations of the sort we have dealt with do not require radical
departures from standard quantificational syntax.
If we can agree about the resources needed for representing the
logic of singular terms in modal contexts, then the obvious next question
is, which specific regimented framework is best? In the present context
the appropriate version of this question is whether the K-family or the
PH-family offers the more promising approach. The two families have a
number of virtues in common. Both leave standard quantificational logic
(sans constants) intact; and both leave normal modal sentential logic
intact. Also, both families contain philosophically interesting languages--
e.g. languages that permit contingently existing objects to have things
necessarily true of them. The choice between the two will therefore have
to be based on more subtle considerations, be they formal or essentialist.
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The K-family is the one most widely discussed in the philo-
sophic literature. In part this is owing to the influence of Kripke.
But even more it reflects the formal simplicity and elegance of the
logics associated with the K-languages. As Kripke showed, these logics
can be axiomatized in a manner strongly reminiscent of Quine's preferred
axiomatization of quantification theory. This is no small virtue in
the present climate of opinion toward quantified modal logic. Neverthe-
less, from the standpoint of philosophers interested in expressing
essentialist doctrines in a regimented framework, the K-family has serious
shortcomings. The failure to distinguish between normal and recherch'
predicates and the unqualified invalidity of the converse Barcan formulas
in the K-languages that permit contingently existing objects do not conform
well with pre-theoretical intuitions. Worse, as we indicated in Section
III, certain common essentialist claims appear to be incompatible with
the K-languages. For example, one is apparently forced to give up either
the claim that '0 exists' is not essentially true of contingently existing
objects or the claim that some relations, like '(Dis the offspring of)',
are internal to one relatum and external to the other. And finally, the
K-family fails to provide an explanation of why rigid designators have
been widely held to be scope neutral.
The PH-family, on the other hand, does provide such an explana-
tion. But of course it was devised specifically for this purpose. We
needed the converse Barcan formulas to be valid in order for rigid
designators to be scope neutral in a limited, yet reasonable range of
modal contexts. Identity then had to be treated specially to prevent the
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PH-family from being philosophically unacceptable. What is striking
about the PH-family is that, though it was concocted for such a narrow
purpose, it nevertheless appears to provide an adequate framework for
expressing essentialist claims. In particular, it avoids the short-
comings of the K-family. And it does so through two simple moves that
to some extent can be motivated on other grounds. Of all the regimented
modal frameworks that have been proposed in the literature, the PH-family
appears to conform best with pre-theoretical essentialist intuitions. Its
only obvious shortcomings are formal--having two different kinds of
predicates complicates the formal logic. But if the point is to find a
regimented framework for expressing essentialist doctrines, formal con-
siderations ought to weigh less heavily than essentialist ones.
The final moral I want to draw, then,is again in the form of
a proposal: the PH-family should be viewed as offering a more promis-
ing framework than the K-family offers for regimenting de re modality.
___ --
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Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to give an explicit character-
ization of the two families of modal quantificational languages considered
in the text. The characterization is a semantic one, using the mathe-
matical framework of "possible world" model theory. The first section
sets up the framework, and the two remaining sections characterize the
K-family and the PH-family respectively.
The Semantic Framework
By a qml-model structure, we mean a quadruple Q =<co, K, R,J>,
where K is a set, co e K, R is a reflexive binary relation defined on K,
and Z is a function that assigns a set to every member of K. For
heuristic purposes, K is the set of possible worlds, co is the actual
world, R is an accessibility relation, and a(c) is the domain of c--i.e.
the set of objects that would exist were c the actual world. Different
languages in a family are obtained by imposing different further restric-
tions on the accessibility relation and on the domain function. For
example, a language that imposes no further restrictions on R and 0 is
to be contrasted with one that requires R to be an equivalence relation
and Z(c) = (co) for all c E K.
The universe of discourse of a qml-model-structure Q is the set
S= i •(c). Let IT be the set of predicate letters (with numerical super-
scripts indicating the number of places in the predicate). A function o
defined on ITx K is a qml-model on a qml-model-structure Q provided that
0(P", c)S 5 for all c E K and all predicate letters Pn. A qml-model
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is then a couple )= <Q,po>, where Q is a qml-model-structure andp is a
qml-model on it.
We now proceed in a customary way. A function or from the
variables of the language into the universe of discourse A of a qml-model
Mr is an assignment (of values to the variables) on m. Let A be the set
of well-formed formulas of the language. The next step is to define a
function In,r from the set Ax K into fT, F3. This function is called
the valuation induced by the assignment V on the qml-model 7. The
valuation functions will be different for the K-family and the PH-family.
In particular, the valuation functions for the K-family will be total
functions, while those for the PH-family will generally be partial func-
tions.
The difference between the PH-family and the K-family will be
specified below when we specify the requirements on their respective
valuation functions. Once the valuation functions have been characterized,
other semantical categories can be defined in terms of them. For example,
a formula A is said to be satisfied with respect to a world c by an
assignment 1 on a qml-model mjust in case mr,r(A, c) = T. A closed for-
mula B is true on m if and only if it is satisfied with respect to the
actual world by every assignment on r--i.e. if and only if I,n#(B, co) = T
for all assignments Y on Tl. Finally, a closed formula B is logically true
or valid just in case it is true on all qml-models.
The K-Family
A function Im,r from Ax K into {T, F is the K-valuation in-
duced by the assignment 1 on the qml-model fl7 provided that it satisfies
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the following conditions for all A, B&A and c e K:
i. For atomic identity formulas ',l = • , Im,~( =, = , c) = T
iff 1( ,) = T(rr); otherwise, Im,r( , =C , c) = F.
i i. For other atomic formulas rpO... n,1 mrP,..-l , c) = T
iff <>r((,),...., r (i,)> 6 p (Pn, c); otherwise,
m(rp pn".. .,,'I, c, ) = F.
iii. m,t(r'A & B', c) = T iff TI,,t(A,
otherwise, Im,r(rA & B7, c) = F.
iv. Im,F(rA v B c, ) = T iff Im,,(A,
otherwise,[m,r(rA v BE, c) = F.
v. m,r( rA B , c) = T i ff Im,r(A,
otherwise, m,r (rA z B', c) = F.
vi. Inm,t( rA = B , c) = T iff Inm,t(A,
otherwise, Im,r( (rA B', c) = F.
vii. Im,t(r A , c) = T iff Im,t(A, c)
t , c) = F.
viii. Ic,,( rDA, c) = T iff for all c'
otherwise, mm ( rA', c) = F.
c) = T and Im,r(B, c) = T;
c) = T or Im,r(B, c) = T;
c) = F or Im,,r(B, c) = T;
c) = Im,r(B, c);
= F; otherwise,
such that cRc', Imr(A, c') = TUMOM-- -- $ ! ---- ) .--
ix. It,r(rA', c) = T iff there is some c' such that cRc' and
Im,r,(A, c') = T; otherwise, Xm,r (rOA, c) = F.
x. I•,(r(,,))A, c) = T iff for every assignment To' that is
like 'r save perhaps at I, 1 (f))e (c) only if 1m,t'(A, c) = T;
otherwise, In,r (r(YV)A, c) = F.
xi. Im,t.(r()A , c) = T iff there is some assignment r' that is
like V" save perhaps at and for which 1'(f) 4 -(c) and
IpTh'(A, c) = T; otherwise, Im,A (r(3Y)A , c) = F.
The K-languages are those languages whose valuation functions
on qml-models are K-valuations.
The two important things to notice about K-valuations are
first, that an open formula can be satisfied with respect to a world by
an assignment that assigns "nonexisting" objects to its free variables--
i.e., objects that are not in the domain of that world; and second, that
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when a quantificational formula is evaluated with respect to a world,
quantified variables, unlike free variables, range only over the domain
of that world. This contrast between free and quantified variables is
also a feature of the PH-languages.
The PH-Family
A function Ir from A xK into fT, F3 is the PH-valuation in-
duced by the assignment r on the qml-model m provided that it satisfies
the following conditions for all A, BeA and c e K:
i. For atomic identity formulas r,=• , m,r( r,=I , c) = 
iff t(I,) = r(,); otherwise, Z,Ir( rI T , c) = F.
i i. For other atomic formulas rpf l or( rpA ... , c) is
undefined iff r(1,) OZ(c) or...or r(f,,)# (c); otherwise,
,v,~( rp'~ ...~n , c) = T if <#r(r,),..., 7(,)> (P", c), and
rm, r(rP">", - - ' l, c) = F if(rm(,),..., r()n)> gp(Pr, c).
iii. Im,,'("A & B', c) is undefined iff m,,-(A, c) or Im,.r(B, c) is
undefined; Im,X'( rA & B', c) = T iff Irm,.(A, c) = T and
Im,r(B, c) = T; otherwise, I•n,r(A & B', c) = F.
iv. m ,(rA v B', c) is undefined iff Im,r(A, c) or m,,,r(B, c) is
undefined; m, r((A v B, c) = T i ff rm,'r(A, c) = T or
mrT(B, c) = T; otherwise, I,,r(r(A v B, c) = F.
v. Imy(rA = B ), c is undefined iff £m,r(A, c) or Im,r(B, c) is
undefined; Im,r(rA = B', c) = T iff Im,r(A, c) = F or
Im,r(B, c) = T; otherwise, Im,r(rA = B', c) = F.
vi. m,,,r(rA O BE, c) is undefined iff Irm,(A, c) or tm,,,(B, c) is
undefined; otherwise, rm,r( rA C) B, c) = T if I,r(A, c)
In,,r(B, c), and %I, ,(rA B', c) = F if £,,M(A, c) 1 I%,'r (B, c).
vii. Im r(rA', c) is undefined iff Im,r(A, c) is undefined;
Im~,r('A, c) = T iff £m,r(A, c) = F; otherwise,
viii. Im,r(r 'A', c) is undefined iff Zm,r(A, c) is undefined:
m,7('rtA', c) = T iff there is no c' such that cRc' and
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m,Ir(A, c) = F; otherwise, Xm,r(rOA , c) = F.
ix. Tm,r(rOAP , c) is undefined iff Im,r(A, c) is undefined;
Xmf(rOA' , c) = T iff there is some c' such that cRc' and
mw,,(A, c) = T; otherwise, Im,r(rOA', c) = F.
x. Sm,r(r(V)A, c) = T iff either V(c) is empty and no variable
other than occurs freely in A or r(c) is not empty and for
every assignment 1' that is like 1 save perhaps at ,
'(f) 6 d(c) only if Im,r'(A, c) = T;
I1 ,,(r(Vry)A7 , c) = F iff there is some assignment ir' that is
like T' save perhaps at J and for which r'(f)e 5 (c) and
Im,.t(A, c) = F; otherwise,I,,,• (r(Vf)A7 c) is undefined.
xi. Im,(r(35)A" , c) = T iff there is some assignment '" that is
like 'r save perhaps at - and for which -1'($) (c) and
Im,,(A, c) = T; Im•1r(r(3y)A, c) = F iff either a(c) is
empty and no variable other than occurs freely in A or Z(c)
is not empty and for every assignment "' that is like r save
perhaps at , r'(t) e (c) only if Im,r"'(A, c) = F; otherwise,
Im,r(r3P)A', c) is undefined.
Clauses (x) and (xi) include special provisions for worlds with empty
domains. The need is to prevent such a world from validating
'(3x)O(\Vy)FZxy ' and from invalidating '(3x)O(3y)Fxy'.
The PH-family includes all those languages whose valuation func-
tions on qml-models are PH-valuations. But we permit it to include other
related languages as well. The characterization of PH-valuations pre-
supposes that identity is the only special, nonstandard atomic predicate.
As indicated in the text, however, perhaps there are reasons to include
other nonstandard atomic predicates. This can be done by singling them
out syntactically and adding further clauses between (i) and (ii) to
cover them. Languages whose valuation functions on qml-models involve
such extensions of PH-valuations are also considered PH-languages. Of
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course, from a logical standpoint, it would be nice if identity turns out
to be the only well-motivated nonstandard atomic predicate.
The main differences between PH-valuations and K-valuations are
in clauses (ii) and (viii). Clause (ii) introduces satisfaction gaps at
the atomic level, and clause (viii) adjusts the handling of 'O' to
accommodate these gaps. Of course, nothing would be affected if the first
part of clause (viii) in the definition of K-valuations were also,
Im,r(rOA , c) = T iff there is no c' such that cRc'and Im,,(A, c') = F.
Accordingly, the critical difference in the PH-valuations is clause (ii).
The other clauses must then provide for satisfaction gaps, which under
the valuation rules given propagate to nonatomic levels. Only open formulas,
however, can fail to be assigned T or F. PH-valuations never fail to assign
a value to closed formulas. Hence, the term "satisfaction gaps" is appro-
priate.
The treatment of identity in clause (i) is the same as in K-
valuations. This is the most straightforward way of treating identity,
and it simplifies formal matters considerably. As mentioned in the text,
however, one might instead adopt the following treatment:
i'. m,r( = , c) is undefined iff (r(J,) c) and
l(fi) 5 (c); otherwise, 2m,r(r , = s. , c) = T if
t(1 ) = t(r3 ), and Im,(Y r , c) = F if f(,) T(f).
None of the conclusions in the text is affected if (i') is chosen instead
of (i).
The valuation rules given above for the truth-functional con-
nectives are the familiar "weak" three-valued ones. Thus an open formula
that is a truth-functional compound is not assigned a value just in case
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it includes a constituent that is not assigned a value. The weak valua-
tion rules were adopted because they promise to be easier to work with
than other three-valued approaches. But none of the conclusions in the
text turns on this choice. In particular, the points put forward in favor
of the PH-family hold equally well, for example, for the related family
obtained by adopting Kleene's "strong" valuation rules: 91AA  & B BA B AAB rA vB rA B rA_____
T T F T T T T
T F F F T F F
T - F - T
F T T F T T F
F F T F F T T
F - T F - T -
- T - - T T -
- F - F - - -
Any philosophically motivated choice between such alternative valuation
rules would have to be based on essentialist considerations beyond those
emphasized in the text. For example, is 'FO& (3y)(y =0D)' essentially
true of every object that 'Fe' is essentially true of? One good reason
to prefer the weak valuation rules comes from sentences like 'Jimmy Carter
had to be the offspring of Miss Lillian'. (i) expresses this straight-
forwardly with the weak valuation rules, but not with the strong valuation
rules since with them it is false just because Miss Lillian did not have
to exist.
(i) (3x)(('y) (Jy 3 y=x) &D(3w)((V y) (Ly _ y=w) & Ozxw))
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2 Tyler Burge, "Book Review: Meaning, Reference, and Necessity. Simon
Blackburn, ed." The Journal of Philosophy, LXXIV, 4 (April, 1977), p. 244.
3 Christopher Peacocke, "Proper Names, Reference, and Rigid Designa-
tion," Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, ed. Simon Blackburn, (Cambridge:
Cambridge U. Press, 1975), p. lllf. As we discuss later, Peacocke's
notion of a rigid designator is idiosyncratically narrow.
4 Michale A. Slote, Metaphysics and Essence, (New York: New York
University Press, 1975), p. 75.
5 Leonard Linsky, Names and Descriptions, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1977), p. 56ff. (Again, p. 66.)
6 Ibid., p. 59.
7 Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," Identity and Individuation,
ed. M. K. Munitz, (New York: New York University Press, 1971), p. 140.
8 Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica:
to *56, (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1962), p. 184ff.
9 Kripke has expressly sanctioned Quine's move in the context of dis-
cussions of a rigid designation. Cf. "Naming and Necessity," Semantics
of Natural Languages, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), p. 343, fn. 5.
10 '(..**x--.)' is here assumed to include no free variables besides 'x'.
I have not examined the "rigid functors" that would result were this
assumption relaxed.
11 Peacocke, op. cit., p. 114, has intimated that definitions of
rigid designation that employ modal operators do not give necessary
conditions for rigidity since nonmodal languages can contain rigid
designators too. The remarks in the text are meant to counter this
idea.
207
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when the schema is interpreted in accordance with the modal languages
Kripke develops in detail in "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic."
A more accurate, though otherwise less felicitous characterization
would be as follows: a designating definite description is a rigid
designator if and only if it is impossible for (i) the object it desig-
nates to exist and not satisfy the description and (ii) for any other
object to exist and satisfy the description. This point will be dis-
cussed further in footnote 23.
13 Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," p. 146.
14 Kripke is not always consistent about his intuitive test. Some-
times his test seems not to be that rt might not have beenao be
false, but that ra might have been something other than the thing
that in fact is ' be false. (Cf., "Naming and Necessity," p. 270,
where the alternative phrasings occur in consecutive paragraphs; or
see "Identity and Necessity," p. 148.) The two phrasings differ
significantly. Suppose d is a designating definite description,
'(Ix)(Px)'. Then the test based on a' might not have been i' requires
that (i) be false:
(i) G3 x)O~(y) (Py y=x)
By contrast, the test based on La might have been something other
than the thing that in fact iso requires that (ii) be false:
(ii) (3x)0(3w) ((Vy) (Py y=--w) & ^ 0(w=x))
The crucial difference between (i) and (ii) is a difference in the
scope of negation. As can readily be verified, the falsity of (i) is
in keeping with the criterion for rigidity we give in the text, whereas
the falsity of (ii) is not. As Slote has pointed out (op. cit., p. 72ff),
(ii) is false if '(7x)(Px)' is taken to stand for 'the individual that
is Nixon and a politician'. Hence according to the test based on
'L might have been something other than the thing that in fact is a.,
an intuitively nonrigid designator--'the individual that is Nixon and
a politician'--would be rigid. By contrast, (i) is true if '(7x)(Px)'
is taken to stand for this designator. That is, the test based on
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rL might not have been 9' --and hence our criterion--excludes this
intuitively nonrigid designator. These considerations lead me to
conclude that the test Kripke meant to propose, his lapses not with-
standing, is that ar might not have been a be false.
15 Kripke, "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic," reprinted in
Reference and Modality, ed. Leonard Linsky, "London: Oxford U. Press,
1971), p. 66f.
16 Here and elsewhere in the paper I use Quine's notation for predicates.
Cf. W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic, third edition, (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 143ff.
17 This modal language is discussed at length under the title "LPC + SS"
in G. E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell, An Introduction to Modal Logic,
(London: Methuen, 1972), Chapters 8 and 9, pp. 133-169.
18 Kripke, ibid., p. 69.
19 Ibid., p. 68.
20 The languages that require the same objects to exist in every
accessible world are not deviant in the manner described (though,
of course, they are philosophically objectionable on other grounds).
The deviance described is easy to miss. I am indebted to Drew Christie
for first calling my attention to it in regard to the criterion for
rigid designation given earlier.
21 '(ix)(Gx)' will be what Slote calls an "inclusively rigid designator,"
as contrasted with an "exclusively rigid designator" exemplified by
'(Ux)(Px)' in footnote 14 (op. cit., p. 72ff). As I point out in my
"Rigid Designation and Its Variants," where inclusively and exclusively
rigid designators are systematically contrasted with rigid designators,
the example Slote gives of an inclusively rigid designator will not
quite do. I am indebted to Richard Cartwright for the Fregean example
I use in the text.
22 Thus 'x=x' would still be handled differently from the way it is in
the K-languages. The identity predicate would not be just a K-language
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predicate. But '(Vx)((Ox=x)' would continue to be logically true on
the modified definition. By contrast, it would not be logically true
if we required 'y=x' to be false with respect to worlds in which the
object assigned to at least one of its variables does not exist.
23 I use the phrase, "existent objects 'Fx' is true of," for good
reason. We need to be careful about what our criterion for rigidity
requires of a designator '(1x)(Fx)'. One thing it requires, stated in
model-theoretical terms, is that the predicate '(Yy)(Fy 5 y=O)' not be
satisfied with respect to any accessible world by any extraneous
object--i.e. by any object other than the designated object. (When I
speak of an object satisfying "the defi:nite description" or "the definite
description predicate," I am alluding to a predicate of this sort.)
This requirement must not be confused with a related one, viz. that
'F0' not be satisfied with respect to any accessible world by any
extraneous object. In the case of our revised alternative truth
definition, these two requirements are equivalent. This is one of
several features of the languages picked out by this truth definition
that makes them philosophically attractive. But the two requirements
are not equivalent in the case of the truth definition for the K-
languages. Any number of objects that do not exist in a world may
satisfy 'F0' with respect to that world in a K-language, and yet
'(Vy)(Fy- - y=D)' still be satisfied only by the designated object.
K-languages are peculiar in this respect. The requirement our criterion
imposes on 'FO' in their case is that it not be satisfied with respect
to any accessible world by any existent extraneous object. Of course,
our criterion clearly imposes this same requirement in the case of
the languages picked out by our revised alternative truth definition.
There is another potential confusion here. In standard logic (i)
and (ii) are equivalent:
(i) (3x)(Vy)(Fy E y=x)
(ii) (3x)(Fx & (Vy)(Fy a y=x))
One might therefore expect (iii) and (iv) to be equivalent:
(iii) (Ix)a(F(y) (Fy _ y=x)
(iv) (3x)l(Fx & (Vy)(Fy a y-x))
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And indeed they are equivalent in the case of our revised alternative
truth definition. But they are not equivalent in the case of the
truth definition for the K-languages. Specifically, (iv) can be
false while (iii) is true since (iv) additionally requires 'FD' to
be true of the object in question even with respect to accessible
worlds in which this object does not exist. The non-equivalence of
(iii) and (iv) is another peculiarity of most K-languages. Two con-
siderations lie behind our adopting (iii) rather than (iv) in our
criterion for rigidity. First, imposing requirements with respect to
worlds in which the designated object does not exist seems gratuitous
to a referential notion like rigid designation. Second, if a require-
ment of this sort were to be imposed, a more appropriate one would be
for 'Fe' to be uniquely true of the designated object with respect to
every accessible world--i.e. the requirement expressed by (v) in the
K-languages:
(v) (.x)U(Fx & ('y)u(Fy = y=x))
Even though (iii) and (v) are equivalent in the case of our revised
alternative truth definition, I do not find (v) perspicuous as an
expression of our intuitive notion of rigid designation. Whether
these two considerations suffice to justify our choice of (iii) will
not be important here. None of our results pertaining to scope will
turn on this choice.
What then does our criterion for the rigidity of a designator
'()x)(Fx)' require of 'FG'? Stated in language that is free of model-
theoretic talk about possible worlds and that is neutral with respect
to all of the modal languages we are considering, our criterion
requires that
a. the designated object cannot exist unless 'F0' is true of it.
b. no other object can both exist and have 'F0' be true of it.
Neither of these requirements is readily expressed in standard philo-
sophic terms like 'essential' and 'essentially unique'. But this
should not be altogether surprising. We have no reason to expect our
standard philosophic terminology to be neutral with respect to all
of the modal languages we are considering. Undoubtedly, some of these
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languages conform more closely to this terminology than others do.
At this point we should be pleased just to have an informal character-
ization of our criterion that is neutral with respect to all of the
formal languages we are considering.
24 Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," p. 151.
25 The example is Drew Christie's. He has shown that a restricted
form of the distribution axiom schema holds in all PH-languages. Also,
see Jaakko Hintikka, "Modality and Quantification," Models for Modalities,
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), p. 65.
26 Our metalinguistic convention has 'V' as a variable ranging over
variables and 'd.' as a variable ranging over singular terms. '#(I)'
denotes an open formula in which has one or more free occurrences.
'4(o)' denotes the formula that results from substituting oa for in
4(0), and '#(()x)(Fx))' denotes a formula that results from substitut-
ing '(Ix)(Fx)' for Y in 0(4).
*27 According to our convention about the representation of predicates
in the PH-languages, both 'F&' and 'GO' are standard predicates in
(5) and (6). As will be evident, our conclusions about (5) and (6)
will require 'GO' to be standard. But they will not require 'Fe' to
be standard. 'FQ' occurs in (5) and (6) only within a definite
description predicate, '(Vy)(Fy - y=0)'. Whether the predicate
occurring thusly is standard or not makes no difference to the truth-
value of any PH-sentence in which the definite description predicate
occurs. Hence, although we will use definite descriptions formed
with standard predicates--e.g. '(Ux)(Fx)'--when discussing the PH-
languages, our results will always extend to definite descriptions
formed with nonstandard predicates.
28 Some may prefer (7) to (2) as the criterion for rigid designation.
Kripke's comments about 'Sherlock Holmes' in the addenda to "Naming
and Necessity" (ibid., p. 764) are compatible with both of them.
Furthermore, the intuitive considerations that best serve to motivate
the notion of rigid designation do not discriminate between them. (7)
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is, of course, less restrictive. And it has the virtue of allowing
the thesis that proper names are rigid designators to stand without
qualifications for fictional names, assuming Kripke's comments are
correct. Still, I prefer (2). As we will see, (7) is not the only
weakening of (2) that is in accord with the intuitive underpinnings
of the notion of rigidity. Considerations beyond these motivating
ones will be needed to settle on a definition in any case. For me,
one such consideration is the incongruity of expressions like 'the
round square' being rigid designators.
29 Obviously, the distinction between rigidity and semi-rigidity can
be drawn. But I do not see how to motivate it except by expressly
appealing to "essentialist" considerations. Such considerations seem
to me more elusive than the ones usually put forward to motivate a
special class of designators in modal languages. This point will be
explored further in Section VIII.
30 Kripke, "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic," op. cit., p. 67f.
31 Note that this conclusion holds for the PH-languages even when the
occurrences of the designator are restricted to standard contexts.
The distinction between standard and nonstandard predicates is not
significant when '0' replaces 'u' in (4).
32 1 think that the model-theoretical characterization of rBAI below
accomplishes everything needed. Given a formula A, let 0'A be the set
of satisfiable closed formulas Bi such thatr
i. Bi is (3! )( i())), where no atomic predicate occurs more
times in Bi than in A.
ii. There is an open formula "i( ) such that A (•,) (Vft)
(4ý(5t) (Y & '& ( *)I' is valid.
In the K-languages, rBA' is assigned a truth-value with respect to
all worlds. In the PH-languages, it will have satisfaction gaps in
the usual manner. With this proviso, one rule for assigning truth-
values will serve for all of the languages: given an assignment of
objects to variables, rBA • is assigned T with respect to a world
if and only if (i) the members of O'A are mutually satisfiable and
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(ii) A is assigned F with respect to no accessible world in which
all members of 0 A are assigned T. (The first clause, or something
like it, is needed to prevent such formulas as '(ix)(Fx)=(7x)(Gx)'
from being weakly necessarily true when '(3x)(Fx) -ow(3x)(Gx)' is
necessarily true.)
33 It is possible to construct a weaker necessity operator than '8'
that has the desired scope-related characteristics in the K-languages.
Let rB'A be assigned T in a K-language just in case A is assigned F
with respect to no accessible world in which (i) there exist objects
denoted by the designating expressions in A and (ii) the objects
assigned to the free variables in A exist. '"l in the K-languages
mirrors '8' in the PH-languages provided that one ignores nonstandard
contexts. '"' and '0"' can be similarly constructed to mirror 'O'
and '0' in the PH-languages, again excepting nonstandard contexts.
,, , and '0" have the same scope-related characteristics in
the K-languages as '18', '0', and '0' have in standard contexts in the
PH-languages. However, these weakened operators in the K-languages
lack many of the philosophic virtues of the corresponding operators
in the PH-languages. The distinction between standard and nonstandard
contexts is an important feature of the PH-languages. Thus, for
example, we cannot say that 'G0' is essentially true of an object
just in case 'OG@' is true of it unless we concede that the
existence predicate is trivially essentially true of every object.
Thus '"'' is not the philosophic analogue in the K-languages of '0'
in the PH-languages. 'DOG' in the PH-languages seems to capture the
notion of an essential predicate exceptionally well. In passing, we
should also note that 'BGO' in the PH-languages does not give an
acceptable representation of essential predicates unless we concede
that there are no relations that are "internal" to one relatum and
"external" to the other. (These points are discussed in more detail
in Christie and Smith, op. cit.)
34 The requirement is that A be closed and contain no de re occurrences
of modal operators. The latter is needed because the following formula
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is materially equivalent to (II) in every K-language when '(7x)(Fx)'
is a rigid designator:
O(Vy) (y=(,x)(Fx). Q Gy)
(where the definite description is read with minimal scope).
35 A corollary of this result is that, without employing de re
modality, there is no way in the K-languages to refer singularly to
an object with respect to worlds in which it does not exist. This
holds for the PH-languages even without the stricture against de re
modality.
36 A parallel point can be developed about '-' in the PH-languages by
replacing 'W' with '8' and 'Gx' with 'Fx' in (37) and (38).
37 That is, both must be assigned 'T', 'F', or nothing. (Keep in
mind that extensional contexts include ones like '(Vx).......'.)
38 Both Peacocke and Dummett seem to insist on a nonmodal definition
of rigid designation. Not surprisingly, the nonmodal definitions they
offer turn out to be thoroughly incompatible with our definition. I
discuss their definitions briefly later. A more detailed discussion,
particularly of Peacocke's definition, can be found in my "Rigid
Designation and Its Variants."
39 The best defense of this assumption I know of is by Quine (cf. Word
and Object, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), pp. 176-190). Although the
point is sometimes ignored, Quine's method of reparsing names involves
two steps: first, names are replaced by definite descriptions formed
with special predicates and second, the definite descriptions are then
treated in the manner of Russell. The latter is the controversial
step. Without it, the former step is essentially notational. Thus
one could have name-free languages in which definite descriptions are
treated along the lines suggested by Strawson or as they are in some
free-logics (e.g. as in K. Lambert and B. C. van Fraassen, Derivation
and Counterexample, (Encino: Dickenson, 1972), Chapters 7 and 10).
As I hope this paper illustrates, one important advantage of replacing
names by definite descriptions is that it puts one in a position to
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mark scope distinctions that otherwise are difficult to mark and thus
are sources of confusion.
40 Our two families together cover a large fraction of the formal modal
languages in the literature. Still, there are modal languages in the
literature that are not in either family. For example, languages in
which bound variables always range over all of the objects in the
universe of discourse are neither PH- nor K-languages (unless, of
course, they require the same objects to exist in every possible world).
An unattractive feature of such languages is the extent to which their
nonmodal fragments depart from standard quantificational theory.
The PH- and K-families should also be contrasted with the family
of modal languages in which the semantics is just like Kripke's except
F is assigned to an atomic open sentence with respect to every world in
which an object assigned to one of its free variables does not exist.
(Robert Stalnaker has promoted a variant of these languages in his
"Complex Predicates," The Monist, 60, 3, (July, 1977), p. 334ff.)
One unattractive feature of this family, pointed out by Kripke (in
"Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic," fn. 11, p. 66), is that
validity is not always preserved when nonatomic predicates are sub-
stituted for atomic ones in valid formulas. Another unattractive fea-
ture of this family is that '(3x)( ~(3y)(y=x) &Qx=x)' is invariably
false in it, so that it precludes contingently existing objects being
necessarily self-identical. Hence, being essential cannot reasonably
be identified with being necessary de re.
41 Of course, the Barcan formulas are valid in some K-languages. But
these languages are special: in the model theory, they require the
universe of discourse to consist of just the objects that exist in
the actual world. Informally, the Barcan formulas assert that if it
is possible for '(3x)(Gx)' to be true, then there is an actual object
of which 'Gx' can be true. This is a strong claim, reaching well beyond
pre-theoretical intuitions. Still, given our present understanding
of de re modalities, we cannot entirely rule it out. As matters stand,
an ideal formalism for expressing alternative essentialist theories is
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one that leaves the question of the validity of the Barcan formulas
open. One virtue of the K-family (and the PH-family) is that it does
just that. Indeed, it does more since it brings out what is at issue
in the question by systematically contrasting those member languages
in which the Barcan formulas are valid with those in which they are not.
The converse Barcan formulas are also not automatically validated
in the K-family. Their pre-theoretical status is, however, sharply
different from that of the Barcan formulas (cf. Alvin Plantinga, The
Nature of Necessity, (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1974), p. 59). The
Barcan formulas are suspect generally. But the converse Barcan for-
mulas seem correct for most predicates. That is, it seems reasonable
to grant that if there is an actual object of which 'Gx' can be true,
then unless something peculiar is going on with the predicate, it is
possible for '(3x)(Gx)' to be true. The objectionable instances of
the converse Barcan formulas exploit exceptional predicates such as
the nonexistence predicate, ",(3y)(y=0)'--predicates Kripke would call
"recherche." An attractive line to take with the converse Barcan
formulas is to distinguish two kinds of predicates, one for which the
formulas in question are universally valid and another for which they
are not. This is precisely the line taken in the PH-family.
In spite of some counterintuitive features, the K-family has been
dominant in the recent philosophic literature on essentialism. I
suspect this is as much owing to the historical role of Kripke's
formalization as it is to its elegance. Until "Some Considerations on
Modal Logic," efforts to join axioms for standard quantificational logic
with ones for S5 invariably ended up validating the Barcan formulas
(cf. A. N. Prior, "Modality and Quantification in S5," Journal of Sym-
bolic Logic, 21 (1956), pp. 6-62, and Hughes and Cresswell, op. cit.,
Ch. 8-10). This made the enterprise of quantified modal logic suspect.
For it is counterintuitive for a principle making so controversial a
claim to be a logical consequence of independently motivated principles
that seem to make no such controversial claim. Kripke put an end to
this source of suspicion (though not to others) by finding axioms for
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the two logics that when combined do not validate the Barcan formulas.
It is not just that Kripke's formalization of quantified modal logic
leaves standard quantificational logic and normal modal propositional
logic intact. The formal logic underlying the PH-family does this.
The point is that each of Kripke's axioms is an axiom for either
standard quantificational logic or normal modal propositional logic.
Hence, each of his axioms is motivated completely independently of
de re modal considerations. The one restriction he introduces is that
only closed formulas can be theorems, so that open formulas in proofs
must be taken as abbreviations of their universal closures. But even
this restriction can be motivated within standard quantificational
logic (cf. Quine, Mathematical Logic, (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press,
1947), pp. 76-89). Consequently, to object to the K-family, one must
argue that some basic principle of standard quantificational logic or
of normal modal propositional logic requires modification in the context
of quantified modal logic.
It is striking that the one restriction Kripke imposes pertains to
open formulas. This reinforces a point suggested by contrasting the
PH- and K-families, viz. that the treatment of open formulas is the
crucial issue in quantified modal logic.
42 The PH-family has many intuitively attractive features that other
formalizations have been criticized for lacking:
i. It leaves standard quantificational logic intact.
ii. It leaves normal modal propositional logic intact.
iii. It allows contingently existing objects.
iv. The Barcan formulas are not automatically valid in it.
v. It allows predicates to be essentially and necessarily true
of contingently existing objects.
vi. It requires every object to be essentially and necessarily
identical with itself.
vii. It allows being essential to be straightforwardly defined
in terms of de re necessity--viz. by equating the two.
viii. In it, existence is essential only to necessarily existing
objects.
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ix. It allows relations that are internal (essential) to one
of their relata and external (nonessential) to the other--
i.e., relations of the sort that being the off-spring of is
often held to be.
x. It represents the distinction between de re and de dicto
modality via differences in the scope of modal operators
vis-a-vis quantifiers, and not via separate operators for
de re and de dicto modalities.
xi. Validity is preserved when nonatomic predicates are sub-
stituted for atomic ones in its valid schemata (subject to
a syntactically specifiable restriction on substitution).
xii. Instances of '(3x)(DGx) =I 0(3x)(Gx)' are not automatically
valid in it.
xiii. The condition can be specified under which co-referring
designators can be universally substituted for one another
in it salva veritate--viz. that the designators be rigid or
semi-rigid.
xiv. Rigid designators are "scope neutral" in a specifiable
range of its contexts that can appropriately be considered
the "intuitively standard" contexts.
xv. The converse Barcan formulas are valid in it in the case of
normal predicates, but not in the case of a specifiable set
of recherche predicates.
xvi. Normally, a predicate is essentially true of an object in
it if and only if it is necessary that the predicate be
true of the object should the object exist; but this condi-
tion is not sufficient in the case of a specifiable set of
recherche predicates.
xvii. Normally, '*Gx 2 (3y)(Gy))' is not false in it regardless
of the object assigned to 'x'; but instances of the schema
can be false in it in the case of a specifiable set of
recherche predicates.
xviii. Normally, 'Gx a (3y)(Gy)' is not false in it regardless
of the object assigned to 'x'; but instances of the schema
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can be false in it in the case of a specifiable set of
recherche predicates.
xix. It allows the two versions of the Russellian definite
description predicate-- r(0) & (VY)((Y). =0 and
r( =0)--to be interchanged salva veritate
unless C(~) is a recherch predicate.
To the best of my knowledge, every other approach to formalizing de re
and de dicto modalities in the literature lacks at least one of these
features.
Of course, some features in the list carry more intuitive weight
than others. I have tried to list them in what I take to be roughly
the order of their importance. Again, to the best of my knowledge,
every other approach to formalizing de re and de dicto modalities in
the literature lacks at least one of the first ten features. For ex-
ample, Kripke's approach cannot have all of (vii), (viii), and (ix).
For suppose 'Gx'is essentially true of s is equated with 'UGx' is true
of s; then the K-family will bar relations that are internal to one
relatum and external to the other. Suppose instead 'Gx' is essentially
true of s is equated with '0((3y)(y=x)= Gx)' is true of s; then
existence will be essential to contingently existing objects. Need-
less to say, the K-family also lacks (xiv) through (xix). Formally,
the PH-family secures the features the K-family lacks chiefly through
a not unreasonable revision of the distribution axiom: r3 (A = B)
(OA1 OiB)' becomes rC(A B) = (QA = D((3f)(f==,)&...&(3') ('=f%)  & B))',
where I,, .... ,k are the variables occurring free in standard contexts
in A but not in B (cf. Christie and Smith, op. cit.).
Showing that the PH-family has all of the features listed does not
show that it is beyond objection. Perhaps it has some yet to be
noticed feature that conflicts with our informal intuitions. The list
covers only those features that other formalizations have been criticized
for lacking. Still, since the PH-family does have all of these features,
it is not open to any of the usual objections. This fact provides a
good prima facie case that the family fits our intuitions. It also
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provides a good prima facie case against the claim that to get an in-
tuitively reasonable formalization of de re modality, one must resort
to separate de re and de dicto operators (cf., for example, David
Wiggins, "The De Re Must, " Truth and Meaning, ed. Gareth Evans and
John McDowell, (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1976), pp. 285-312).
43 Linsky alludes to the PH-languages (op. cit., p. 134), but the for-
mal semantics he elaborates and defends is that of the K-languages,
supplemented with constants (pp. 130-152).
44 This does not imply that de re modality can be reduced to de dicto
modality in standard contexts in the PH-languages, for rigid designa-
tion is itself an inherently de re modal notion.
45 Under the imposed restrictions, the only such inferences that are
warranted in K-like languages are ones from de dicto to de re possi-
bility and strong necessity.
46 Peacocke, op. cit., p. Ill.
47 Ibid., p. Illf.
48 Some may think that the position I attribute to Dummett, while suit-
ing my purposes, is not entirely faithful to his text. I attribute
the position to him primarily on the basis of the following passage
(op. cit., p. 128):
Kripke's doctrine that proper names are rigid designators
and definite descriptions non-rigid ones thus reduces to the
claim that, within a modal context, the scope of a definite
description should always be taken to exclude the modal
operator, whereas the scope of a proper name should always
be taken to include it. Even if this were so, it would not
demonstrate the non-equivalence of a proper name with a
definite description in any very strong sense: it would
simply show that they behaved differently with respect to
ad hoc conventions employed by us for determining scope. But,
in any case, we have already seen that Kripke's doctrine,
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thus understood, is false on both counts. Kripke himself
gives several examples in which a definite description is
taken as having a scope inclusive of the modal operator;
while we have noted that there are, conversely, cases in
which the scope of a proper name must be taken to exclude
the modal operator, a fact which is implicitly admitted by
Kripke in his comments on the example of the standard metre
rod.
Notice that, even though Kripke's paradigm of a rigid designator is a
definite description, Dummett nonetheless attributes to him the view
that all definite descriptions are nonrigid. In his haste to reject
Kripke's claim that names are rigid, Dummett appears to me not to
have fully grasped what Kripke is getting at. I discuss Dummett's
response to Kripke in more detail in my "Rigid Designation and Its
Variants."
49 Every designator would trivially satisfy Kripke's test if the two
occurrences of d were taken to have the same scope, be it wide or
narrow. Hence, Dummett's view completely undermines this test. It
cannot even be employed to argue that 'the inventor of bifocals' is
nonrigid.
50 In both the PH- and K-languages, all variables that are bound from
outside the scope of modal operators range only over the objects that
exist in the actual world. Nevertheless, 'there are no possible-yet-
not-actual objects' cannot be expressed in any of these languages
unless first a further modal device--e.g., an actuality predicate or
operator--is introduced that in effect permits one to refer to other
possible worlds in contrast to the actual world. 'a', ' ', and '-'
do not enable one to talk exclusively about worlds other than the
actual one.
51 Given Dummett's criticisms of the explanatory use of possible world
model theory (cf. ibid., p. 284f), I would expect him to agree that one
can use modal operators independently of the possible world metaphor.
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52 This way of motivating the notion proved to be especially effective
in my "Rigid Designation and Its Variants," where it is used to defend
the definition of rigid designation given earlier--i.e., (2)--against
some alternatives that have been proposed in the literature.
53 Burge, op. cit., p. 244.
54 This point is easy to see. Substitution of '(Vy)(Gy = y=x)' for
'(Vy)(Fy - y=x)' preserves truth in all modal contexts so long as
'O(Vx) [(Vy)(Fy E y=x) " (Vy)(Gy - y=x)]' is true. But the latter is
clearly true if '(1x)(Fx)' and '(ix)(Gx)' denote the same object with
respect to every accessible world in which it exists, and they denote
no object with respect to any other accessible world.
55 So long as both occurrences of o have narrow scope with respect
to 'a', t =, is valid regardless of whether 4. is even a designator.
- If, however, one or both occurrences of ao has wide scope, then r•L=40
is valid only if d. is a designator. Of course, the substitution of
j6 for an occurrence of a in rBaL=c is comparatively uninteresting un-
less the occurrence of A in question has narrow scope.
56 The purely de dicto formula 'rl==c', which is not true unless a is
a strongly rigid designator, should not be confused with the purely
de re formula b.L =.- , which is true even if .L is only a designator.
57 On our understanding of 'l', if &($) is 'Gx', the de dicto formula
r1 ((0)x)(FX)) is equivalent to '1a[(3!x)(Fx) Z (3x)((Yy)(Fy = y=x) & Gx)'.
One might instead drop the uniqueness requirement from the antecedent,
so that the equivalent formula would read 'O((3x)(Fx)= ...... '. On
this understanding of '',rE =19 would no longer follow from ra =,i'
unless both d and a are rigid designators. Semi-rigidity would no
longer suffice because the de dicto formula rI9c=- would not be true
if o. is a semi-rigid designator. Such an alternative construal of
'8', while no more arbitrary than ours, is nonetheless too arbitrary
to provide a natural way of motivating the notion of rigid, as opposed
to semi-rigid, designation.
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58 Identity statements do yield a characteristic or rigid designators
that semi-rigid designators interestingly lack. If '(ix)(Fx)' and
'(7x)(Gx)' are co-referring rigid designators, then 'O(~dx)(Fx - Gx)'
is true. But it need not be true if either or both of them are semi-
rigid. This difference is nonetheless a flimsy intuitive basis for
motivating rigid, as opposed to semi-rigid, designation. As the text
indicates, the pair of notions together can be naturally motivated
without blatantly invoking essentialist considerations. I suspect,
however, that essentialist considerations like those used in our
definitions of the two notions are indispensable for motivating the
distinction between them.
59 Co-referring, scope neutral designators can be everywhere substituted
for one another salva veritate unless some of their wide scope occur-
rences are not referentially transparent. If there is such an exception,
it is clearly idiosyncratic.
60 The main difference remaining between strongly rigid designators
and standard constants is that the latter can denote, if not any exist-
ing object, at least any object that can be picked out by a definite
description, whereas the former can denote only necessarily existing
objects. Of course, this difference would disappear if every existing
object were to exist necessarily. Perhaps this is why the early
quantified modal logics, like Barcan's, required every object to
exist necessarily; the alternative was a quantified modal logic with
no exact counterparts of standard constants.
61 W. V. Quine, "Intensions Revisited," Midwest Studies in Philosophy,
Volume II: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, ed. Peter A. French,
Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, (Morris: University
of Minnesota, 1977), pp. 5-11.
62 Ibid., p. 7.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 8.
65 Ibid.
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66 Ibid.
67 Cf. Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, vol. 1,
(Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1956), p. 10ff, where this view of
constants is explicit. Church remarks (ibid., no. 27),
It is indeed possible, as we shall see later by particular
examples, to construct languages of so restricted a vocabulary
as to contain no constants, but only variables and forms.
But it would seem that the most natural way to arrive at
the meaning of forms which occur in these languages is by
contemplating languages which are extensions of them and
which do contain constants--or else, what is nearly the
same thing, by allowing a temporary change in the meaning
of the variables ("fixing the values of the variables") so
that they become constants.
68 The phrase "purely de dicto" is crucial to this claim. For suppose
'c' is a fixed-valued free variable that denotes the same object as the
rigid designator '(ix)(Fx)'. Then 't(3x)(x=c & Gx)' would have the
same truth-value as ';(3x)[(Vy)(Fy E y=x) & Gx3'. But 'O(3x)(x=c & Gx)'
would not be purely de dicto since 'c' has referential position in it,
ex hypothesi. Indeed, as Kripke remarks ("Identity and Necessity,"
p. 139, n. 4), 'O(5x)(x=c & Gx)' would not be the necessitation of
'(3x)(x=c & Gx)'.
69 Quine, op. cit., p. 7.
70 Ibid., p. 8.
71 Contrast this with standard nonmodal languages that have no con-
stants, in which denoting definite descriptions are like fixed-valued
free variables.
72 Ibid., p. 6.
73 If all formulas of the form of (74) are valid, then so too are all
formulas of the form of both (i) and (ii):
(i) oGc = (3x)(x=c & )Gx)
(ii) Gc (3x)(x=c & Gx)
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From the latter we conclude, by virtue of the substitutability of
strictly equivalent formulas, that all formulas of the form of (iii)
are valid:
(iii) 'Gc S -(3x)(x=c & Gx)
The validity of all formulas of the form of (73) then follows from (i)
and (iii).
74 For universal instantiation we here assume that domains are never
empty. The adjustment needed to allow for empty domains is obvious.
75 See, for example, the discussion and use of "Henkin constants" in
Jane Bridge, Beginning Model Theory, (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1977),
p. 68ff.
76 See the discussion of existential instantiation and universal
generalization in W. V. 0. Quine, Methods of Logic, second edition,
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1959), pp. 160-167.
77 Richmond H. Thomason, "Some Completeness Results for Modal Predicate
Calculi," in Philosophical Problems in Logic, ed. K. Lambert, (Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 1970), pp. 56-76. See note 9, p. 76, in particular.
78 David K. Lewis, "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,"
The Journal of Philosophy, LXV, 5 (March 7, 1968), pp. 113-126. By the
way, the condition Lewis gives for designators to be scope neutral in
his counterpart version of quantified modal logic (p. 121f) turns out
to be strong rigidity (in the manner of (64)) if the counterpart
relation is taken to be identity.
79 Universal instantiation could be revised to allow for domains in
which there are no necessarily existing objects, in much the way it
can be revised in standard logic to allow for empty domains. This
parallelism, however, should not lead anyone to think that domains
with no necessarily existing objects are the modal analogue of empty
domains. The analogy holds only for constants, and then when the
constants in the modal case are required to be strongly rigid desig-
nators.
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80 Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," p. 139, n. 4.
81 Even though the constants of Q3 are not fixed-valued free variables,
Thomason's completeness proof for Q3 shows that such constants would
suffice as witnesses in the case of the K-languages (op. cit.). Com-
pleteness proofs along the lines of Thomason's, but using such constants
as witnesses, can be found in Hughes Leblanc, Truth-Value Semantics,
(Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1976), chapters 8 and 9.
Not surprisingly, Leblanc emphasizes the free-logic character of these
constants. More recently, Kit Fine has published an elegant Henkin-
style completeness proof using such constants as witnesses; cf. "Model
Theory for Modal Logic, Part I - The De Re/De Dicto Distinction,"
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 7 (1978), pp. 125-156.
82 Some simplification might be gained here were we to decide to handle
'=' in the PH-languages exactly as it is handled in the K-languages.
Up to this point the precise handling of 'x=y' when the objects assigned
to the variables do not exist has not mattered. But if '=' were handled
as in the K-languages, and 'd)=' were the only nonstandard atomic predi-
cate, then the logic of fixed-valued free variables in the PH-languages
would be a little more straightforward.
83 In keeping with the interpretation of '0' in the PH-family, 'valid'
would probably best mean "never false." But questions of proper for-
malization remain to be answered here.
84 One way to make the construction more manageable is to restrict
occurrences of constants to '=' contexts and adopt a K-language treat-
ment of 'V=V'. This would avoid the loss of a classically two-valued
logic for the closed formulas. But however much this might facilitate
the construction needed in Henkin-style completeness proofs, it would
clearly compromise the program of introducing constants as fixed-
valued free variables. Rather, the constants would be a special re-
stricted sort of fixed-valued free variable, namely one confined to
'=' contexts. The subject of completeness proofs for the PH-family
is explored in detail in Christie and Smith, op. cit.
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